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ABSTRACT 
This thesis extends analysis of the policy problem of Egyptian Vocational 
Education and Training (VET) beyond the current supply/demand mismatch 
perspective and into a broader institutional analytic framework.  It critically 
deploys concepts from Whitley‘s institutional framework (1999) and Wood and 
Frynas‘ (2006) Segmented Business Systems (SBS) archetype to the problem, 
complementing them with historical and political dimensions.  These illustrate the 
continuities and discontinuities in key institutional features and relationships 
influencing VET since the military coup in the 1950s and through subsequent 
paradigm shifts.  The institutional analysis illustrates that VET is embedded in a 
set of incoherent institutional arrangements that have constrained systemic 
development. Further, they have not supported development towards Western 
models suggested by international organisations. These have had limited effect.  
 
A key institutional relationship for VET; state-employer-union cooperation, is 
currently being developed by the ILO through its Social Dialogue Project (ILO 
SDP).  This could, if effectively realised, enhance institutional actors‘ participation 
in VET and hence its effectiveness.  This proposition is examined through 
empirical investigation of institutional actors‘ (i) mutual perceptions of state-
employer-union cooperation and contributions to VET; and (ii) their perceptions of 
the ILO SDP and the ways in which it has influenced VET.  These responses are 
verified on an enterprise level through two cases in the tourism sector.  The 
investigation took place in three phases from July 2008 to April 2010 in Egypt, 
Switzerland and the UK, through triangulated data collection: documentation, 60 
interviews, 2 focus groups and observation. 
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The findings have theoretical and practical implications.  On a theoretical level, the 
proposition that Egypt largely corresponds to the SBS archetype is confirmed.  
Suggestions for modifying Whitley‘s institutional framework include (i) a better 
integration of historical and political dimensions; and (ii) the inclusion of 
international organisations as a key institutional influence on state relations with 
social actors in developing countries.  Practical conclusions confirm the ineffective 
levels of state-employer-union cooperation and contributions to VET.  ILO 
attempts to develop these relationships through social dialogue were perceived to 
be largely ineffective by institutional actors.  The ILO SDP has been constrained 
by institutional incoherencies which are difficult to change in the short- to medium 
term.  Some positive experiences of effective state-employer-union cooperation 
and employer-employee interdependence were reported on regional and enterprise 
levels.  These could possibly be expanded on by the ILO SDP as a bottom-up 
approach to enhancing social dialogue.  Finally, the 2011 events could offer new 
institutional opportunities for enhanced representation of social actors in socio-
economic matters which could possibly lead to their effective cooperation in VET 
and its development; an area which could  be pursued  in future research. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis aims to provide an institutional and historically-informed analytic 
framework to the policy problem of VET and its development in Egypt.  VET is a 
wide-encompassing term that combines theory and practice1.  UNESCO and the ILO 
offer an extensive definition of VET as ‗a comprehensive term referring to those 
aspects of educational process involving, in addition to general education, the study 
of technologies and related sciences, and the acquisition of practical skills, attitudes, 
understanding and knowledge relating to occupations in various sectors of economic 
and social life‘ (2002:7).  The development of an effective VET system has become 
increasingly important in recent decades to Egypt and more widely the Middle East 
and North Africa (MENA2) region due to its potentially significant economic and 
social contributions.   
 
The study focuses on the Egyptian case for four main reasons.  First, it is the most 
populous country in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region with a 
population of 83.0 millions3.  Opportunities for business and economic development 
are hindered by low levels of workforce development and training, as illustrated by an 
underdeveloped and fragmented VET system.  An underdeveloped VET system is 
perceived to be a major obstacle to developing business capacities in Egypt.  Second, 
Egypt has one of the highest levels of youth/adult unemployment in MENA (Kabbani 
                                                             
1 There is a debate in the literature on the differences and similarities between Vocational Education and 
Vocational Training (e.g. Gill et al, 2000; Winch, 2000; Clarke and Winch, 2007; Rauner and Maclean, 
2009).  In this study, reference is made to both types of learning and thus the term Vocational Education 
and Training (VET) as defined by the UNESCO/ILO (2002).  This definition stretches VET and related 
challenges beyond the confines of the educational system and allows for more institutional influences to be 
explored. 
2
 See Chapter 2 for a definition of MENA region. 
3 Algeria is the second most populous country with 34.9 millions. 
2 
 
and Kothari, 2005).  Third, Egypt represents one of the top recipients of development 
aid in MENA (Harrigan et al., 2006).  Fourth, the country was nominated as the 
World‟s top reformer in 2007 by the World Bank (El-Mahdi and Marfleet, 2009:2).  
These characteristics explain why Egypt is a particularly interesting case study for 
understanding the reasons behind the ineffectiveness of VET and its development. 
 
There is a wide consensus across national and international bodies on the relative 
ineffectiveness of Egyptian VET despite its increasing significance to economic and 
social development.  For decades, VET development policies have been based on a 
largely neo-liberal perspective to the problem; a mismatch between the supply and 
demand of VET in the labour market.  Accordingly, the Egyptian government with 
the assistance of international organisations has focused on adopting Western VET 
models that have proved to be successful in other countries, such as the attempt to 
adopt the German VET model in Egypt through the Mubarak-Kohl Initiative.  Little 
emphasis however was put on the extent to which the Egyptian institutional 
configuration is capable of supporting these VET models or more generally an 
effective VET system.  In other words, such VET development policies fail to 
effectively address the main institutional challenges that have contributed to the 
ineffectiveness of the system over time.   
 
The study critically deploys concepts from institutional theory in relation to this 
policy problem.  Whitley‘s institutional framework (1999), an archetype of which for 
developing economies is the segmented business systems suggested by Wood and 
Frynas (2006), suggests a number of key institutions, which inter alia, support 
increased levels of human development.  These institutions‘ characteristics vary 
widely across developed and developing economies; nevertheless, the framework is 
still relevant to developing countries, albeit with some exceptions (Wood and Frynas, 
3 
 
2006).  The institutional analysis is supported with two supplementary dimensions: (i) 
a historical investigation of the origins of key institutional influences on VET; and (ii) 
the influence of international organisations through the case of the ILO social 
dialogue project.  These offer deep insights into the origins of institutional 
incoherencies that challenge VET and explore attempts to enhance key institutional 
deficiencies and the degree of its influence on VET.   
 
The study contributes to the understanding of VET in Egypt and its continuing 
ineffectiveness.  It concludes that Egyptian VET is embedded in a historically 
developed set of incoherent institutional arrangements that have prevented the 
development of effective investments in VET.  The ILO‘s attempt to strengthen key 
institutional arrangements and notably state-employer-union relationships, through 
the ILO Social Dialogue Project proved to be relatively ineffective.  Nevertheless, as 
suggested by the Segmented Business Systems approach (Wood and Frynas, 2006) to 
which the Egyptian case largely corresponds, there are some exceptions to this 
general rule.  There are some positive institutional arrangements evident on a sectoral 
level.  Employers in the tourism sector, which is exposed to international markets and 
competition, are willing to cooperate in VET These tendencies are reflected on the 
enterprise level (in tourism) in higher employer-employee interdependence in the 
provision of VET.  On a regional level, these are in the form of enhanced employer-
employer cooperation which could possibly be extended to VET provision.  Also, 
there is an instance where effective VET programme was launched as a result of state-
employer-union cooperation in the small region of Al Marg.   
 
Such a segmented institutional fabric suggests that the development of VET policies 
should follow sectoral and/or regional patterns as opposed to adopting a largely 
ineffective top down approach at the national level.  This would allow strategies to 
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take into account numerous formal and informal aspects and issues that are specific to 
each sector, which is currently not the case with VET policies.  The study also argues 
that the ILO needs to follow a bottom-up approach to enhancing tripartite relations, 
using localised experiences as potential pilots for developing and generalising 
successful embryonic initiatives.  On the theoretical level, the study confirms the 
proposition that the Egyptian institutional environment largely corresponds to the 
segmented business systems archetype (Wood and Frynas, 2006). The thesis also 
makes a contribution to Whitley‘s institutional framework as it argues for a better 
integration of the historical and political dimensions into institutional analysis.  These 
identify patterns of continuities and ruptures in institutional relationships over time in 
ways that foster understanding of institutional incoherencies and influences, all of 
which offer deeper insights into institutional structures.  It also proposes the inclusion 
of state relations with international organisations as a key influence on institutional 
actors in developing countries as these tend to indirectly influence state relations with 
key institutional actors in these contexts. 
 
 
1.1. RESEARCH AIMS, OBJECTIVES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
The overall aim is to provide an institutional analytic framework to the policy 
problem of VET and its development.  This is pursued through a number of 
objectives: 
 Critically deploying Whitley‘s institutional framework to explore 
institutional influences on Egyptian VET.  
 Offering a historical and politically informed analysis of key institutional 
features and relationships influencing VET since the 1950s. 
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 Analysing institutional actors‘ mutual perceptions of the contributions and 
cooperation of state, employers and unions in VET. 
 Exploring ILO attempts to enhance one of the key institutional features 
influencing VET; state-employer-union relations and dialogue, through the 
ILO Social Dialogue Project (ILO SDP). 
 Analysing institutional actors‘ perceptions of ILO SDP influence on state-
employer-union relations and cooperation in VET. 
These objectives are approached through three research questions: 
RQ1: In what ways has the institutional environment influenced VET in Egypt? 
RQ2: What are the mutual perceptions of the key institutional actors of state, 
employer and union inputs and cooperation in VET? 
RQ3: in what ways do institutional actors perceive the ILO SDP to have 
influenced state-employer-union relationships and VET development? 
 
 
1.2. STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY  
 
The first chapter introduces the main arguments, the contributions and the structure of 
the thesis.  Chapter two discusses historic patterns of VET development in developing 
countries.  The discussion is then funnelled down to the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) region, through discussing VET in the region and the challenges it faces 
with a special reference to the Egyptian case.  Finally, the main argument is 
introduced; an institutional approach to the problem of VET offers the prospect of a 
contextual and deep understanding of the problem in a way not offered by the 
neoliberal perspective.   
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The third chapter provides a working definition for institutions after a literature 
review of the main institutionalist approaches.  This is followed with a discussion of 
early contributions and the major works of researchers in the field.  Whitley‘s 
institutional framework is chosen to be critically deployed here to explore the 
influences of the institutional environment on VET.   Chapter four discusses the ways 
in which institutional theory can help understand VET in developed, and more 
importantly for our purposes in this case, developing countries. 
 
Chapter five analyses the institutional context surrounding VET in Egypt with the aim 
of answering the first research question.  The analysis provides propositions which 
are investigated through the second and third research questions.  Chapter six 
discusses the methodological approach to our research design and methods of data 
collection.  The empirical results are analysed in Chapter seven together and findings 
are identified.  Finally, Chapter 8 concludes by identifying our contributions, policy 
recommendations and suggestions for future research developed.   
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2. THE HISTORIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE CURRENT VET POLICY ISSUE 
 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the 1950s, VET was the focus of educational development policies in 
developing countries until the 1980s when the emphasis shifted to basic education.  In 
the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, the situation was coupled with low 
rates of industrialisation and economic growth which across time added to the 
ineffectiveness of VET.  In recent years, national and international organisations 
developed a consensus on the economic potential for VET to growth in the region.  
Nevertheless, the suggested VET development policies have been largely market-
driven.  This chapter argues against the current simple market-oriented approach to 
VET development, and suggests an alternative institutional approach.  
 
 
2.2. VET IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: SHIFTS IN DEVELOPMENT POLICIES   
 
Since the early 1950s, there has been a wide spread „conventional wisdom‟ that VET 
is key to the economic development of newly decolonised Third World countries 
(Foster, 1992:149).  A number of reasons were given to justify this orientation.  First, 
after decolonisation, there was a tendency to replace experienced expatriate workers 
and technicians with nationals and therefore investments in VET to upgrade the skills 
and experiences of workers were necessary.  Second, these countries had high hopes 
for high levels of industrialisation and VET had been considered an important source 
of skilled workforce necessary for such developments (Adams et al., 1992; Middleton 
and Ziderman, 1993).  Third, VET was, and continues to be, regarded as a means of 
reducing unemployment, especially amongst youth, by offering individuals skills for 
employability.  Fourth, governments have always considered VET as a means of 
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enhancing social equality and access to education; especially since it offers a chance 
for the less-academically able individuals.  This could also reduce the rates of 
unemployment (Foster, 1992; Adams et al., 1992; Middleton and Ziderman, 1997; 
Oketch, 2007).   
 
VET in these countries has largely been developed along ‗Western paradigms‟ as 
Watson (1994:85) dubs them, under the guidance of international organisations.  The 
latter offered VET in developing countries massive financial and technical support 
until the 1980s.  For instance, by the 1980s the World Bank‘s investments in VET 
reached US$ 432 million, rising from US$ 43 million in the 1970s, accounting for 
25% of total investments in educational development (Middleton and Ziderman, 
1997).  On the technical front, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) started to 
send technical assistance missions to developing countries, such as Egypt, India and 
Brazil, to help upgrade their VET systems (ILO, 1957). 
 
2.2.1. A shift away from VET  
After two decades of such support, international organisations led by the World Bank 
realised that VET was not meeting its intended objectives. This was in part ascribed 
to the Manpower Requirements Approach (MRA).  The latter focused on calculating 
long-term manpower requirements in economies based on the Leontief-type input-
output model (Bennell and Segerstrom, 1998).  The MRA was criticised by the neo-
liberal school of thought, which had become influential in the World Bank and its 
policies.  Neo-liberals pointed to a number of shortfalls of the MRA approach; (i) in 
many countries future manpower projections were inflated and thus individuals could 
not find jobs after finishing their VET.  This contributed to an increase rather than a 
decrease in unemployment rates; (ii) it ignores the rate of return to investment which 
for VET had been relatively low as compared to basic education in developing 
countries; (iii) the approach was supply-driven and thus did not take into 
consideration different elements of the demand side.   These arguments were first 
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brought up by Philip Foster‘s in his work ‗The Vocational School Fallacy‘ in 1967 
but gained wide acceptance by the end of the 1980s (e.g. Foster, 1987; 
Psacharopoulos, 1991).  Since then, the World Bank‘s policy on educational 
development: (i) has shifted away from the previous massive support for VET; for 
instance in 1996 the share of VET fell sharply to 3% of total expenditure on education 
(Bennell and Segerstrom, 1998); (ii) has became market-oriented dealing with VET 
and its development as a matter of supply and demand mismatches with a special 
focus on the demand side of the problem (King et al., 2007; Oketch, 2007; Middleton 
and Ziderman, 1997).   
 
The neo-liberal approach to VET was part of the new trend of economic liberalisation 
supported by the Bretton Woods organisations based on the ideologies of neo-
classical economics (Wood and Frynas, 2006).  By the 1990s, the IMF and the World 
Bank have initiated Structural Adjustment Programmes in many developing countries 
and have worked with their governments towards economic decentralisation, 
liberalisation, privatisation and maximisation of rates of return and other areas of 
reform in different aspects of the economy.  On the educational front, the neo-liberal 
approach has argued for leaving VET and its development to individuals and private 
employers with the state acting as a facilitator to the process (Canagarajah et al., 
2002; Yamada and Matsuda, 2007).  The World Bank was not interested in VET per 
se as it used to be in the 1960s and 1970s as indicated before and instead it focused on 
basic education and more generally on capacity building of the educational system in 
developing countries (Canagarajah et al., 2002). 
 
2.2.2. Arguments against the new policies 
This new approach to VET has been criticised by several researchers (e.g. Bennell 
and Segerstrom, 1998; Lewis, 2009).  They argue that the failure of VET to realise 
intended targets, such as manpower requirements, unemployment reduction and 
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others, in developing countries should have led the World Bank to reconsider the 
implementation of VET policies rather than disregarding the system as a whole.  They 
further argue that VET and its development cannot be merely based on economic 
policies and strategies; neither can it be left to the private sector with minimum state 
intervention (Watson, 1994; Bennell and Segerstrom, 1998).  The German VET 
system and the idea Bildung (and vocational engagement through Ausbildung) was 
used to support this argument.  As in Germany, so more widely, VET is likely to be 
successful when the system is entrenched in the social fabric as a concept of work and 
continuous personal and professional development rather than simply a set of 
strategies that can help attain certain economic aspirations (Winch, 2006; Lewis, 
2009).  The availability of guidance from the state and the use of a mixture of 
incentives to encourage as well as rules to oblige different actors‘ participation in the 
system are necessary for the development of VET (Thelen, 2004).  These and similar 
arguments did not gain any acceptance until the 1990s. 
 
 2.2.3. A Renewed Interest in VET 
By the new millennium, there were increases in the enrolment rates in basic 
education.  Nevertheless, the quality of education has not improved but in some cases 
as in Egypt for instance has been deteriorating (Radwan, 2002; World Bank, 2007).  
On the VET front, little progress has been achieved on the issue of shortages in 
vocational skills in developing countries; a problem which has become significant in 
a way that hampers business competitiveness and more general economic 
development in some regions, such as MENA (King et al., 2007; OECD, 2010a).  By 
that time, a new strategy was adopted, refocusing development efforts on the 
development of general skills through enhanced levels of VET.  A number of policy 
papers by the World Bank and other international organisations, such as the ILO, 
were undertaken to find out ways of enhancing systems of skill development in 
general (King et al., 2007) with a re-focus on VET in particular regions, such as the 
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Middle East and North Africa (e.g. Heyneman, 1997; Gill et al., 2000; Abrahart, 
2003; ETF and World Bank, 2006; Amer, 2007).     
 
 
2.3. VET IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA (MENA) REGION 
The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region shares two major features; 
language and religion4, and accordingly international organisations and donor 
agencies continue to address the issues of the region collectively despite the 
numerous political, economic and social differences between the MENA countries.  
In the literature, MENA countries are distinguished according to (i) the geographical 
location; (ii) economic performance and per capita GDP; and (iii) type of regime; 
oil/non-oil monarchies and single party regimes (Cammett and Posusney 2010).  
Other distinctions are based on the labour market; labour-importing and labour-
exporting countries (e.g. Agénor et al., 2003).  These distinctions lead to quite similar 
groupings of countries; for instance, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain are both high-income, 
labour-importing oil monarchies in the Gulf whereas Tunisia and Egypt are lower 
middle income, labour-exporting, single-party states in North Africa.  For these 
reasons, the research uses North African countries as a comparator for Egypt 
whenever necessary during the discussion, as these countries have more in common 
with Egypt than the Gulf countries. 
 
As other developing countries, the MENA region witnessed increased investment 
levels and expansion of VET since the 1950s; however, these were not sustained 
beyond the 1970s.  Some researchers analyse this fall in VET investments mainly 
from a cultural perspective.  For instance, Georgie Hyde (1978) uses evidence from 
Egypt to argue that VET has always been perceived as a low prestige option.  More 
                                                             
4 MENA here refers to the Arab Middle East to exclude non-Arab speaking countries in the region; 
Turkey, Iran and Israel (e.g. see Schwarz, 2008: 616).   
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recent studies, such as the work of Abdul Ghafour Al Heeti and Colin Brock (1997) 
argue that although Islam supports vocational and manual work, Arabs have always 
had an inferior image of VET, even prior to the spreading of Islam in the region (Al 
Heeti and Brock, 1997).  Hence any support for VET is likely to be temporary as it is 
not deeply entrenched in Arabs‘ social norms and values (Al Heeti and Brock, 1997).  
This perspective offers some insight, but it would be erroneous to disregard other 
political and economic circumstances that have led to decelerated levels of VET 
investments and effectiveness in the region.  
 
 
2.4 POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGES IN MENA AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON 
VET 
 
Post- World War II, the MENA region has largely followed an interventionist-
redistributive trajectory to development (Yousef, 2004:92; Richards and Waterbury, 
2008).  Thus, the state has become the main instrument for political, economic and 
social development.  An increased wave of import -substitution industrialisation was 
in place as a means of reducing economic dependency (Waterbury, 1998; 
Hinnebusch, 2001).  This was coupled with waves of land reform and nationalisation 
of foreign and privately owned assets as a means of redistributing wealth, especially 
in the newly independent states (Waterbury, 1998; Hinnebusch, 2001).  These statist 
policies have had more adverse effects on the size and power of the private sector in 
the newly independent states, such as Egypt, Syria and Tunis, than in monarchies, 
such as Jordan (Yousef, 2004).  
 
The region witnessed unprecedentedly high levels of social and economic growth 
from the 1950s until the end of the 1970s (Waterbury, 1998; Yousef, 2004).  Between 
1960 and 1985, the growth rate of per capita GDP in MENA was 3.7 percent per year, 
according to the World Bank (2004), as compared to 1.6 percent per annum growth in 
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GDP per capita in Latin America and the Caribbean region and 4.3 percent in East 
Asia (World Bank, 2004).  During this period, there were massive levels of 
industrialisation and investments in physical capital by MENA states.  The public 
sector and state-owned enterprises have widely expanded accordingly, including 
further expansions in the educational system (Richards and Waterbury, 2008).  Oil 
revenues supported the economic boom and in the 1960s MENA had the highest 
economic growth rates in the world at 6.0 percent per worker per year (Yousef, 2004: 
96).  High economic performance was accompanied by advances on the social front, 
such as expansion of the system of education including VET, expansion of health 
services and enhanced employment rates. 
  
These high levels of economic and social performance did not continue through the 
1980s as the region slipped into a debt crisis.  There were signals of this crisis in the 
high growth period of the 1960s and 1970s as the increased levels of economic 
growth were not translated to increased productive capacity but instead were used to 
fuel public sector expansion and ensure its protection from competition.  Thus, 
resources were misallocated to areas that could not sustain economic growth in the 
long run (Véganzonès –Varoudakis and Pissarides, 2007).  Thus, falling oil prices in 
the 1980s had a severe negative influence on MENA economies.  This was 
accompanied with reductions in remittances, increased unemployment as a result of 
reduced demand for migrant labour and increased international competitiveness 
(Shafik, 1998; Al-Sayyid, 2001).  Economic growth had dramatically decelerated as a 
result at an estimated rate of -3.5 per year throughout the 1970s (Yousef, 2004:99).  
All of these circumstances resulted in accumulated levels of debt and many MENA 
states were compelled to resort to international assistance.  By the end of 1980s, many 
MENA countries had resorted to the international financial institutions; mainly the 
IMF and World Bank for economic assistance and programmes of structural 
adjustment were initiated in these countries (Harrigan et al., 2006; Richards and 
Waterbury, 2008).  
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2.4.1 Influences on VET: A period of VET Expansion  
New policies of import substitute industrialisation and nationalisation in the region 
supported a wave of increased investments in VET to replace expatriate labour and 
fuel industrial development (Hyde, 1978).  This trend was common to many newly 
independent countries and supported by international donor organisations at the time 
(Bennell and Segerstrom, 1998; Oketch, 2007).  Nevertheless, the statist approach to 
development in the region extended to VET and educational development more 
generally.  The latter occurred in a highly centralised manner whereby the state 
assumed the main role in VET and its development.  Educational budgets have been 
allocated in terms of previous years‘ budgets with little reflection on the needs of the 
economy and with almost no consultation with other institutional actors (Gill et al., 
2000; World Bank, 2007).   
 
Economic growth in the region in the 1960s and 1970s resulted in expansion of the 
educational system.  For instance, school enrolments almost doubled and the rate of 
illiteracy in the region fell from 60 percent to 40 percent by the 1980s (Yousef, 2004).  
Nevertheless, such expansion emphasised quantity of education over quality.  In other 
words, despite the increased levels of enrolment in education, the quality of MENA 
students and graduates is amongst the lowest in the world (World Bank, 2007).  The 
VET system in particular is argued to have eventually developed to be a functional 
system mainly concerned with the provision of qualifications regardless of their 
quality (ETF and World Bank, 2006).   
 
2.4.2. A shift away from VET  
The initiation of Structural Adjustment Programmes in the region in the 1990s 
marked the beginning of a shift in emphasis away from VET to basic education, 
following the World Bank‘s neoliberal ideology.  It also called for a decentralisation 
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of the system, arguing that investments in VET are best left to individuals and 
enterprises in the private sector.  The World Bank used the experience of High 
Performing Asian Economies (HPAE) as an example to support its new educational 
policies.  The World Bank emphasised HPAE reliance on high investments in primary 
and basic education and their contribution to the high levels of industrialisation and 
economic growth achieved by these countries (World Bank, 1993; World Bank, 
2004).  Less emphasis was put on the fact that they shifted their investments to VET 
early in the industrialisation process (Lewis, 2009).  For instance, in the 1960s South 
Korea focused on export-oriented industrialisation; a policy that did not call for 
highly skilled workers but required a minimum level of education (Ashton and Green, 
1996).  Hence, the state promoted Confucian values that accentuate basic education 
and relied on slogans such as ‗nation building through education‘ and ‗education for 
economic development‘ to promote these values nationwide (Adams and Gottlieb, 
1993: 26 in Ashton et al., 1999).  In the 1970s this strategy was changed as the 
country started a new phase of industrialisation; investments in Heavy Chemicals in 
1973, towards a focus on VET to secure required quantities and qualities of skilled 
and semi-skilled workers (Ashton et al., 1999). By the mid 1980s, the percentage of 
students in the VET path accounted for 40% of all secondary school students in the 
country.  Such a VET trajectory was largely ignored by the World Bank in its 
argument against vocationalisation policies (Bennell and Segerstrom, 1998).  The 
World Bank is also argued to have put little emphasis on the relatively high levels of 
state interventionist policies in HPAEs in VET and its development and more 
generally in the industrialisation process (e.g. Wade, 1990; Amsden; 1994; Kwon, 
1994; Brohman, 1996).     
 
The World Bank‘s new educational emphasis was introduced at a time when the 
scope of VET was already high in some MENA countries.  For instance, in Egypt 
VET represented 60 percent of all secondary school enrolments by the mid-1990s 
(Humphreys and Oxtoby, 1995) and VET public centres expanded from below 100 in 
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the 1950s to 1,222 centres in 1998 (Hyde, 1978:151; Abrahart, 2003:9).  MENA 
governments, like governments of other developing countries, have used VET as a 
means to reduce the burden on general and university education and to reduce social 
exclusion by accommodating failing students (Hyde, 1987; Gill et al., 2000).  The 
expanded VET system was thus left with further limitations on its already scarce 
financial resources due to reductions in the World Bank‘s investments. This resulted 
in further complications that have negatively influenced the effectiveness of VET in 
the region.   
 
2.4.3 A renewed interest in VET 
Over the last decade, there has been a renewed interest in VET in MENA.  The 
economic significance of VET has been widely acknowledged by national and 
international organisations but the high level of VET ineffectiveness in the region 
continue to be a major constraint (e.g. Gill et al., 2000; van Eekelen et al., 2001; 
Billeh, 2002; Handoussa and Tzannatos, 2002; World Bank, 2004; Kabbani and 
Kothari, 2005; Bardak, 2006; ETF and World Bank, 2006; Véganzonès –Varoudakis 
and Pissarides, 2007; World Bank, 2007; ).  The economic significance of VET is 
illustrated below through the Egyptian case, the focus of this study.  This is followed 
by a discussion of the challenges faced by VET in the region, with special reference 
to Egypt.       
 
 
2.5. WHY VET MATTERS: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF VET TO THE EGYPTIAN 
ECONOMY 
 
The Egyptian economy has undergone various changes and developments since the 
beginning of the third Millennium.  On a legislative level, a number of new laws have 
been passed that have enhanced the business climate, such as the Competition law, 
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the Banking statute of 2003, Tax and Customs laws (OECD, 2007; Kalhoefer and 
Salem, 2008).  On the governmental level, new Ministerial bodies have been 
established; the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology in 2003 and 
the Ministry of Investment in 2004.  The latter has become a major player in 
economic development under the new technocratic government that was appointed in 
July 2004 (OECD, 2007).  The new cabinet is a mixture of big businessmen and 
western-educated academics who have promoted an agenda of reform to the Egyptian 
economy through opening to international forces and increasing its global 
competitiveness (Kalhoefer and Salem, 2008).  The business-friendly new 
government conducted reform along the neo-liberal agenda driven by the IMF and the 
World Bank (El-Mahdi, 2009).   
 
The new government‘s policies have boosted economic growth which is showing its 
highest rates since the ERSA programme in the 1990s.  This is not to argue that the 
new government has been entirely successful as evaluation of its performance 
requires an extensive review of progress on political, economic and social levels.  
However, it is important to note that the Egyptian economy has reached an 
unprecedented real GDP growth rate of 7.2 percent in June 20085 as compared to 3.2 
percent in June 2004 (El-Sherif, 2010).     
 
2.5.1. Economic growth and VET effectiveness  
Growth in GDP rates have been mainly led by the private sector whose share in the 
economy has been increasing since 2004.  As shown in Table 2.1, in 2007/08 private 
sector contributions to real GDP growth have reached 68 percent representing 4.9 
percent points of the total GDP growth of 7.2 percent (ENCC, 2009).  The main 
                                                             
5 This rate of real GDP growth has been dropped to 4.5 percent in June 2009 due to the global financial 
crisis (El-Sherif, 2010). 
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drivers of this growth have been investments in construction activities, 
manufacturing, transport and communication and tourism sectors in particular 
(ENCC, 2009).   
Table 2.1:  
Private and Public Sector Contributions to Real GDP Growth in 
2004/2005 to 2007/2008 
  
2004/2005   2005/2006  2006/2007  2007/2008 
Private   Public Private   Public Private   Public Private   Public 
Agriculture, 
Woodlands & 
Hunting 
0.53 0.00 0.53 -0.01 0.57 0.00 0.47 0.00 
Extractions 0.07 0.48 0.28 1.35 0.08 0.26 0.12 0.47 
Manufacturing 
Industries 
0.74 0.11 0.99 0.12 1.23 0.14 1.15 0.14 
Electricity 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.14 0.01 0.1 0.00 0.11 
Water 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.02 
Construction & 
Buildings 
0.19 0.03 0.54 0.07 0.67 0.07 0.58 0.05 
Transportation 
& 
Communication 
0.42 0.07 0.52 0.08 0.62 0.09 0.59 0.21 
Suez Canal 0.00 0.47 0.00 0.31 0.00 0.5 0.00 0.61 
Whole Sale & 
Retail 
0.35 0.02 0.73 0.02 0.92 0.04 0.75 0.03 
Financial 
Intermediaries 
& Supporting 
Services 
0.09 0.15 0.11 0.2 0.15 0.26 0.11 0.19 
Insurance & 
Social Insurance 
0.00 0.1 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.24 
Restaurants & 
Hotels 
0.61 0.01 0.15 0.00 0.44 0.01 0.83 0.01 
Real Estate 
Activities 
0.11 0.01 0.14 0.01 0.15 0.01 0.1 0.00 
Public 
Government 
0.00 0.3 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.32 0.00 0.18 
Education, 
health, social, 
cultural, 
entertainment 
& personal 
services 
0.12 0.00 0.15 0.01 0.21 0.01 0.2 0.01 
Other Services -- -- 0.07 0.00 0.12 0.00 -- -- 
Sub-Total of 
Sectors 
3.24 1.88 4.22 2.78 5.18 1.99 4.91 2.27 
Total Real GDP 
Growth Rate 
5.12 7.00 7.17 7.18 
                                                                           (ENCC, 2010:70) 
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As shown in Figure 2.1, these sectors collectively represent about 50% of national 
employment.  Growth of these sectors can thus contribute to enhancement of 
employment rates.  Unlike some sectors such as agriculture (which relies on unskilled 
and semi-skilled workers) these sectors require high levels of skills; a requirement 
that is largely lacking in the labour force (ETF/World Bank, 2006; World Bank, 2007; 
Amer, 2007; Assaad, 2007; ENCC, 2009; 2010; OECD, 2010).  In that sense, low 
levels of skills and more specifically VET levels can have a doubling effect as they 
pose serious economic challenges on; (i) the potential development of these sectors 
and in turn future GDP growth; (ii) the rate of employment in the economy, which 
has been decreasing recently, especially among the youth.   
 
Figure 2.1: Distribution of employment by sector of economic activity in 2006 
(Adapted from Assaad, 2007) 
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The situation can be briefly illustrated through the case of the tourism sector; one of 
the most crucial industries and a main source of foreign currency.  In 2009, the share 
of tourism from Egypt‘s real GDP was 9 percent (see Figure 2.2).  The sector 
represents 17% of national employment, as shown in Figure 2.1 (ENCC, 2009).  
However, it faces serious challenges imposed by both endogenous and exogenous 
factors.  The latter were shown in the global financial crisis which has negatively 
influenced the sector‘s performance.  In 2004/05, tourism‘s contribution to the 
balance of payments was 6.4 billion US dollars but this dropped to 1.5 billion US 
dollars in the second half of 2008 and it is expected to show further reductions in the 
coming years.   
 
Figure 2.2: Structure of the Egyptian economy – sector share of GDP in 2009 
 (Adapted from El-Sherif, 2010) 
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Endogenous challenges on the macroeconomic level hampering the sector‘s growth 
and international competitiveness more generally include an inefficient VET and 
more generally a poor level of human resources (ENCC, 2009; 2010; OECD, 2010).  
This constrains the growth, development and international competitiveness of the 
tourism sector which faces severe competition from strong international players, such 
as East Asia and Europe (OECD, 2010).  This has been considered to be a priority 
area of reform argued to be necessary for enhancing Egypt‘s business climate and the 
country‘s global competitiveness, as suggested by the OECD6 (OECD, 2010). 
 
2.5.2. Egypt’s Global Competitiveness and levels of VET  
The developments realised since 2004 have to some extent enhanced Egypt‘s business 
climate and the country‘s global competitiveness.  Nevertheless, Egypt‘s ranking on 
the Global Competitiveness Index has deteriorated from the 77th out of 131 in 2007/8 
to 81st out of 134 in 2008/09; in 2010/11 it ranked 81st out of 139.  This situates Egypt 
towards the end of the spectrum as compared to other countries in the MENA region.  
For instance Tunisia ranked 32 out of 139 in 2010/11, Jordan ranked 65, Morocco 
ranked 75, Algeria ranked 86 and Lebanon ranked 92 in the same year.  Egypt enjoys 
some competitive advantages that can enhance its position in comparison to other 
MENA countries, and indeed internationally.  For instance, its relatively large market 
size; a population of 83 million (whereas Tunisia and Jordan are 10.3 and 6.3 million 
respectively), is capable of attracting investments.  Nevertheless, the country fails to 
make the best use of this advantage due to other constraints, such as its ineffective 
bureaucracies, corruption, what is claimed to be an overregulated labour market and 
ineffectively skilled labour (ENCC, 2009; OECD, 2010; Schwab, 2010).  The latter is 
perceived to be the third most constraining factor when doing business in Egypt 
                                                             
6 MENA-OECD Investment Programme on Business Climate Development Strategy (BCDS) 
that suggests 12 dimensions of reform to enhance BCDS. 
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according to the 2010 Arab World Competitiveness report7 (Hanouz and Khatib, 
2010) Hence, VET has been a major factor within Egypt‘s deteriorated 
competitiveness on the GCI (ENCC, 2009; Schwab, 2010).   
 
As shown from this discussion and as argued by the OECD, Egyptian National 
Competitiveness Council, the World Economic Forum, World Bank, European Union 
and other national and international bodies, enhancement of VET  effectiveness  is  
crucial for the development and competitiveness of the Egyptian economy in general 
(ETF/World Bank, 2006; ENCC, 2008; ENCC, 2009; OECD, 2010; Schwab, 2010).  
However, the challenges facing Egyptian and MENA VET have reduced the system‘s 
effectiveness over time. 
 
2.6. CURRENT UNDERSTANDINGS OF VET INEFFECTIVENESS  
 
The ineffectiveness of VET in Egypt and the wider MENA region has been widely 
asserted by national and international organisations (e.g. Heyneman, 1997; Abrahart, 
2003; Agénor et al., 2003; Yousef, 2004; Bardak, 2006; ETF and World Bank, 2006; 
Amer, 2007).  The problem has been widely theorised as one of VET demand and 
supply mismatches8 resulting from several challenges.   
 
MENA governments have assumed a dirigiste role in VET and its development.  
Moreover, responsibility for VET within the state is fragmented across various public 
bodies in a way that hampers rather than supports VET development (Gill et al., 
                                                             
7
 Corruption comes at the top of the list followed by inflation. 
8
 There is a wide body of research on education and jobs mismatches that analyse the problem from 
different perspectives, such as credentialism, overeducation and underemployment (for more 
information on the debate see e.g. Halaby, 1994; Borghans and de Grip, 2000; Livingstone, 2009) 
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2000; ETF and World Bank, 2006; World Bank, 2007).  For instance, the 
performance of the relatively successful MANFORME programme of Mise a Niveau 
de la Formation Professionnelle et de 1' Emploi9 in Tunisia has been strongly 
constrained by the fragmentation of the project across different bodies (Bardak, 2006; 
Aubert and Reiffers, 2003).  Similarly, VET fragmentation has been a challenge to 
the Egyptian Mubarak-Kohl Initiative that aims at developing the German dual 
system of VET in Egypt (Grunwald et al., 2009).  Such fragmentation is more 
problematic given the ineffective bureaucracies of the different bodies involved and 
their resistance to any change, even when positive (Aubert and Reiffers, 2003).   
 
VET‘S relatively high centralisation has led to the marginalisation of employers and 
workers in VET design, delivery and evaluation.  As a result, VET  quality  has 
deteriorated as its content has gradually become outdated and detached from 
technological developments and the ostensible social ‗targets‘ of the VET, i.e. 
workers and employers (Humphreys, and Oxtoby, 1995; Al-Qudsi, 1996).  There 
have been attempts to enhance the involvement of employers in the process of VET 
provision but these are difficult to sustain, as in Jordan where after their initial 
agreement to participate in VET design, employers started to lose interest (ETF and 
World Bank, 2006).  In Egypt, there are attempts to develop curricula in cooperation 
with employers.  Some technical colleges started to rely on teams consisting of an 
employer, a teacher (civil servant) and a professor to develop curricula (AED, 2008).  
Although this is a positive step towards employer involvement it cannot be 
considered representative of employers across the sector (AED, 2008).  Also, there 
are no representatives of labour and the small team increases the chances of capture 
by the interests of any of the parties involved.     
 
                                                             
9 MANFORME has been established with the assistance of the World Bank and the European Union to 
enhance VET quality using a demand-driven approach (Bardak, 2006).  For more details on 
MANFORME and Human Resource Development in Tunisia see Mahmoud Yagoubi in Kamoche, K. 
(2004) Managing Human Resource in Africa, and Routledge: London.     
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Teaching continues to depend on rote learning with little practical training due to the 
scarcity of resources to (i) hire experienced trainers; and (ii) afford laboratories with 
up-to-date and sufficient quantities of tools and machinery (Gill et al., 2000; World 
Bank, 2007).  Finally, the quality of VET has been negatively influenced by the 
poorly qualified individuals resorting to this route (ETF and World Vank, 2006).  
MENA governments, in common with other developing countries‘ governments, have 
relied on VET to absorb academically less qualified individuals (Middleton and 
Ziderman, 1997; Oketch, 2007).  This is a critical challenge to the development of 
VET which cannot be upgraded without the availability of recipients with the 
capacity to learn and reflect on their learning and experiences10 (ETF/World Bank, 
2006). 
 
Policy literature on VET and its development argues that it will be sufficient to 
reform VET along ‗market-driven‘ lines (e.g. Heyneman, 1997; Gill et al., 2000; 
Abrahart, 2003; Bardak, 2006; ETF and World Bank, 2006; Amer, 2007; El-Hamidi, 
2009).  Governments have been advised to work on making VET less centralised and 
more demand-driven in order to better meet the needs of employers.  Whereas the 
system definitely needs to become more flexible, this approach assumes that there is a 
genuine ‗market‟ for VET that is responsive to the forces of ‗supply‟ from formal 
education and ‗demand‟ by employers. In reality, this is not the case.   
 
Measuring supply and demand and accounting for market failures, though 
theoretically possible, is practically difficult and can be misleading especially in 
developing countries (Bennell and Segerstrom, 1998).  Formal qualifications can be 
used as an indication of the supply side of VET; however, this ignores a large amount 
of VET that occurs informally, such as informal apprenticeships, which cannot be 
easily recognised and/or evaluated (Gill at al., 2000).  These are expected to be 
                                                             
10 Learning by reflection is gradually being integrated as an essential part of adult education, see for 
instance Knowles et al., 2005; Laird, 2005. 
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widespread in developing economies; in Egypt the informal sector represents more 
than 50% of the economy (Assaad, 2007).  This also makes it difficult to ascertain the 
actual demand for VET.  The latter in these cases is likely to be limited to the needs 
of a few large private enterprises (Bennell and Segerstrom, 1998) as the private sector 
in such relatively immature markets as MENA tends be relatively new and small in 
size.  Some questions are raised at this point: who represents this demand? Who are 
these employers and to what extent are the different types and sizes of employers are 
represented nationwide? What is the role of workers‘ organisations in formulating this 
demand? And more generally, to what degree do MENA countries have a supportive 
institutional framework for the decentralisation of VET?  These are not fully 
answered by the market-driven approach.   
 
This study suggests approaching the policy problem from a wider institutional 
perspective that considers historically entrenched institutional relationships and 
influences, offering a broader analytic framework for and a more encompassing 
theorisation of the problem than the one currently available. 
 
2.7. CONCLUSION 
The problem of VET ineffectiveness in developing countries, including Egypt, has 
always been influenced by the direction of international organisations‘ educational 
policies; most notably the World Bank.  The problem of VET has been widely 
analysed as one of skill supply and demand mismatches.  However, such an analysis 
largely disregards key institutional structures and actors, historically entrenched in 
individual contexts, which have contributed to VET ineffectiveness over time.  The 
next chapter discusses institutional theory and develops an appropriate framework for 
it. 
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3.  INSTITUTIONAL THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
During the last three decades, institutional theory has increasingly been used to 
examine different models of capitalist economies during the last three decades.  It has 
benefited from the contributions of various schools of thought and has been recently 
extended, though still on a limited scope, to study institutional inefficiencies in 
developing economies.  All of these enriched institutional theory but also increased its 
fragmentation across different theoretical perspectives and frameworks.  This chapter 
aims to justify the choice of: first, the institutional perspective; the regulatory 
approach which is discussed in Part (1).  Second, the choice of Whitley‘s (1999) 
institutional framework, extended to African economies through the Segmented 
Business Systems approach (Wood and Frynas, 2006) to guide the institutional 
analysis of VET in Egypt.  This is discussed in Part (3) and preceded in Part (2) with 
a discussion of the different institutional frameworks that could have been used.  
 
PART (1): INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVES 
 
3.2. WHAT IS AN INSTITUTION?     
There is no consensus on a single definition for institution but instead different 
approaches have been taken to its theorisation (e.g. Schotter, 1981; North, 1990; 
Crawford and Ostrom, 1995; Scott, 1995; Jackson and Deeg, 2006).  This ‗multi-
faceted‟ concept (Scott, 1995:33) includes „cognitive, normative and regulative 
structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social behavior‟ (Scott, 
1995:33).  These are argued to be the ‗three pillars‟ (Scott, 1995:33) emphasised to 
varying degrees in institutional approaches, such as the institutions-as-norms and the 
regulative approaches upon which numerous popular institutional studies were based 
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(e.g. Meyer et al., 1987; DiMaggio and Powell, 1993; Scott, 1995; Hollingsworth and 
Boyer, 1997; Whitley, 1999; Hall and Soskice, 2001; Amable, 2003) .  Another 
approach is the institutions-as-equilibria, (Schotter, 1981; Crawford and Ostrom, 
1995) which is different from, but not mutually exclusive with, the three pillars 
suggested by Scott (1995).   
 
3.2.1. Institutions-as-equilibria 
The institutions-as-equilibria approach analyses any social interaction in terms of the 
behaviour of parties directly involved.   The equilibrium behaviour which is the 
essence of this approach holds that ‗rational individuals, interacting with other 
rational individuals, continue to change their planned responses to the actions of 
others until no improvement can be obtained in their expected outcomes from 
independent action‟  (Crawford and Ostrom, 1995:582).  According to this approach, 
institutions are considered to be ‗self-sustaining system(s) of shared beliefs about a 
salient way in which the game is repeatedly played‟ (Aoki, 2001:10).   
 
A major element of this approach is the shared set of expectations and preferences of 
the individuals involved in the social interaction as this is the main driver for reaching 
a state of equilibrium.  However, the process through which the parties arrive at 
equilibrium, which may involve a set of more influential institutions and/or actors, is 
not explored through this approach (Crawford and Ostrom, 1995; Aoki, 2001).  This 
is a major drawback that would lead to incomplete analysis of a certain situation by 
ignoring cross-party interactions and other external influences (Page and Bednar, 
2006).  Hence, this approach to institutional analysis is disregarded as our aim is to 
obtain a deep understanding of inter-institutional relationships and influences  
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3.2.2. Institutions-as-norms 
In this approach, the foundations of institutions are argued to rest on the set of norms 
and values shared by individuals as these are likely to guide social actions and 
interactions.  It is also based on some cognitive concepts which define institutions in 
connection with their external environment as perceived by social actors (Scott, 
1995).  D‘Andrade argues that „(i) n the cognitive paradigm, what a creature does is, 
in large part, a function of the creature‟s internal representation of its environment‟ 
(1994:88).  In other words, this approach bases institutional analysis on cultural 
symbols and meanings, including social norms and values.  In that sense, institutions 
are defined as ‗cultural rules giving collective meaning and value to particular 
entities and activities, integrating them into the larger schemes‟ as suggested by 
Meyer and colleagues (1987:13).   
 
One of the popular schools of thought rooted in this institutional approach is New 
Institutionalism (e.g. DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott and Meyer, 1994).  
Advocates of this school argue for the influence of societal and cultural values and 
expectations on the ways in which organisations and institutions act and interact in 
the economy (Tempel and Walgenbach, 2007).  These are reinforced over time 
through a process of isomorphism, a ―constraining process that forces one unit in a 
population to resemble other units that face the same set of environmental 
conditions‖ (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983:149).  This is particularly evident in social-
constructivist neoinstitutionalism which is one of three type of neoinstitutionalism 
suggested by DiMaggio (1998).  The other two types,viz. rational-action and 
mediated-conflict neoinstitutionalism, place more emphasis on economic and political 
norms, respectively, than on social ones (Nielsen, 2001).    
 
29 
 
Normative and cognitive structures offer useful insights into the nature of social 
interactions based on cultural norms and values as depicted in the work of New 
Institutionalists.  Nevertheless, the institutions-as-norms approach cannot be 
undertaken in this study as it does not consider other factors and regulative structures 
that would influence the institutional analysis of VET in Egypt.   
 
3.2.3. The Regulative Approach  
The regulative approach considers institutions to be a set of rules that constrain and 
direct the behaviour and actions of individuals.  Such Mode(s) of Regulation, as 
referred to by the French regulationist school enforce social relations and interactions 
in ways that sustain and develop the regime of capital accumulation (Boyer and 
Saillard, 2002; McLeod, 2004; Zuindeau, 2007).  This last phrase refers to a ‗set of 
regularities that ensure the general and relatively coherent progress of capital 
accumulation, that is, which allow the resolution or postponement of the distortions 
and disequilibria to which the process continually gives rise‘ (Boyer, 1986: 35)11.  
This relationship is influenced by the wage-labour nexus, monetary regime, state, 
international regime (Boyer and Saillard, 2002; Zuindeau, 2007).   
 
Thus, the regulative approach considers institutions to be „the rules of the game in a 
society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human 
interaction‟ (North, 1990:3).  These rules can be either formal such as legislations or 
informal such as norms to govern how players act in the game. In that sense, there is a 
distinction between institutions and organisations.  The former define the means of 
playing the game which are historically developed and are subject to change (North, 
2005; Zweynert, 2009).  The latter represent the actors or players who are responsible 
for attaining a certain goal by following the set rules (North, 1990).  Thus, for 
                                                             
11 The language used reveals their origins in Marxism (Nadel, 2002). 
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instance, the state is considered to be an institution whose actors/organisations 
include Ministries and city councils.  The regulative approach relies on ‗force, fear 
and expedience‟ (Scott, 1995:36) to enhance the enforcement of rules which can be 
challenged by corruption or conflict of interest.  Enforcement levels explain the 
discrepancies between the effectiveness of economic activities across different 
contexts that share the same rules of the game (North, 1990; Crawford and Ostrom, 
1995). 
3.2.4. Institutional Perspective to the study  
Of the three approaches, the regulative approach offers the most suitable perspective 
on institutions.  Unlike the institution-as-equillibria, the regulative approach 
recognises external influences or third party enforcement mechanism.  It also offers a 
broad perspective on institutions that does not solely emphasise cultural aspects, but 
also considers formal rules and structures.  This recognition of the influence of 
various formal and informal institutions on VET is expected to enrich our analysis.  
 
Analysis of the policy problem of Egyptian VET could have been approached from a 
culturalist perspective but an institutional approach was selected for a number of 
reasons.  Fist, cultural perspectives are best suited to inter-country comparisons.  
Within a single country to offer meaningful insights the analysis would need to be 
extended to sub-cultural comparisons, which does not meet our purposes.  Second, 
the cultural perspective ignores political and economic factors whereas 
institutionalists acknowledge the role and influence of culture.  For instance, Whitley 
does not ignore cultural factors as he takes the role of informal institutions into 
account.  Nevertheless, unlike cultural theorists, such as Hofstede, Whitley focuses on 
dimensions relevant and important to our purposes such as trust and authority 
relations.  Third, Whitley suggests a number of defining key institutional features 
which allow cultural dimensions to be applied to different contexts within and across 
regions unlike Hofstede who addresses the Arab world and other regions collectively. 
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The second part of this chapter starts with a discussion of the main contributions to 
institutional theory.  Different contributions rest on the idea of the unavailability of a 
single recipe to economic success (e.g. Whitley, 1999; Aoki, 2001; Hall and Soskice, 
2001; Amable, 2003) proved through the analysis of various institutional domains 
and structures. 
   
PART (2): MAJOR APPROACHES TO INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 
  
3.3. EARLY CONTRIBUTIONS TO INSTITUTIONAL THEORY 
Institutional theory was largely influenced by the modernisation approach best 
captured by Shonfield‘s work ―Modern Capitalism‖ in 1965.  This approach was 
primarily concerned with means of modernising economies in the post-war era to 
increase rates of economic growth through the identification of strategic actors with 
major influences on economic activities (Shonfield, 1965).  This contributed to a 
general convergence towards a political-economic approach to the study of 
institutional roles (Jackson and Deeg, 2006) which has gained popularity in the last 
decade (e.g. Thelen, 2004; Amable, 2003).  
 
During the 1970s, industrial relations were put at the centre of institutional analysis.  
This was part of the neo-corporatist approach that emerged to study the capacity of 
developed nations to respond to economic challenges at that time. Neo-corporatism 
was primarily concerned with the capacity of states to collectively negotiate with 
trade unions and employers on socio-economic policies argued to have an influence 
on problems of, mainly, inflation and unemployment (Jackson and Deeg, 2006; Hall 
and Soskice, 2001).  Later, in the 1980s, the role of the monetary system in analysing 
capitalism was emphasised as a result of the contributions of Scharpf (1988).  Hence, 
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by the end of the 1980s, these influences of these institutions were emphasised in 
most studies.  
 
In the 1980s, the macro-focus of institutional studies, then prevalent was extended 
and interlinked with micro-level analysis through the contributions of the French 
regulation school and, most notably, the influential work of Robert Boyer in 1988.  
Boyer studied the institutional diversity of wage-labour relations in different firms. 
He focused on work organisation, workers‘ mobility, skill formation and 
stratification, wage formation (Boyer, 1988) and linked these to macro-level 
institutions within and across capitalist economies, focusing on a central relationship; 
state relations with employers and unions.  Nevertheless, he ignored other institutions, 
including for example the societal effect approach. 
 
The idea of the availability of a single ideal type of capitalism was challenged later in 
the work of Michael Porter and Michel Albert.  They argued for the existence of 
distinct competitive advantages embedded in the historical development of national 
institutional capacities, such as production skills and technologies, in ‗The 
Competitive Advantage of Nations‘ (Porter, 1990).  Albert introduced a distinction 
between Rhineland and Anglo-Saxon capitalism in ‗Capitalism v. Capitalism‟ in 
1993.  Albert‘s work built on the work of Alfred Chandler (1978, 1990) who 
questioned the differences between capitalist economies and suggested important 
similarities and differences between the United States and other nations in terms of 
the rise of corporations and their hierarchies.  This body of research diverted 
emphasis to the conceptualisation of institutional circumstances leading to economic 
efficiencies in various capitalist economies.   
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3.4. FRAMEWORKS FOR INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 
Jackson and Deeg (2006) suggest different institutional frameworks to explain 
economic performance and diversity relying on different sets of institutional 
mechanisms.  These authors, however, have been limited to a number of commonly 
used domains as in Table 3.1.  Our discussion here is focused on a limited number of 
institutional frameworks (Table 3.2) that (1) have been extended and applied in 
developing countries; and/or (2) could be considered for application in Egypt.  These 
are then matched against institutional frameworks based on the study of developing 
economies in section 3.6.  Finally, the institutional framework of this study is selected 
(section 3.6.1) and discussed in Part 3.  
Table 3.1: Examples of commonly used institutional domains 
Institutional 
Domain 
Representative Typology Selected examples of 
performance effects 
Financial systems Bank-/stock market-based Investment patterns; 
corporate governance 
Corporate 
governance 
Insider/outsider or 
shareholder/stakeholder 
Firm strategy; income 
distribution; skills; 
investment; innovation 
Inter-firm relations Conflictarian/pluralist/corporatist Internal vs. External 
labour market 
flexibility; wage 
levels; unemployment 
Skill creation State/associations/market/firms Income distribution; 
work organization; 
innovation; industrial 
relations; firm strategy 
Work organisation Fordism/flexible 
specialisation/diversified quality 
production 
Business strategy; 
industrial relations 
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Welfare states Liberal/conservative/social 
democratic 
Labour market 
participation; patterns 
of savings and 
investment; 
organisation of labour 
unions 
Innovation Radical/incremental Work organisation; 
business strategy; 
employment 
(Jackson and Deeg, 2006) 
 
3.4.1. Societal Effect Approach 
The French regulation school paved the way for one of the most recent and influential 
perspectives to the study of institutions and capitalist diversity; the societal effect or 
society-centred approach (Kang, 2006; Jackson and Deeg, 2006).  This school of 
thought adds more institutions to the analysis of capitalist economies, including skill 
formation, innovation and industry structure, and considers a sociological approach 
that pays attention to the behaviour of firms and studies actors‘ actions and 
interactions.   
 
A popular contribution to this school of thought is Hollingsworth and Boyer‘s (1997) 
Social Systems of Production (SSP) concept.  Those authors argue that institutions 
integrate in a particular social configuration which supports a dominant system of 
production.  Capitalist economies then tend to develop competitive advantages in 
industrial sectors that best suit the dominant Social SSP within the economy 
(Rousseau, 1985; Hollingsworth and Boyer, 1997).  The study suggests two types of 
SSP; flexible production, such as that in Germany, and mass production systems, such 
as in the United States.  Each system exhibits a set of institutional relationships.  For 
example, flexible production systems tend to have well-trained and highly flexible 
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workforces with relatively high levels of job security.  The system is supported by 
strong state-employer-union cooperation and a financial system based on long-
termism.  All of these have positive influences on VET and are relevant to our 
analysis (Lane, 2002; Hollingsworth and Boyer, 1997).   
 
More recently, another important contribution was made by Bruno Amable (2003).  
Amable‘s study is significant in that it used quantitative evidence in its institutional 
analysis.  Amable used data from 21 OECD countries to study five main institutional 
elements and their interactions; product markets, labour markets, financial systems, 
social protection and education system (2003).  He uses a variety of sophisticated 
measures to assess each of these elements and discusses various institutional 
complementarities (Crouch et al., 2005).  Countries are grouped into five clusters: 
market-based capitalism (mainly Anglophone), social-democratic economies 
(Nordic), Asian capitalism (Japan and Korea), Mediterranean capitalism (south 
European countries) and Continental European capitalism (Western European 
countries).  Amable‘s institutional theory avoids much of the criticism for Whitley‘s 
business systems approach (discussed below) for the lack of quantitative evidence 
(e.g. Crouch, 2005; Jackson and Deeg, 2006; Foss, 1999).  While this is a strong 
argument, it is important to note that Whitley‘s framework has been tested by some 
studies (e.g. Brookes et al., 2005).  Being part of the Euro-Mediterranean region, 
Egypt could fall under the Mediterranean capitalism.  However, the lack of reliable 
quantitative data would be a major challenge to the application of Amable‘s 
framework to the Egyptian institutional environment.    
 
Table 3.2: Selected frameworks for institutional analysis 
Representative 
Authors 
Institutional 
Domains 
Country Groups Notes 
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Hall/Soskice Financial system, 
industrial relations, 
skills, inter-firm 
coordination 
Liberal vs. 
Coordinated 
(industry vs. 
Group-coordinated) 
Rooted in 
transaction cost 
economics  
Hollingsworth, 
and Boyer 
No systematization Every case unique Based on six 
governance 
mechanisms for 
coordinating 
transactions: 
markets, 
hierarchies, 
states, 
associations, 
networks and 
communities. 
Amable Product market 
competition, the 
wage-labour nexus or 
labour market 
institutions, finance 
and corporate 
governance, social 
protection/welfare 
state, and the 
education/training 
system. 
Five country 
clusters  
Uses some 
inductive 
clustering of 
types, unlike the 
more a priori 
approach of 
Whitley 
Whitley States, financial 
systems, skills, 
trust/authority 
Eight ideal-types: 
Fragmented, 
coordinated, 
industrial district, 
compartmentalised, 
state-organised, and 
highly coordinated 
Compares  
dimensions of 
coordination 
related to 
horizontal vs. 
Vertical 
organisation, 
control through 
ownership vs. 
Non-ownership, 
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and employer-
employee 
dependence 
(Jackson and Deeg, 2006:31) 
 
3.4.2. Firm-Centred Approach 
The popular work of Hall and Soskice (2001) introduced a firm-centred approach to 
institutional analysis and study of capitalism.  The VoC framework introduced by 
Hall and Soskice (2001) aims to ―bring firms back to the centre of the analysis of 
comparative capitalism‖ (2001: 4).  It analyses capitalisms by exploring the 
behaviour of firms in different institutional contexts. It focuses on five main spheres: 
(1) Industrial relations, (2) Vocational training and education, (3) Corporate 
governance, (4) Inter-firm relationships and (5) Employee relationships.  
 
These interactions enable economies to develop certain comparative institutional 
advantages, since ―the institutional structure of the political economy provides firms 
with advantages for engaging in specific kinds of activities‖ (Hall and Soskice, 
2001:32).  For instance, high-value added production systems, as in Germany, have 
been developed and reproduced as a result of certain institutional structurings and 
interactions, such as high levels of state-employer-union collaboration, a strong 
public training system, strong unions and system of centralised collective bargaining.  
Other contexts have not had these institutional combinations and interactions and thus 
been successful, such as in the case of the low-value added production systems 
common in  the United Kingdom (UK).  The VoC approach argues for the importance 
of such institutional interactions or institutional complementarities in shaping, 
sustaining and reproducing specific institutional arrangements within capitalist 
economies. This process is very closely related to the concept of path dependence 
(discussed later). 
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Hall and Soskice (2001) categorise economies as either Liberal Market Economies 
(LMEs), such as UK and US, or Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs), such as 
Germany and Japan, based on firms‘ interactions with different institutions.  Such a 
dualist approach provides a relatively simple conceptualisation, argued to be 
beneficial for capturing complicated institutional features and complementarities 
(Hall and Soskice, 2003).  However, the VoC dualistic approach has been 
increasingly criticised for its simplicity which prevents it from capturing important 
differences between countries within the same category (Amable, 2003; Crouch, 
2005; Höpner, 2005; Jackson and Deeg, 2006; Goergen et al., 2009).  For instance, 
Germany and Japan are grouped under the same category, CMEs, yet they have 
different comparative institutional advantages which have developed as a result of 
distinct institutional configurations in each context.  The VoC framework offers 
limited explanations for such differences.  Nevertheless, it is one of the few 
frameworks extended to developing countries and its applicability to the Egyptian 
case is discussed later.   
 
3.4.3. Business Systems Approach 
The Business Systems approach is another major contribution to the study of 
institutions from a socio-economic perspective.  In his early work, Richard Whitley 
suggested six types of business systems (1992a, 1992b, 1999) based on research in 
Europe and East Asia.  He extended these to eight business systems in his latest work 
(2007) and a further type, one which analyses economic failure instead of success, is 
suggested by Geoffrey Wood and George Frynas (2006): the segmented business 
system, based on four African economies.  The different types of business systems are 
based on a number of firm characteristics (categorised under ownership integration, 
non-ownership integration and employer-employee interdependence) and are 
influenced by certain combinations of key institutions.   
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The current study uses Whitley‘s institutional framework for VET institutional 
analysis.  The rationale of this choice is discussed in Part (3) following the discussion 
of institutional frameworks in developing countries.  Before this, it is important to 
highlight two key concepts relevant to our use of institutional analysis. 
 
3.5. KEY CONCEPTS IN INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 
 
Two of the key concepts to institutional analysis are (i) institutional 
complementarities; and (ii) path dependence (e.g. Lane, 1995; Thelen, 2004; Crouch 
et al., 2005; Streeck and Thelen, 2005; Jackson and Deeg, 2008).  These are discussed 
here as (i) they provide more insight into the ways in which institutions influence one 
another; and (ii) to illustrate that although historical influences are recognised, the 
analysis does not follow a path dependent approach (e.g. Mahoney, 2000; Pierson, 
2000; Thelen, 2004; Morgan et al., 2005; Deeg and Jackson, 2006). 
 
3.5.1. Institutional Complementarities 
The basic idea of institutional complementarities is that two institutions are likely to 
enhance each other‘s effectiveness by interacting in a particular context.  There have 
been attempts in the literature to define in detail this phenomenon which attracted 
more attention than the idea of institutional isomorphism (see section 3.2.2) adopted 
by New Institutionalists (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).   
 
There are three main definitions for institutional complementarities (Crouch et al., 
2005). First, it is ―where components of a whole mutually compensate for each 
other‘s deficiencies in constituting the whole‖.  Second, it is defined as 
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―complementarily in the economist‘s sense of two goods, a fall in the price of one of 
which will lead to a rise in the demand for the other‖.  Third, it is simply 
―complementarily as similarity‖ (Crouch et al., 2005:360).  The choice of any one 
definition depends on the purpose for which and the context in which it is used.  For 
instance, the first definition (which Colin Crouch (2005) argues is the most 
commonly used one in the literature) explains the importance of strong public training 
in Germany, which offsets the drawbacks of low labour mobility.  In that sense, this 
definition involves describing the characteristics of at least two institutions in an 
attempt to realize the deficiencies of each and the means by which it is complemented 
by other institutions. 
 
The second definition is not as straightforward as it might seem.  It does not 
necessarily involve direct and logical relationships between the items, in this case 
institutions, involved.  Thus, the task of identifying the missing characteristics that 
need to be complemented through the incorporation of another institution is not 
expected to be as predictable as in the first definition.  However, it offers a more 
flexible approach to institutional complementarities as it leaves room for ―human 
creativity in forging these complementarities‖ (Crouch et al., 2005: 361).  Thus, the 
second definition would be useful in reasoning some indirect relationships between 
institutions that might have been formed to meet some kind of interest, for instance as 
with social welfare institutions. 
 
The last definition does not strictly adhere to the concept of complementing and/or 
balancing capacities to enhance efficiency as similarity contradicts the idea of 
complementarities.  Nevertheless, the point from this definition is to show that when 
two institutions of similar capacities are grouped together they tend to reinforce one 
another (Crouch et al., 2005).  For instance, education, training and industrial 
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relations have certain similarities and thus are grouped under one institution in 
Whitley‘s framework (1999) and in this way they complement one another into the 
formation of a key institution.  
 
3.5.2. The theory of path dependency 
The national business systems approach assumes that ideal types of business systems 
are reproduced over time through a process of path dependency.  In its simplest form, 
path dependency refers to the idea that ‗what has happened at an earlier point in time 
will affect the possible outcomes of a sequence of events occurring at a later point in 
time‘ (Sewell, 1996:262).  This soft version of path dependency assumes that models 
of business systems are simply replicated over time.  It takes for granted that past 
events shape future ones (Mahoney, 2000) which has been challenged by economists 
and political scientists.  These critics define path dependency in terms of a process of 
increasing returns (Mahoney, 2000; Pierson, 2000).  In this case, a particular path 
which will be reproduced until one of two things occur; either it reaches a lock-in or a 
process of decreasing returns occurs and in both cases a new path with increasing 
returns will be sought.  This approach distinguishes between the origins of the path, 
its reinforcement mechanisms and eventually its termination.   
 
Different mechanisms, such as policy feedback or power, have been suggested by 
political scientists to have similar reinforcement and retrenchment effects on 
particular paths (Mahoney, 2000).  For instance, the power obtained by the United 
States after the Second World War enabled it to exert some policy influence on post-
war German cartels and more generally its organised capitalism.  These influences 
have shaped the type of business systems prevalent in Germany today as explained 
above (Djelic and Quack, 2005).  However, it is important to note that these 
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influences or political power tend to be significant at particular points in time rather 
than eternal (Djelic and Quack, 2007; Djelic, 1998).   
 
The business systems approach offers a different perspective to the concept of path 
dependency.  Through focusing on institutional frameworks and their influence on 
economic organisation, development and interactions (through processes of 
institutional complementarities) the theory attempts to explain the reinforcement 
mechanisms on a certain path rather than explain the underlying reasons for the 
emergence of this path in the first place.  This approach has traditionally provided 
explanations for taking one path rather than another but has only recently been used 
to account for the factors that have originally lead to the establishment of this path 
(e.g. Morgan et al., 2005; Lane, 2005; Crouch, 2005).  Kathleen Thelen‘s (2004) 
contribution to the contextualised study of a number of developed capitalisms offers 
interesting insights into this issue.  Thelen accords importance to understanding the 
role of social actors in choosing a particular path and their levels of power at different 
points in time throughout the history of individual capitalisms.  As she approaches the 
issue from a socio-political perspective, she shares the concept of political power and 
influence with other political scientists (as indicated above).  Differences in the power 
levels of social actors create tensions that might eventually lead to ruptures, such as in 
the case of revolution, where less powerful actors would re-emerge to challenge more 
powerful ones and such disputes could lead to institutional changes and divergence in 
the path.  Djelic and Quack (2005) have also referred to the influence of both 
endogenous and exogenous factors on the German product market and banking sector 
after the Second World War which resulted in a crooked path (Djelic and Quack, 
2005).   
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In that sense, the conceptualisation of path dependence as a series of self-reinforcing 
mechanisms is challenged (Mahoney, 2000; Pierson, 2000).   The idea of path 
dependence assists in describing institutional development in a retrospective manner; 
however, it falls short of identifying possible conditions that might lead to the 
redirection of a certain path (Deeg, 2005) and this is what Djelic and Quack (2005; 
2007) try to deal with their concept of path generation.  An example of such path 
generation is the experience of post-socialist countries.  The transformation of these 
economies was far from being path dependent; the path was shaped by a variety of 
socio-political struggles and influences. The transformation process was doomed to 
make rational-action institutional changes (DiMaggio, 1998; Nielsen, 2001) along 
neoliberal prescriptions.  Nevertheless, as argued by critical institutionalists, social 
influences and informal institutions are as important as economic considerations in 
shaping the paths of economies (Jessop, 2001; Krier, 2009; Weiner, 2011).  These 
influence power relations and the differentiated interests of social actors. The old 
guard try to maintain their power through transforming their social capital to 
economic capital and trade unions who attempt to achieve effective involvement in 
socio-economic matters to secure more benefits and rights (Hardy, 2004; 2006).  
These and similar struggles could promote and/or impede economic development and 
result in a new path.  The latter would neither be entirely dependent on historical 
developments nor predicted by neoliberal experts (Nielsen et al., 1995; Hardy, 2004).  
Path shaping is also influenced by important exogenous factors, most notably 
international aid (Hardy, 2004).  The latter factor is not effectively discussed in 
institutional accounts as these are mainly based on developed economies.  
Nevertheless, the influence of international aid on path shaping and institutional 
change is significant in developing countries as shown in this study.12 
 
                                                             
12 The inclusion of international organisations as one of the key institutional influences on state relations 
with social actors is one of the contributions of this research. 
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This study does not follow a ‗path dependent approach‘.  A historical dimension is 
offered in the analysis to give a nuanced account of the origins of institutions rather 
than explaining the situation in terms of path dependency.  We recognise the 
influence of the past on the present but in ways that are refracted through 
contingency, especially political contingency on an international level.  
 
3.6. INSTITUTIONAL THEORY IN DEVELOPING ECONOMIES  
 
Unlike the numerous contributions to the studies of the varieties of economic 
successes in developed countries there have been very limited attempts proposed in 
cases of economic failures; in developing countries.  Some authors interpret the 
relative effectiveness of institutions in the economy in terms of its historical origins, 
such as the work of Peter Boettke, Christopher Coyne and Peter Leeson (2008).  They 
suggest the idea of institutional ―stickiness‖ which argues that ―the ability or inability 
of new institutional arrangements to take hold where they are transplanted – is central 
to understanding how history matters for institutions‖ (2008:332) which is expected 
to be applicable to the case of Egyptian VET. 
 
Based on this idea they propose three types of institutions; first, Indigenously 
Introduced Endogenous (IEN) Institutions and these include informal rules, norms 
and values that are specific to a certain context and are deeply rooted in the social 
fabric or as the authors call it Métis; ―local knowledge resulting from practical 
experience‖ (2008:338).  Second are Indigenously Introduced Exogenous (IEX) 
Institutions which are formally created by local authorities which pulls them away 
from the informal rules at the local level or Métis.  At the same time, these are not 
completely free from Métis as these are created indigenously by officials who are 
aware of the Métis and the widely accepted informal rules within the society.  So the 
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authors argue that the relative influence and institutional stickiness of IEX depend on 
the extent to which these correspond to IEN and Métis at the local level.  Third, 
Foreign–Introduced Exogenous (FEX) Institutions.  As implied by their name, these 
are institutions that are created by foreign bodies and are mostly not based on local 
informal rules and Métis.  On the contrary, these tend to be transplanted from 
successful developed contexts to less developed countries.  The authors argue that 
these tend to be the kind of institutions with the least stickiness and are thus not 
expected to be sustainably effective (Boettke, Coyne and Leeson, 2008). 
 
The categorisation of institutions into any of these three types dictates their relative 
effectiveness in developing contexts, according to this perspective (Boettke, Coyne 
and Leeson, 2008).  However, this approach does not provide insights into the means 
by which actors deal and/or cope with these institutional deficiencies in developing 
contexts.  This has been provided by other researchers, such as Maris G. Martinsons 
(1997; 2002; 2005; 2008) in his writings on institutional deficiencies. 
 
Martinsons emphasises the role of indigenous institutions that support informal 
networks and personalisation of economic dealings over other formal institutions, 
such as the concept of institutional deficiencies in China and Russia (Martinsons, 
2002; 2008).  He argues that in contexts with institutional deficiencies, where the 
enforcement of formal rule-based working methods are largely lacking or non-
existent, institutional actors tend to rely on informal inter-personal relationships 
which are highly valuable and effective in these contexts.  He bases his argument on 
the case of electronic commerce businesses in China.  The institutional configuration 
of the Chinese economy has not been found to be supportive of this type of business.  
Nevertheless, Chinese businesses were able to cope with these institutional 
deficiencies by finding substitutes in the informal relations; known as guanxi of trust 
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and personal connections (Xin and Pearce, 1996; Martinsons, 2008).  These informal 
rules of the game were capable of supporting the industry which has flourished 
especially in business-to-business dealings.  Martinsons‘ idea of institutional 
deficiencies and how they may be compensated for by informal relations is an 
indication of the possibility of realising relative success in contexts that lag behind the 
efficient institutional configurations of their developed counterparts.   
 
Although Martinsons offers a new dimension to the study of institutions in 
developing contexts, he does not offer a comprehensive framework for various 
institutional arrangements and complementarities within these economies.  Others 
offer such a framework by extending current institutional theories to transitional and 
developing countries.  For instance, Andreas Nölke and Arjan Vliegenthart (2009) 
attempted to extend the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) approach to East Central 
European economies.  They suggest a third variant: Dependent Market Economy 
(DME), to the dualistic model of Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs) and Liberal 
Market Economies (LMEs) as suggested by Peter Hall and David Soskice (2001).  
Nölke and Vliegen (2009) argue that the uneven economic configuration of these 
countries which have undergone transition after the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
does not fall precisely into the CMEs or the LMEs.    Instead, these economies form 
their own variety of capitalism; some sectors have succeeded more than others, 
mainly due to its reliance on investments from Trans-National Companies (TNCs) 
and hence the model labelling; ―Dependent Market Economy‖.  The authors illustrate 
their argument by demonstrating some of the institutional complementarities in these 
economies, such as the relatively low cost of skilled labour that has created a 
comparative advantage in the technical assembly of industrial products (Nölke and 
Vliegen, 2009).   
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VoC theory has been also extended to Latin America by Ben Ross Schneider (2008; 
2009).  Schneider suggests a new typology for Latin American economies: 
Hierarchical Market Economies (HMEs).  The main idea of the HMEs is based on the 
hierarchical relations that exist in these economies and that characterise all kinds of 
dealings; (i) formal dealings along the hierarchy in terms of rules and orders; and (ii) 
more importantly informal networks and/or relations, for example owners-managers 
relations, managers-employee relations, inter-firm relations within the same sector.  
Schneider suggests that HMEs have four core features: multinational corporations 
(MNCs); low-skilled labour; diversified business groups; and atomistic labour 
relations (2009: 2).  The interaction and complementarities of the key features are 
argued to influence the availability and efficiency of key resources; capital, labour 
and technology, in ways that shape HMEs.  Although the HME model is suggested to 
typify Latin American economies, Schneider acknowledges the existence of 
discrepancies between some countries in the region (2008; 2009). 
 
Another institutional framework extended to developing economies is Richard 
Whitley‘s; the business systems approach (1992; 1999).  Geoffrey Wood and George 
Frynas (2006) suggest the segmented business system as a new archetype of Whitley‘s 
theory, analysing the institutional configuration of economies that hinder rather than 
support economic growth, using the case of East Africa.  They argue for the 
availability of important potential economic successes in theorising the categorisation 
of these developing economies.  These are found to be uneven and fragmented 
instances or cases of economic success in a limited number of sectors in the midst of 
the general atmosphere of economic failure.  These sectors are privileged with 
particular institutional arrangements that are not available to all sectors within the 
economy, such as exposure to export sectors or international partners.  Additionally, 
the economic returns of these cases are limited to a few elite segments of the 
population. 
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3.6.1. The Institutional Framework of this study 
The above are amongst the main attempts to typify developing economies.  The main 
issue at this point is to choose a framework that best fits our purpose.  Let us consider 
two options: (1) to attempt to extend other institutional theories that have not been 
applied to developing countries: particularly Hollingsworth and Boyer SSP or 
Amable‘s framework (as extensions of these models were not found at the time this 
research was undertaken); (2) to build on  prior attempts to typify economies of 
developing countries.    
 
The first option is hindered by a central drawback in developing countries; the lack of 
valid and reliable data.  Hollingsworth and Boyer‘s (1997) Social Systems of 
Production (SSP) approach requires sufficient relevant and reliable data on the 
dominant SSP within the economy, such as national and international 
competitiveness, size and expansion, share of GDP and so forth.  This is in addition to 
reliable data on macro- and micro-institutions within the economy.  Such information 
is usually not available in developing economies and when it is available it is difficult 
to access and/or difficult to assess its reliability.  This greatly constrains the scope of 
analysis.  The lack of data also constrains the use of the more sophisticated 
quantitative analysis offered in Bruno Amable‘s (2003) work, especially since  this 
analysis will be based on a single country rather than a cluster analysis. For these 
reasons, we will not extend either of these theories to the study of the institutional 
environment of VET in Egypt. 
 
The second option involves a review of the institutional ideas and/or frameworks that 
have been applied to developing countries, discussed above.  The institutional 
stickiness and institutional deficiencies approaches emphasise important features of 
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institutional arrangements in developing economies.  Nevertheless, neither offers an 
institutional framework that can be applied to other contexts.  Such frameworks are 
offered by other contributors to the VoC and the business systems approaches. 
 
A main feature of the VoC approach is its focus on the firm (Hall and Soskice, 2001).  
This does not fit the overall intention of this research to construct a national rather 
than an enterprise level analysis of the institutional environment and its influences on 
VET.  Another limitation of firm-focused analysis is the limited account given of the 
political dimension in explaining the institutional complementarities.  This deprives 
these institutional models of political depth; a limitation acknowledged by Andreas 
Nölke and Arjan Vliegenthart (2009: 694).  
 
By contrast, the political dimension is extensively discussed by Wood and Frynas 
(2006) in their analysis of the state as one of the key institutions suggested by Whitley 
(1999).  This dimension is particularly important in the study of developing 
economies where the state is expected to play a leading role and to largely influence 
key socio-economic factors.  The financial system, system of skill development and 
control and trust and authority relations are also discussed, and the institutional 
complementarities taking place in the economy are reflected based on the institutional 
interactions of key institutions.  The division of these institutional domains in the way 
developed by Whitley (1999) enhances the clarity of the analytical framework.  This 
offers a more specific and comprehensive institutional analysis than other typologies 
for developing economies.  Equally important is the perspective from which Whitley 
(and in turn Wood and Frynas) approaches institutional analysis which suits the 
overall philosophical underpinning of the study (see chapter 5 on Methodology and 
Methods) as it takes into consideration the influence of social actors in constructing 
reality or.  Finally, the segmented business approach is based on the study of East 
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African economies which are expected to have more resemblance to the Egyptian 
economy than economies of Latin America and/or transition economies.  For these 
purposes, Whitley‘s framework as applied in and extended to developing contexts by 
Wood and Frynas (2006) is critically deployed here.  
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PART (3):  INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF THE STUDY 
3.7. INSTITUTIONAL FEATURES OF THE SBS APPROACH 
 
Richard Whitley defined  Business Systems  as "particular combinations of firms and 
markets which have become established in particular institutional contexts and so 
develop at the level of collective organisation which contains key institutions" 
(1992a: 269).  Whitley‘s model was initially based on East Asian capitalisms and then 
extended to European business systems.  It is interesting to note that more reference 
has been made to cultural norms and values in analysing and characterising East 
Asian capitalism in European business systems (1992a; 1992b; Lane, 2002).  Later, 
Whitley refined the definition of business systems to refer to ―distinctive patterns of 
economic organisation that vary in their degree and mode of authoritative 
coordination of economic activities, and in the organisation of, and interconnections 
between, owners, managers, experts, and other employees‖ (Whitley, 1999:33). 
 
Whitley‘s theory was extended to developing economies by Geoffrey Wood and 
George Frynas (2006).  They offered a typology for the institutional configurations 
that hinder rather than promote economic growth and development.  Their 
characterisation, which is discussed below, largely corresponds to the Egyptian case.   
 
3.7.1. Characteristics of Business Systems 
Business Systems are suggested to have different characteristics that vary according to 
ownership coordination, non-ownership coordination and employment relations.  
Interactions between these three broad categories are likely to result in distinctive 
types of business systems and thus distinctive patterns of economic organisation and 
control.  It would be incorrect, however to assume the entire economy is only limited 
to a particular type of business system.  Different means of organisation are likely to 
52 
 
be available in a single economy: for instance, not all American businesses are in the 
form of professionally managed large conglomerates (Redding, 2005).  However, the 
suggested framework presents the prevalent or dominant form of economic and 
organisational coordination (Whitley, 1999; Redding, 2005).  There could be different 
criteria for determining the dominant form of economic organisation: share of GDP, 
share in national value-added production or power relations.  Whitley decides on the 
dominant form of economic organisation or business system according to business‘s 
share of value added production.  For instance, in South Korea there are a limited 
number of Chaebols; however, this is the dominant type of business on which the 
whole analytical framework is based, as it controls the largest share of value-added 
production in the economy (Whitley, 1992a, 1999).   
 
In other contexts, the process of determining the dominant form of economic 
organisation is not as straightforward.  For instance, in the case of East Africa (Wood 
and Frynas, 2006) the form of economic organisation that dominates the economy 
depends on power relations with state elites and not necessarily the share of value-
added production or share of GDP.  The Egyptian case is not expected to be much 
different from its African counterparts in that sense, as discussed later. 
  
Business systems cannot be developed independently of the external environment 
within which they operate.  In other words, they tend to be a by product of the 
interaction between business system characteristics and dominant social institutions 
in economies (Whitley, 1999).  Whitley (1992b) argues that institutions could be 
broadly classified into background and proximate social institutions.  The latter are 
institutions which are likely have a more immediate influence on the economy, such 
as the state and financial system, than the former (Redding, 2005).  Background 
social institutions are informal institutions, such as values and norms, in which 
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change and its influence on the economy is likely to occur over a prolonged period of 
time.  In the case of developing countries, informal influences tend to largely guide 
the means by which formal rules of the game are practised (Wood and Frynas, 2006; 
Yousfi and Humphrey, 2008; Martinsons, 2002; 2005; 2008).  Such practices might 
not necessarily be beneficial to an economy as a whole as much as they are to a small 
group of privileged state and business elites (Wood and Fryans, 2006).   
 
Across the proximate and background social institutions, a number of key social 
institutions have been specified: the state, the financial system, skill development, 
control system and finally trust and authority relations (Whitley, 1999).  These key 
institutions are argued to control critical resources within economies and to have a 
direct influence on the generation and development of business systems in economies.  
The discussion focuses on these key institutions as defined by Whitley and as typified 
in the Segmented Business Systems archetype of the theory with reflections on Egypt.  
It is important to note that the aim of this discussion is not to generate a typology for 
the Egyptian economy or its business system.  Instead, I simply critically deploy 
features of key institutions to the study of the institutional influences on VET in 
Egypt by referring to the institutional framework suggested by Whitley (1992; 1999) 
and extended to East African economies by Wood and Frynas (2006).   
 
3.7.2. Features of Key Institutions 
 
3.7.2.1. The State 
The literature is rich with defining features of the state, a term that has had its 
orientation and boundaries extensively debated. The debate becomes even more 
complicated when discussing Third World countries (e.g. Abraham, 1977; 1988; 
Johnson; 1982; Mitchell, 1991; Albert, 1993; Evans, 1995 and others).  Richard  
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Table 3.3 Key institutional features structuring business systems 
The state 
 Dominance of the state and its willingness to share risks with private 
owners 
 State antagonism to collective intermediaries 
 Extent of formal regulation of markets 
Financial system 
 Capital market or credit based 
Skill development and control system 
 Strength of public training system and of state-employer-union 
collaboration 
 Strength of independent trade unions 
 Strength of labour organisations based on certified expertise 
 Centralisation of bargaining 
Trust and authority relations 
 Reliability of formal institutions governing trust relations 
 Predominance of paternalist authority relations 
 Importance of communal norms governing authority relations 
(Whitley, 1999: 48) 
Whitley‘s discussion of the state as part of his institutional framework largely 
corresponds to the Weberian definition of the state as ―a set of organisations invested 
with the authority to make the binding decisions for people and organisations juridical 
located in a particular territory and to implement these decisions using, if necessary, 
force‖ (Evans and Rueschemeyer, 1985:46/7).  Whitley suggests and discusses three 
features of the state: the degree of (i) dominance of the state and its willingness to 
share risks with private owners; (ii) state antagonism to collective intermediaries; and 
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(iii) formal regulation of markets (Table 3.3).  He argues this to be significant in 
influencing the means of economic organisation and in determining the levels of 
cohesiveness and complementarity of national institutional systems (Whitley, 1999; 
2003).  Wood and Frynas (2006) also discuss the state in East Africa, though the state 
in that sense no longer corresponds to the Weberian state. This is largely due to its 
patrimonial characters that has reduced its efficiency (Mkandawire, 2001), in terms of 
these three features which are then exemplified in other regions.   
 
States exhibit different levels of interference in coordinating and organising economic 
development activities.  Different theoretical distinctions have been suggested for 
developed economies in that respect. For instance Michel Albert, (1993) distinguishes 
between Anglo-Saxon and Rhenish states. Later, Hall and Soskice (2001) argued for a 
different role of the state in Liberal and Coordinated Market Economies, such as the 
UK and Germany respectively.  The popular work of Chalmers Johnson (1982) is 
another example which, by challenging the neo-classical approach dominant at that 
time, has suggested a distinction between the developmental and regulatory states.  
Developmental states assume a wider scope of responsibility for guiding of economic 
development than their regulatory counterparts (Johnson, 1982).  In these examples, 
the state has been successful to varying degrees in realising economic growth and 
development despite the different levels of state intervention in economic affairs.   
 
By contrast, in the developing world, the state is characterised by high levels of 
interventionism but this has seldom led to effective levels of sustainable economic 
development.  This is mainly due to the relatively weak structure of the state as an 
institution.  Such states are not likely to operate in a clearly structured manner, 
sticking to formal rules of the game as in the developed world (Wood and Frynas, 
2006).  Instead, the state continues to be dominated by small factions of state and 
business elites as well as informal rules that emphasise personal networks and interest 
over formal ones.   In that sense, the state‘s willingness to share risks shrinks to a 
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limited number of private sector businesses that are in related in some way to state 
elites.  In other words, inter-personal connections and the relative gains by state elites, 
rather than the long-term wellbeing of the economy as a whole, are the major 
determinants for the state‘s decision to share risks.  After all, the state is cautious not 
to excessively empower the private sector and/or other interest groups, including 
employers‘ associations and unions as discussed later, in a way that would threaten its 
hegemony over the economy.  This tendency is part of the authoritarian character of 
these states which is more generally not in favour of intermediary associations despite 
their positive influences on economic matters.  For instance, intermediary 
associations have positively contributed to the relative level of sophistication of VET 
at different trajectories of industrialisation in Germany as an example (Ashton and 
Green, 1996; Clarke and Winch, 2006; 2007; Martin and Swank, 2008; Thelen, 2004; 
2008; Trampusch, 2010) but such advantages are largely lacking in developing 
economies.  
 
In such a corrupt environment, investments and markets tend to be driven to suit the 
interests of state elites.  However, these states find it difficult to attract investments in 
the first place, mainly due to the fragmented nature of the state and the incoherent 
state-business relations and above all decentralised corruption.  The latter is different 
in the case of South East Asian developmental states, for instance, where corruption 
tends to be more centralised and therefore easier for businesses to find ways of 
coping with (Wood and Frynas, 2006).  This is not the case in, say, East Africa, where 
businesses find it difficult to predict and/or internalise the costs of corruption. This 
reduces the attractiveness of investing in these economies (Wood and Frynas, 2006).    
 
The relatively high levels of state intervention in the economy and the general levels 
of investment and economic growth did not change much under programmes of 
structural adjustment led by international financial institutions: the World Bank and 
IMF, which aim at enhancing the economic conditions in these developing contexts.  
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Instead, many of these economies have become increasingly indebted after the 
initiation of such programmes with little effective progress on the economic front 
despite the numerous projects for economic development.  This has been the case for 
the policy problem of VET development in Egypt, which despite the increasing 
international funding and assistance it receives, has achieved little progress.  This 
example applies to different sectors and factions of developing economies where only 
specific sectors that prove beneficial to state elites receive effective attention and 
development levels (Wood and Frynas, 2006).   
 
Relatively high levels of state intervention in economic affairs in developing regions 
seemed to be necessary in the post-independence period (Yousef, 2004).  
Nevertheless, a few decades later, these states: (i) failed to achieve positive economic 
results, or at least sustainable ones; (ii) failed to reduce their economic interventions 
over time which hindered more than developed the economy (Wood and Frynas, 
2006; Yousef, 2004).  For instance, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region 
has assumed an interventionist-redistributive character since the 1950s.  The state 
played an increasingly interventionist role in the economy which had undergone 
massive restructuring and waves of redistribution of wealth and power.  These have 
resulted in increases in real GDP but were largely driven by the waves of 
nationalisation of foreign and private assets, such as in Egypt, and the oil boom for oil 
rich countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, without an actual increase in 
productive capacities (Véganzonès –Varoudakis and Pissarides, 2007).  Hence, such 
economic boosts were not sustainable beyond the 1970s.  A series of shocks in the 
region, most notably the oil crisis in the 1970s and a series of wars and conflicts, led 
to a number of economic failures that went beyond the control of the states in the 
region (Hakimian, 2001; Kassem, 2004; Yousef, 2004).  Since the 1980s, the 
influence of international financial institutions increased in the region, as in other 
developing regions in Africa and Latin America as part of programmes of structural 
adjustment.  In time, state control started to be dominated by a niche part of society 
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resulting in limited progress along the lines of democratisation (Yousef, 2004; Wood 
and Frynas, 2006).   
 
The aforesaid factors hinder the effectiveness of formal rules and changes the 
institutional configurations of these economies away from economic growth and 
development (Hutchcroft, 1997; Robinson, 1998; Wood and Frynas, 2006).  Other 
key institutions are equally negatively influenced as a result, as for instance, in the 
case of East Africa the incoherence of the state extends to influence the financial 
system, the skill levels of the labour force; which are generally low and the economic 
competitiveness of the economy (Wood and Frynas, 2006) as illustrated in the 
following discussion.   
 
The Egyptian case is not expected to different trajectory.  However, a cross-sectional 
analysis of the Egyptian state is not expected to offer insights into the origins of its 
features.  Instead, discussion of the state and more precisely some of the relevant 
institutional complementarities that fit the purpose of this study should be approached 
from a historical perspective to gain a deep understanding of the roots of the situation 
as embedded in the historical development of these relationships and/or 
complementarities.    
   
3.7.2.2. The Financial System 
Whitley (1992; 1999) classifies financial systems as either Capital- or Credit-based 
markets, according to the availability, liquidity and price of capital.  However, he 
acknowledges the fact that some markets would not precisely fit into one of these 
categories, making divergence between these two extremes a possible variation.  This 
is essentially the case with developing economies which have different arrangements 
as suggested by Wood and Frynas (2006). 
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Capital-based markets are highly liquid markets in which the prices of financial 
commodities are largely determined by capital markets.  Ownership of assets and 
capital is freely traded, enhancing the flexibility and contributing to the liquidity of 
the financial system in these economies. However, the latter tends to reduce investors' 
interests in the growth of any particular entity or organisation.  Moreover, short-term 
transactions and profits are a significant characteristic of such a system, which has its 
implications for skill development and control as well as on other social institutions.  
On the contrary, Credit-based financial systems operate in a completely different 
manner that restricts the flexibility for trading and pricing financial commodities.  
These processes are likely to be decided upon by major financial institutions: Banks.  
Banks put more restrictions in relation to the capital-based markets, on the free trade 
of shares and ownership.  Thus, in response to the relative illiquidity and inflexibility 
of the system, owners, banks and trust managers are likely to be more involved in 
detailed evaluation of investment options and in the decision-making process to 
ensure the profitability and potential development of the organisation.  This type of 
financial system emphasises long-term dealings and transactions.  This has a positive 
influence on long-term investments such as the training and development of the 
workforce, as it is the case in Germany (e.g. Lane, 1995; Crouch and Streeck, 1997; 
Thelen, 2004; Gospel and Pendleton, 2005). 
 
In developing economies, the financial system is likely to be largely dependent on 
external markets and foreign bodies; most notably from international financial 
institutions.  These countries do not have the capacities or the liquidity to effectively 
run capital-based markets and at the same time they are faced with external pressures 
from the IMF and World Bank to deregulate their financial systems.  Thus, these 
economies do not fall into any of the categories suggested by Whitley (1999) and 
continue to struggle with ineffective state financial strategies, increased foreign 
influences as part of structural adjustment programmes, and a relatively weak 
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commitment from foreign investors who are ready to shift their investments and 
capital to other contexts if proved to be more beneficial (Wood and Frynas, 2006).  
This leaves these financial systems relatively unstable, risky and volatile. 
 
The Egyptian financial system is better than its African counterparts in this respect, 
having undergone relatively high levels of reform with the beginning of the new 
millennium after a long period of stagnation in the 1990s (Alissa, 2007; Kolb, 2010).  
An important change in the financial market in Egypt was the floatation of the 
Egyptian pound in January 2003 (Moursi et al., 2007).  The Egyptian pound had been 
fixed to the US dollar at adjustable rates since the 1960s.  The floatation has opened 
the long-controlled foreign exchange rates argued to enhance capital mobility and 
flexibility (Kamar and Bakardzhieva, 2005).  The banking sector has undergone some 
structural reforms as well which reduced the role of the state and increased the role 
the share of foreign banks in the economy.  This trend is still in operation but has 
been greatly slowed by the current global financial crisis (ENCC, 2010).  These 
changes would enhance the stability and strength of the financial system which has 
already proved to be relatively stable so far in facing the current financial crisis 
(ENCC, 2010).  The structure of the system started to support long-term dealings and 
transactions more than it has in past decades (Alissa, 2007) which would increase the 
chances for making long-term investments, such as investments in VET.  
Nevertheless, employers‘ willingness to make such investments is very low as 
explained later. 
  
3.7.2.3. Skill development and Control 
Under this broad category of fall two sets of interrelated institutions; the Education 
and Training system which is responsible for the development and certification of 
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skills and competences, and the Control system that influences the organisation and 
coordination of labour markets in different economies.  
There are major variations in the system of Education and Training across nations 
which have been broadly categorised as either unitary or dual systems of education 
and training.  In unitary systems of Education and Training, such as in Japan and 
France, the criteria of student success are mainly, if not solely, based on academic 
performance in formal examinations.  There is minimal, if any, emphasis on practical 
training, which tends to be associated with low social prestige as it is perceived to be 
limited to failures.  
 
On the other hand, the dual system of Education and Training, the most popular and 
successful example of which is Germany, recognises and combines both theory and 
practice.  In other words, it is both industry- and college-based and delivers 
standardised courses jointly organised between schools, employers and trade unions 
(Ashton and Green, 1996; Lane, 2002).  The system tends to be co-financed by the 
state and employers and its courses are expected to meet specific industrial standards 
in which competence and skill level are the main criteria of success.  Though different 
from grammar schools (general education), VET is thus likely to have high prestige 
under the dual system as its outcomes tend to be highly appreciated by the state, 
employers and labour organisations in these economies; the system itself builds social 
acceptance.  This relatively high level of state-employer-union collaboration is 
institutionally embedded in the historical development of German capitalism and is 
supported by nested institutional complementarities (see Chapter 5) (Ashton and 
Green, 1996; Crouch and Streeck, 1997; Lane, 2002; Thelen, 2004).  The Egyptian 
system of education and training does not fall into this category.  Nevertheless, there 
have been attempts to apply the dual system of education and training as practiced in 
Germany to the Egyptian context through Mubarak-Kohl Initiative (see Chapter 5 for 
details). 
62 
 
The dual system of Education and Training might have an advantage over the unitary 
system in the production of high-level skills relevant to the requirements of 
employers selling in certain markets.  These markets tend to value quality of 
production, hence the whole system becomes part of a high-road strategy (Lane, 
1995) characterized by high skills, high wages and high quality markets, such as the 
case in Germany.  On the other hand, other contexts such as the US and UK tend to 
have low road national strategies.  On the organisational level, the skills required on 
the job tend to be very specific and narrow in scope.  The levels of employer-
employee dependence are low; labour are not delegated many responsibilities and 
generally low levels of trust and poor communication between labour and 
management are prevalent.  Also, employment is poorly secured for workers and 
investment in skills is consequently low as well (Lane, 1995; Hollingsworth and 
Boyer, 1997).   
 
In developing countries, the system of skill development and control is argued to have 
been influenced by the colonial bequest.  Wood and Frynas (2006) argue that in East 
Africa less emphasis was normally put on VET as compared to general education as 
the economy promoted administrative rather than technical jobs; the latter were 
largely handled by foreigners who settled in these economies.  This trend continued 
even after these states gained independence as general education tends to be less 
expensive than VET.  Hence, investments were geared away from technical jobs, 
especially with the financial difficulties and uncertainties that these economies have 
been undergoing.  The curtailed supply of VET was even supported by the state‘s 
continuing role as the main employer in these economies as the relatively low 
economic growth has not been capable of generating sufficient potential jobs that 
would require these kinds of technical and vocational skills.  Thus, on the one hand, 
more emphasis was automatically put on administrative skills and education rather 
than VET by the state and yet, on the other hand, there has been less demand on VET 
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which low returns failed to motivate individuals to invest in this form of human 
development. 
 
Low returns on investments in training and skills development of employees also 
negatively influence employers‘ willingness to support these schemes.  Developing 
economies generally lack clear agenda for development and ineffective medium- and 
long-term planning makes it difficult to (i) assess the need for skills; and (ii) plan for 
the relative returns on investments in skills development.  Such a complicated and 
unstructured process discourages employers as well as employees to invest in skills 
development, including VET.  Employers tend to be sceptical about the benefits they 
would gain from such investments in their labour force as they might be forced to 
downsize their operations and lay off the trained individuals in case of any 
unforeseeable economic disturbances in such a vulnerable environment (Wood and 
Frynas, 2006).  Similarly, employees are not likely to invest in VET if they have low 
job tenure or if the sector does not seem promising (Wood and Frynas, 2006).  This 
matter grows more complicated within the massive informal sector.  Returns on 
investments in human capital development tend to occur over a long period of time 
and in such an unstable and fluctuating economic environment only a few employers 
and employees are likely to take the risk of these investments.   
 
The other component of this key institution as suggested by Whitley (1992; 1999) is 
the control system.  Whitley (1999) suggests three main defining features of this 
system (1999).  First is the degree to which labour skills and capabilities are 
controlled by trade unions.  In other words, their relative strength and independence.  
Second is the manner in which trade unions and professional associations are 
organised.  For instance, whenever associations are organised on industry- or sector-
levels, there are more chances for inter-firm collaboration, such as in the case of 
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Germany, and these are also likely to have a positive influence on employer-
employee interdependence (e.g. Lane, 1995; Whitley, 1999; Thelen, 2004).  Finally, 
the third feature refers to the extent to which union bargaining is centralized.  This is 
expected to have major consequences on, for instance, the willingness of employers 
to cooperate with the state in public training as it could, if powerful enough to 
standardise wages and skill levels, help in minimizing poaching of employees and 
workers by competitors in the workplace (Culpepper, 2001). 
 
These relationships are largely incoherent and/or lacking in the case of developing 
economies.  Tripartite relationships between the state, employers and unions continue 
to be weak in segmented business systems (Wood and Frynas, 2006).  The 
authoritarian character of the state and its unwillingness to share risks and/or decision 
making with other institutional actors together with its relatively high levels of 
antagonism of these bodies has left little chances for establishing cooperative 
relationships.  This situation has never been challenged by unions as these suffer from 
significant structural deficiencies that have weakened their social base and their 
bargaining powers.  Unions in East Africa, as in other developing regions including 
Egypt, have fallen under close state scrutiny post-independence.  Unions in that sense 
have continued to be misrepresentative of workers‘ voices as much as it is a state tool 
to restrain labour actions.  The advent of structural adjustment programmes in the 
1990s could have led to an enhancement of the autonomy of unions, as part of the 
general waves of decentralisation of the state, if that was a goal in the first place.  
Nevertheless, the programmes resulted in more complications for labour, such as 
massive layoffs stemming from privatisation, reduced the already low levels of 
workers‘ bargaining powers and other consequences which have further emasculated 
workers‘ position and have not empowered unions in any significant way.  On the 
firm level, employer-employee relationships are characterised by low levels of 
interdependence and generally low levels of trust (as discussed later) if not governed 
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by inter-personal connections.  This has left workers and unions in a very weak 
bargaining position vis-à-vis the state and employers which is the essence of the poor 
state-employer-union collaboration in different matters including VET. 
 
3.7.2.4. Trust and Authority Relationships 
Although Whitley follows a regulationist approach to institutional analysis, he has not 
ignored the role of culture (Scott, 2004).  Douglass C. North himself changed his 
view when he shifted his focus in 1990 to interactions between formal and informal 
rules (North, 1990) then later he focused more on the relationship between cognitive 
factors, culture and the development of institutions (North, 2005).  However, the 
purely cultural perspective (e.g. Hofstede, 1980; 1998; House et al., 1997; Hofstede 
and Peterson, 2000) that focuses primarily on cultural factors have been extensively 
criticised for its reliability (e.g. McSweeney, 2002) and were proven to be less 
effective than institutional influences as for instance depicted by the study of 
international Human Resources practices (Brookes et al., 2010).  Whitley (1999) does 
not base his analysis on culture but instead he focuses certain cultural elements 
considered to be necessary for institutional understanding: trust and authority 
relations (Brookes et al., 2010). 
 
The norms and values governing trust and authority relations within societies have a 
recognizable impact on exchange relationships between various market players and 
the state.  Whitley (1999) identifies various dimensions of authority relations that are 
grouped under two broad categories; paternalist and formal political authority.  The 
latter tend to recognise the importance of involving subordinates in the management 
of the business more than the former.  The relationship between superordinates and 
subordinates in formal authority relations are governed by preset formal rules.  These 
are likely to offer the latter some rights, such as that to select superordinates, the right 
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to engage in decision-making to a certain extent and others, which superordinates are 
bound to in dealing with subordinates.  However, the degree of formality in this 
authority system could vary between contractual and communal formal authority 
systems.  The latter tends to be more flexible than the former.   Communal authority 
systems are based on mutual understanding of interests and goals between 
superordinates and subordinates supported by high levels of trust and commitment 
which tend to be insufficiently available under contractual formal authority. 
 
On the other hand, in paternalist authority systems the relationship between 
superordinates and subordinates is likely to be parent-child like in which subordinates 
are not given enough responsibility as they are not expected to share management of 
common business interests.  In such a system, there is a high degree of moral and 
social distance between leaders and the led.  These are likely to be more significant in 
the case of Remote paternalism such as in South Korea and in East Africa (whitley, 
1999; Wood and Frynas, 2006) and are likely to be less distant in Reciprocal 
paternalism (Whitley, 1992a; 1999). 
 
Authority relations largely depend on the levels of trust that govern socio-economic 
dealings.  The level of trust as defined by individual societies could be translated into 
the degree of reliability of formal institutions in facilitating and/or organising 
business relations.  Thus, for instance in contexts where trust in formal institutions 
governing exchange relationships is high, business procedures are expected to be 
impersonal, such as in Germany (e.g. Whitley, 1999; Thelen, 2004).  This is not the 
case in East Africa and in most developing countries where the level of trust in formal 
institutions is generally low (Wood and Frynas, 2006).  Therefore, socio-economic 
relations tend to rely on inter-personal relations and networks.   
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This tendency has proved to be more economically rewarding in some contexts.  For 
instance, Asian economies such as in China and South Korea have been successful in 
institutionalising trust.  In other words, they expanded networks of personal trust to 
inter-organisational relations thus enabling fruitful business to be developed between 
organisations based on inter-personal connections and trust, an example of which is in 
the e-commerce business as suggested by Martinsons (2002; 2005; 2008) in his 
theory of institutional deficiencies, discussed earlier (Xin and Pearce, 1996; Ashton et 
al., 1999; Wood and Frynas, 2006).  On the contrary, African economies failed to 
reach such an institutionalisation of trust.  These remain largely locked up at the level 
of personal relations and seldom become effective in fostering inter-organisational 
cooperation and in some instances even intra-organisational collaboration.  
 
3.8. CONCLUSION 
Major contributions to institutional theory are based on developed capitalist 
economies which have little in common with the focus of this study.  For this reason, 
the limited attempts to extend the theory to the developing world have been discussed 
based on which the institutional framework was selected.  The institutional 
configuration of the Egyptian economy is expected to largely correspond to that of its 
African counterparts explored in the work of Wood and Frynas (2006): the 
Segmented Business Systems (SBS) approach, as an extension of Whitley‘s 
institutional framework to developing countries.  The ways in which the Egyptian 
case corresponds to the African experience are to be explored throughout the study.  
Nevertheless, unlike the SBS approach, the aim here is not to typify the form of the 
Egyptian business system but to offer an institutional analysis of VET while putting 
more emphasis on the historical and political dimensions to institutional development 
in ways not provided by the SBS approach.  The ways in which institutional analysis 
can foster the understanding of the policy problem of VET and its development in 
Egypt are discussed in the next chapter.  
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4.  INSTITUTIONAL THEORY AND UNDERSTANDING THE VET SYSTEM 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter addresses two central questions:  (i) in what ways would institutional 
theory offer an understanding of VET? and (ii) how is it likely to offer an 
understanding of VET in Egypt?  Many theorists have relied on institutional analyses 
to explain the dynamics of VET and the institutional complementarities influencing 
the system and its development (e.g. Whitley, 1999; Thelen, 2004; Hall and Soskice, 
2004; Amable, 2003).  This chapter discusses these analyses in both developed and 
developing countries in an attempt to answer the first question.  The chapter then 
addresses the second question and offers suggestion as to the possible institutional 
complementarities and influences on Egyptian VET. 
 
4.2. UNDERSTANDING VET DYNAMICS  
For the first half of the twentieth century, the relative effectiveness and levels of 
investments in VET and skills development more generally was largely due to the 
problem of poaching externalities13, based on the work of Arthur Pigou Wealth and 
Welfare in 1912.  Later in the early 1960s, Gary Becker challenged this orientation 
and offered a completely different theorisation of investments in skills14 as part of his 
Human Capital theory(Boyer and Smith, 2001). 
                                                             
13 The idea that ―there is a positive externality between employers which may lead to under-investment 
in training‖ (Stevens, 1996:21) 
14 Research on the definition of skills is extensive. Some argue that it is merely a social construct but a 
pragmatic definition is adopted here.  In this study, the definition suggested by Sean Glynn and Howard 
Gospel is used to refer to skills as ―useful ability which is relatively scarce and therefore commands a 
premium in the labour market, either in the form of higher wages or superior work conditions‖ 
(1993:113).                                                                        
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Becker (1964) divided skills into (i) general skills which are beneficial to and 
transportable across many employers; and (ii) specific skills which are particularly 
advantageous and relevant only to the firm that employs the worker (Becker, 1993) 
and offered a different reasoning to investments in training and skills development, 
assuming a perfectly competitive labour market.  He argued that individuals would be 
more willing to invest in general skills, even if employers were not willing to do so, 
as in such a situation real wages are equivalent to their marginal product.  In the case 
of specific skills, both employers and employees will be willing to share investment 
in training as this will result in more productivity for the firm and wages above the 
rate of the market for that kind of skill.  Through this theorisation, Becker shifts the 
argument of under-investment in skills development from the poaching externalities 
perspective to another that emphasises the affordability of such investments by 
trainees and/or their families; in other words, capital constraints as (Becker and 
Tomes, 1986; Becker, 1993).  
 
Becker‘s work (1964) was a turning point in human capital theory; nevertheless, his 
thesis has been challenged for a number of obvious reasons.  First, the dualistic 
division of skills into general and specific skills was challenged by an argument for 
the availability of intermediary skills divisions (Finegold and Soskice, 1988; Stevens, 
1999; Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999).  Finegold and Soskice argue that the distinction 
between these categories is not clear cut  as in some instances firms would need a 
mixture of these skills, both general and specific,  This view is shared by other more 
institutionalist theorists  such as Acemoglu and Pischke who were very critical of 
Becker‘s work (1998; 1999a; 1999b).   
 
Others challenged this distinction and suggested other categories, such as firm- and 
industry-specific skills (e.g. Estevez-Abe, Iversen and Soskice, 2001) and transferable 
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skills.  The latter has gained popularity in VET and studies on skills development 
more generally (e.g. Stevens, 1999; Estevez-Abe, Iversen and Soskice, 2001; 
Shepherd, 2004; Sheldon and Thornthwaite, 2005; Lucio et al. 2007).  Transferable 
skills are those which are not specific to a particular firm, are relevant to many 
employers and are transportable and therefore much in demand.  Unlike Becker, 
Margaret Stevens (1999) argued that competition in this case does not result in an 
equalisation of real wages and marginal product; there is imperfect labour market 
competition.  For these reasons, workers will not be motivated to invest in skills 
acquisition as the returns on their investments will not be fully recaptured.  Indeed, 
employers in this situation will be willing to invest in skills and/or share in the cost of 
training.  Nevertheless, this raises the problem of poaching externalities as firms are 
likely to compete for skilled workers in such an imperfect labour market (Stevens, 
1999).  This scenario is not recognised by Becker as he bases his assumptions on 
perfectly competitive labour markets. 
 
Becker‘s ‗ideal-type‘ prediction of perfectly competitive labour markets is challenged 
by Acemoglu and Pischke, pointing out the possibilities of labour market 
imperfections.  They offer insights into the different motives for investments in skill 
development other than that offered by Becker‘s general/specific skills distinction.  
They refer to the influences of factors such as the relative efficiency of wage 
structures, the relative strength and effectiveness of unions and the asymmetry of 
information available to employers, in imperfect labour markets, and they support 
their arguments with examples from the developed world; mainly the German system.  
Hence, they draw the argument away from capital constraints (Becker, 1993) and to a 
wider view that accounts for the influences of various “labour market frictions and 
institutions” (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999: 539).  Nevertheless, Acemoglu and 
Pischke do not provide a detailed account of the institutional circumstances leading to 
the different configurations of training in different contexts (Lynch, 2007).  Such 
71 
 
arguments have been raised by literature on comparative capitalism which by that 
time started to gain ground.  The point is that neo-economic theories do not 
adequately capture why skills investments are made, and we recall here that neo-
economic theory has dominated discussion of Egyptian VET.  
 
One of the early and important contributions on this subject is the work of David 
Finegold and David Soskice (1988; Finegold, 1991; Soskice, 1991) which deployed 
institutional analysis to argue for Germany‘s high-skill equilibrium and Britain‘s low-
skill equilibrium (e.g. Finegold and Soskice, 1988:22).  These differences were 
explained in terms of the interactions of different institutional actors: individuals, 
employers, the government and the market for products.  For instance, Britain‘s 
under-investments in skills are argued to be a result of free rider problems, which 
discourage employers to invest in skills, resulting in a pool of low skilled labour.  The 
latter receive low remuneration and have low job tenure in these rapidly changing 
markets which in turn discourages individuals to invest in skills resulting in a vicious 
cycle that is not being effectively penetrated by the state as it follows a free market 
ideology where training is largely left to the private sector, individuals and firms in 
the market (e.g. Finegold and Soskice, 1988; Finegold, 1991; Soskice, 1991; Streeck, 
1992; Lane, 1992; Lane, 2002; Crouch, 2005).  This is not the case in Germany as 
discussed later.  Hence, emphasis on VET systems started to shift from a mere 
emphasis on the quantity of training as in previous accounts, to a wider explanation of 
the quality of skills and the context-specific influences leading to these 
characterisations (Thelen, 2004: 11).   
 
This literature has gradually been integrated with institutional theory thus offering a 
broader characterisation of VET systems by taking into account key institutional 
effects and complementarities.  This has helped explain  the relative effectiveness or 
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otherwise of VET in different economies (e.g. Whitley, 1992; Lane, 1992; Crouch 
and Streeck, 1997; Hall and Soskice, 2001; Aoki, 2001; Culpepper, 2003; Amable, 
2003; Thelen, 2004).  This is because institutional theory emphasises the value of 
integrating societal interests, through effective representation, on VET and its 
development.  It discusses the role of key social and political institutions which not 
only determine the quantity of VET, the relative investment or under-investment in 
training (e.g. Becker, 1964; Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999) but embed VET in wider 
societal and political structures that offer insights into the effectiveness of the VET 
system as a whole.  This allows for a deeper understanding of the role of intermediate 
institutions and the means in which these are influenced by the state, all of which 
affect the structure of VET and its development.  The effectiveness of these 
relationships in developing countries, such as Egypt, are largely uncertain since the 
state assumes a very interventionist role in the economy.  The means by which such a 
configuration influences VET is discussed below. 
  
The literature has focused on developed economies, so examples from these contexts 
are first discussed then the discussion shifts to examples from the developing world 
which is expected to be closer to the Egyptian case.  Finally, the chapter concludes 
with propositions on the ways in which the use of institutional theory in this study 
would be useful in our context. 
 
4.3. INSTITUTIONAL THEORY AND VET IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
There are many examples of VET successes, as well as failures, in the developed 
world. Institutional theory has been deployed to offer an understanding of the relative 
(in)effectiveness of these systems in different economies.  The German model has 
been extensively studied as the most successful example of VET in developed 
economies.  The institutional complementarities supporting German VET are 
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discussed below.  These are completely different from the institutional circumstances 
surrounding VET in developing countries, as exemplified in the case of East Africa in 
the work of Wood and Frynas (2006), where the political and economic environments 
are far less stable than in European environments for this type of analysis. .   
  
The German VET system is characterised by high levels of collaboration between the 
state, employers and unions which have all contributed to the system over time.  The 
state in Germany has been keen to involve institutional actors: works councils, 
employers‘ and workers‘ associations in VET.  The welfare state has co-evolved with 
high levels of VET skills, which have contributed to the development of the quality 
production systems; a German competitive advantage in high value-added markets 
(Hollingsworth and Boyer, 1997).   
 
The German state assumed a major role in developing VET policy in what became 
known as a highly co-ordinated business system (Whitley, 1999).  This in turn has 
resulted in ‗codetermination, coinvestment and certification‟ (Lynch, 2007: 297) of 
VET through close cooperation between these institutional actors.  This allows for the 
inclusion of the differential interests of each party, which are conflicting in nature, 
and for compromises to be reached through a process of collective bargaining.  Such 
cooperation also allows the state to benefit from reliable labour market information, 
which institutional actors share in such a relatively high-trust context.  Informational 
inputs help the state to arrive at effective and fruitful VET policies that take into 
account the needs of all parties involved (Culpepper, 1999; Clarke and Herrmann, 
2004).  This has been the case, for instance, in Eastern Germany, where the state 
benefited greatly from the inputs of employers‘ associations in directing its 
expenditures on VET and its development to target the needs of the firms which are 
likely to make the best use of these programmes (Culpepper, 2001).   Furthermore, 
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the triangulation of information enhances its overall validity and minimises the 
chances of state benefits and resources being captured by one party. 
 
Collective bargaining on a sectoral level is also beneficial in establishing an 
equalisation of wages across employers in the same sector.  This keeps wages out of 
competition, which largely addresses the problem of poaching externalities and 
instead shifts competition to the quality of the end product.  Employers are 
encouraged to invest in VET as a means of enhancing their quality and productivity, a 
long-term investment by nature, whilst not fearing the loss of their workers to free 
riders (Lane, 1992; Whitley, 1999; Culpepper, 2001).   
 
Such long-term investments are supported by a financial system based on long-term 
dealings, although lately this long-termism has been challenged by, for instance, 
recent  changes in the German financial system as argued by Christel Lane 
(2005:104).  Yet, the German system is quite different from other economies, such as 
the US, where the financial system emphasises short-termism and hence employers 
are less likely to lock-up their capital in long-term investments.  Thus, employers are 
not encouraged to invest in VET as workers can be relatively easily and quickly 
replaceable from the workforce of competing companies (Lane, 1992; Whitley, 1999; 
Thelen, 2004; Gospel and Pendleton, 2005).  On the contrary, in Germany the 
institutional circumstances emphasise the long-term retention rather than the 
replacement of workers. This has resulted in the development of relatively high levels 
of employer-employee interdependence, reinforcing employers‘ and workers‘ 
willingness to invest in VET (Whitley, 1999).  High levels of employer-employee 
interdependence are also supported, according to Whitley (1999), by the relatively 
high levels of trust in formal and/or impersonal institutions in the German context, a 
feature largely lacking in developing countries as discussed later.  This overall 
structure has also been supported by the increasingly important role of the state in 
German VET in recent years (Croucher and Brookes, 2009).   
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Finally, the social acceptance of VET, its importance and its tripartite structure are 
part of the Modell Deutschland15 (Streeck, 2005).  VET is deeply embedded in the 
German social fabric as an idea of Bildung and a concept of consistent development 
of skills across industries reinforced by collective bargaining and a mixture of 
sanctions and incentives developed through intermediate institutions (Thelen, 2004; 
Winch, 2006; Burgess and Symon, 2006).  This feature is not available in some other 
developed economies which attach a low social image to VET to an extent that has 
discouraged individuals from joining the system (Whitley, 1999). 
 
VET has not been as successful in other developed economies, such as the UK, an 
example of compartmentalised business systems according to Whitley (1999).  In 
case of the UK, the state has not equally supported and/or involved institutional 
intermediaries throughout the industrialisation process as has its German counterpart.  
The government does not legally enforce employers to engage in VET and tripartite 
relations are not strong enough to oblige employers to invest in VET.  This is a long-
term investment, which makes it even less attractive for British employers, who 
operate under a financial system that emphasises short-term and profitable 
transactions.  In other words, the financial system enforces an arm‘s length approach 
to dealings, investments and profits which discourages locking up capital in VET.  
Thus, employers focus on attracting skilled workers already available in the market; 
i.e. on poaching externalities.   
 
As for individuals, they find it costly to invest in their own VET, especially since 
returns on such investments cannot be guaranteed given the general low levels of 
wages, partly due to ineffective collective bargaining.  As a result, a pool of workers 
with low levels of VET is prevalent. This situation is challenging for the government 
                                                             
15 Modell Deutschland is argued to be threatened by recent legislative developments and economic 
underperformance (for details see Streeck, 2005; Burgess and Symon, 2006).   
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to fix on its own through investments in VET, mainly due to budgetary restraints and 
its free-market ideology (Finegold, 1991:95).  The British case has been described as 
one of low-skill equilibrium (Finegold and Soskice, 1988; Finegold, 1991; Lane, 
1992) a situation characterised by low levels of VET, low wages, low job tenure and 
low quality production systems (e.g. Finegold and Soskice, 1988; Finegold, 1991; 
Hollingworth and Boyer, 1997).   
 
Although the wider system in the UK does not support intermediary associations, the 
integration of employee representatives through trade union learning representatives 
(ULRs)16 has proved to be relatively fruitful and effective for  the development of 
VET (Wallis et al., 2005; Hoque and Bacon, 2008).  As trained unionists, ULRs are 
aware of the nature of employees‘ training needs and reservations about engaging in 
VET and thus are more likely to help them realise positive outcomes.  It is been 
argued that the relative effectiveness of the ULRs in the workplace will depend on the 
extent to which they effectively engage with employers, the relative strength of their 
union and the degree of support offered to ULRs (Munro and Rainbird, 2004; Hoque 
and Bacon, 2008).  Nevertheless, the experience of ULRs is a positive example of 
state‘s engagement with unions to improve VET both by encouraging employees and 
employers to take up the programs (Wallis et al., 2005).  Involvement of employee 
representatives also proved to be effective in the case of the US which largely 
corresponds to the UK model in terms of its approach to VET and tripartite relations.   
For instance, in the US construction sector there are two apprenticeship schemes. One 
is run solely by employers, the other jointly by workers‘ representatives and 
employers.  In his work on this case, Cihan Bilginsoy (2003) argues that programs of 
joint collaboration proved to be more fruitful than the ones unilaterally run by 
employers, in terms of the completion rates of apprentices.  These discrepancies are 
likely to originate from a higher level of understanding of apprentices‘ needs by 
                                                             
16 The initiative started by training the first ULRs in 2000 and was further supported by the British 
Employment Act (Section 43) in 2002 (Wallis et al., 2005; Hoque and Bacon, 2008) 
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unions‘ representatives in the joint scheme, an advantage lacking from the unilateral 
scheme (Bilginsoy, 2003).  Thus, positive effects can be obtained through union 
involvement even where the entire model does not support this.  
 
 
4.4. INSTITUTIONAL THEORY AND VET IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
 
The institutional configuration of developing economies supported the accumulation 
of ineffective VET policies, as exemplified in the work of Wood and Frynas (2006) 
which discusses the various political and social institutional complementarities that 
have led to the current characterisation of VET.  VET is deprived of the advantages 
provided by effective tripartite cooperative relationships available in the German 
model for example.  The German model, although very different, has nevertheless 
been frequently used as a point of reference for developing VET outside of the 
European context.   
 
Developing economies are institutionally configured in ways that offer little pressure 
and/or incentives for institutional actors to engage in VET, resulting in a vicious cycle 
of ineffective investments and outputs.  The cycle starts with the state. As indicated 
before, states in these countries tend to be highly antagonistic to intermediaries, 
including employers‘ and workers‘ organisations (Whitley, 1999; Wood and Frynas, 
2006).  The state has not been willing to empower unions in any way due to political 
considerations.  In the early years of independence, the state co-opted unions. Since 
then, these have been largely representative not of workers but of the state and its 
interests.  This has emasculated the collective voice of workers in the workplace and 
in turn severely lowered the effectiveness of collective bargaining with employers 
regarding VET, wage levels and other issues.   
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Employers have no incentives to invest in VET; there is no pressure from either the 
state or unions.  Poaching externalities is the more popular and cost-effective 
technique, as employers can make use of the low wage levels in the economy by 
offering slightly higher than average wages, which can still be low by international 
standards, to attract skilled workers in competing firms without investing their time 
and money in VET.  In these circumstances, individuals are also not incentivised to 
invest in their own VET as the returns on such investments are not rewarding given 
the low levels of wages and general benefits as well as the low levels of job tenure 
prevalent as a result (Harvey et al., 2002).   
 
The only party left to invest in VET is the state, whose investments have proved 
ineffective for a variety of reasons.  First, the ability of the state to offer reasonable 
levels of VET in developing countries is hindered by financial constraints.  Hence, the 
state tends to reduce investments in VET and focus more on general education which 
is usually less expensive than the former.  This trend corresponds to the general 
international trend of shifting emphasis from VET development to investments in 
basic education as a key to economic development in Third World countries, as 
explained in Chapter 2.  Second, as indicated in the previous chapter, the state in 
these contexts tends to focus on investments likely to yield short-term benefits for 
state and business elites rather than long-term investments as VET even if it is more 
beneficial for the strategic well-being of the economy (Jackson and Rosberg, 1994; 
Harvey, 2002; Wood and Frynas, 2006).  Thus, investments in VET and human 
resources development more generally are not amongst their priorities.   
 
 
Third, the lack of capacity to run VET effectively without the inclusion of key 
institutional actors has proved to be unfruitful from the experiences of developed 
economies and even in developmental states(Wade, 1990; Ashton et al., 1999).  
Although South Korea relied on high levels of state interventionist strategies and the 
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inclusion of labour market institutions seemed unnecessary, this view did not 
continue for long due to massive labour eruptions in the 1980s and then in the 1990s 
(Ashton et al., 1999; Lansbury and Wailes, 2005).  As a result, the South Korean 
government increased workers‘ involvement and engagement in the workplace 
through the Act Concerning the Promotion of Workers‘ Participation and Co-
operation.  This was also followed with the development of works councils which 
have played a role in empowering training plans on an enterprise level (Lansbury and 
Wailes, 2005; Croucher and Miles, 2009). 
 
 
These negative influences on tripartite relations and the VET system were magnified 
with the advent of structural adjustment programmes led by international financial 
institutions.  The influence of international institutions is not explicitly referred to in 
Whitley‘s institutional framework or in Wood and Frynas‘ archetype, the segmented 
business systems, despite its key influences on VET in developing countries and more 
generally on the economy as a whole17.  Their emphasis has been on showing the 
continuities in national systems.  Towards the end of the 1980s, the IMF and the 
World Bank called for structural economic adjustments to promote liberalisation and 
decentralisation of developing economies.  Many developing states failed to develop 
a deliberative capacity to negotiate the means or degree of such economic 
liberalisation with international institutions.  A deliberative capacity which Marian 
Negoita (2006) refers to as ‗the ability of the state managers to navigate between 
internal and external pressures in pursuing their goals‘ (2006:209).  For instance, 
Hungary had the political support to develop a deliberative capacity post 1989 in 
ways that states with similar conditions, such as Romania, had failed to develop.  This 
helped Hungary to escape some of the reforms suggested by International Financial 
Institutions post-1989, notably   shock therapy, in ways that were not possible for 
                                                             
17 The inclusion of international institutions as a key institution in Whitley‘s framework is one of the 
contributions of this study. 
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Romania for example (Negoita, 2006).  A deliberative capacity requires a political 
willingness and a clear political structure to be realised (Dryzek, 2009).  This 
willingness is likely to diminish in the midst of state fragmentation, personalisation 
and corruption; all of which reduce deliberative capacities and hinder the 
effectiveness with which international funds are allocated (Baliamoune-Lutz and 
Mavrotas, 2008).   
 
 
In many developing countries, structural adjustment programmes have had daunting 
influences on unions and labour rights including VET.  Lydia Fraile (2010) argues 
that the degree of negativity caused by structural programmes depends on the relative 
strength of tripartite relations in these countries before the reforms, which in the case 
of developing countries tend to be generally low.  Privatisation of public owned assets 
and enterprises in some East African countries has been oriented to the needs of state 
and business elites with little consideration for labour rights (Tangri, 2000).  Unions 
in these economies did not have the capacity or strength to defend workers and their 
rights and thus were likely to show little resistance throughout the processes of 
privatisation (Tangri, 2000; Friale, 2010).  With regards to VET, privatisation has 
increased the scope of the private sector, which is characterised by low levels of 
employer-employee interdependence.  
 
The high degrees of reliance on informal networks and interpersonal relationships as 
discussed in the previous chapter have had negative influences on VET in developing 
economies.  The generally low levels of trust in these economies and the paternalist 
style of management (Whitley, 1999) have reduced levels of employer-employee 
interdependence.  This lessens delegation of work to employees as well as decreasing 
job tenure, leading to higher rates of turnover, especially with the lack of means for 
workers to voice their demands and/or dissatisfaction (Rizov and Croucher, 2009).  
This leaves little incentive for either employers or employees to invest in VET.  
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Furthermore, in these developing economies interpersonal connections have become a 
main criterion for securing a job and less emphasis is put on individuals‘ skills, which 
further weakens individuals‘ willingness to develop their VET.  This is argued to be 
the case with Egyptian small and medium enterprises18 whose owners, due to the 
relatively low levels of trust, tend to place a higher emphasis on candidates‘ personal 
connections rather than VET to be qualified for the job (Soliman, 2007).  Most of 
these enterprises tend to put a higher priority on personal connections with candidates 
over their skill levels. This is not problematic, due to the relatively low levels of 
competition in the Egyptian market, and because many of these enterprises tend to be 
in the informal sector.  Such compromise is not as explicit in large enterprises and 
these enterprises can afford to have the risk mix of skills and to attract or rather poach 
skilled workers from competition firms in the market without the need to invest in 
skills, while keeping room for personally connected candidates who might not be as 
skilled (Soliman, 2007). 
 
 
4.5. CONCLUSION: INSTITUTIONAL THEORY AND VET IN EGYPT  
 
As exemplified in the cases of developed and developing economies, institutional 
analysis offers an understanding of VET levels in these contexts and institutional 
influences leading to such characterisation.  The Egyptian case is far from 
corresponding to the institutional efficiencies of developed economies, such as 
Germany.  In contrast, many of the institutional features and complementarities 
leading to VET ineffectiveness in developing countries are expected to be replicated 
in the Egyptian case, as discussed above with special reference to the African case in 
the work of Geoffrey Wood and George Frynas (2006). 
                                                             
18 SMEs represent up to 98% of non-agricultural GDP in some estimates, e.g. UNDP (2008). 
82 
 
One drawback of the institutional framework deployed (Whitley, 1999; Wood and 
Frynas, 2006) is the lack of a historical perspective to institutional arrangements 
(Radice, 2000).  This study steps back from the current situation in the Egyptian 
economy and tracks these developments down to its roots since Egypt‘s independence 
in the 1950s.  This enriches the analysis by embedding key institutional 
complementarities argued to have a direct influence on VET (Whitley, 1999; Hall and 
Soskice, 2001; Amable, 2003; Thelen, 2004) into its historical origins thus offering a 
more comprehensive understanding of two-way influences on institutions and one 
another, which is not provided in Whitley‘s framework.  Furthermore, the role of 
international organisations is discussed more explicitly than in Whitley‘s work 
throughout the study and through the case of the ILO social dialogue project in Egypt. 
 
Institutional analysis helps explain the levels and qualities of VET in different 
contexts.  In the case of Egypt, authoritarian and hierarchical relations are unlikely to 
stimulate (i) state-employer-union cooperation on a national level; and (ii) employer-
employee interdependence on an enterprise level.  Such an incoherent set of 
institutional arrangements are not likely to effectively sustain investments in VET.  
This proposition raises an important and our first research question: 
RQ1: In what ways has the institutional environment influenced VET in Egypt?   
This question is answered through a historically informed institutional analysis of 
VET in Egypt in the next chapter.  
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5.  INSTITUTIONAL INFLUENCES AND VET IN EGYPT  
 
 5.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter addresses the first research question and the propositions made in the 
previous chapter to explore the ways in which the institutional environment 
influences VET.  It starts with a discussion of the dominant institution in the Egyptian 
case; the state and the three paradigm shifts it has gone through since 1952.  The 
(semi) authoritarian and interventionist role of the state dictates that, at first, it 
dominates the VET system. Over time it has exhibited increased financial dependence 
on international organisations in developing the system.  Second, the state has 
marginalised institutional actors, leading to weak state-employer-union relations.  
These are examined through a set of continuities in state relations, among both 
employers and workers, through the paradigm discontinuities since 1952.  These 
weak institutional relationships have been reinforced by low levels of trust and high 
authority relations.  Such an institutional structure is argued to have not been 
supportive of the development of an effective VET system.  The chapter concludes 
with ILO attempts to enhance state-employer-union relations through its Social 
Dialogue Project.  The extent to which the project can realise effective results is 
questioned in the second and third research questions and explored over the next 
chapters.  
 
5.2. THE EGYPTIAN STATE SINCE 1952 
 
The Egyptian state cannot be defined in the Weberian sense as a meritocractic and 
effective bureaucracy.  Since the military coup in 1952, the state in Egypt has 
operated in a complex institutional and legal framework, largely in an inconsistent 
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and hierarchical manner (Yousfi and Humphrey, 2008).    The coup is the first in 
three paradigm shifts (Alissa, 2007:2) in Egyptian economic policies which shaped 
the role of the state in economic development till the present as discussed below. 
 
 5.2.1. First shift 1952-1973 
The Egyptian state has assumed an interventionist-redistributive character since the 
overthrow of the monarchy in 1952 (Yousef, 2004; Richards and Waterbury, 2008).  
The new regime, led by radical officers or the free officers as they became known 
later, attempted the redistribution of power and wealth consolidated by upper classes 
prior to the coup to middle and lower strata of the society (Hinnebusch, 1981; 2001).  
It has been argued that the populist regime did not have a clear political and/or 
economic strategy to realise these goals (Ikram, 2006; Beinin and Lockman, 1998; 
1998; Rousillon, 1998; Baker, 1978).  Instead, the broad objectives identified by the 
Revolution Command Council (RCC)19 were largely articulated by a series of 
political even on both the national and international arenas.  Thus, for instance, the 
Nasserist regime did not intend to minimise the role of the private sector El-
(Ghonemy, 2003). Rather this occurred as the state gradually shifted its external 
policies from the Western to the Eastern bloc (Beinin and Lockman, 1998; Brownlee, 
2007).  This shift started in 1954/55 when the United States rejected Egypt‘s request 
to increase its quota of arms, pushing Nasser to turn to the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics (USSR).  Egypt signed its first arms deal with Czechoslovakia in fall 
195520.  In the same year, Egypt‘s request for financial assistance from the West21 to 
build the Aswan High Dam was rejected after some initial approval to support the 
                                                             
19 Beinin and Lockman (1988) summarised these as: ―(1) the purification of political life; (2) the 
establishment of democracy; (3) the promotion of social justice; (4) the abolition of the remnants of 
feudalism; (5) the creation of a strong national army; (6) the assertion of full Egyptian independence 
and sovereignty‖ (1998: 418). 
20 This marked the beginning of USSR relations with Egypt and more widely with MENA (Dawisha, 
1979). 
21 The United States, Britain and the World Bank (Dawisha, 1979) 
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project, for a number of political reasons (Kassem, 2004; Dawisha, 1979).  In 
response, Nasser decided to rely on Egypt‘s own resources to finance the project and 
thus came the decision to nationalise the Suez Canal in 195622.  This then expanded 
into a wave of nationalisation of private entities throughout the 1960s, leading to a 
gradual diminishing of the private sector.  Also, the close relationship Egypt had 
established with the USSR on a political level was extended to the Egyptian economy 
as portrayed in the regime‘s increased social welfare strategies, plans for import-
substitute industrialisation, nationalisation of foreign and private assets and land 
reform; redistribution of land to the middle and lower classes (Dawisha, 1979; 2003).   
 
Towards the end of the 1960s, the Egyptian state became a largely authoritarian one, 
controlling the political and economic spheres, including the VET system, with 
almost no role for other independent institutional actors, such as employer‘s and 
workers‘ associations.  The state relied on a mixture of repressive and redistributive 
policies to co-opt different institutional actors who would otherwise oppose them 
(Cooper, 1979).  This can be illustrated through state-labour relations. Labour gained 
a lot of benefits under the Nasserist regime as compared to other political eras, but 
witnessed high levels of repression as explained later.    
 
Over the Nasserist era, the Egyptian state accumulated a number of structural 
weaknesses, such as a huge ineffective bureaucracy that inhibited rather than 
supported economic development, a largely insufficient and ineffective productive 
capacity and increased social welfare that started to go beyond the state‘s capacities.  
Statist policies to economic development were exhausted towards the 1960s, 
especially upon Egypt‘s defeat in the 1967 war.  More economic difficulties were 
encountered before the 1973 war and average growth rates dropped to 2.85% from 
1964/65 to 1973 from an average of 7.52% from 1959/60 to 1964/65.  This has led 
                                                             
22
 In 1958, the USSR offered Egypt a refundable loan at a 2.5 percent interest to build the Aswan High 
Dam (Dawisha, 1979; Abdalla, 1982; Ikram, 2006).  It was completed in 1970/71 with an overall cost 
of 500 million Egyptian Pounds (Bhatia et al., 2009).   
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the country to reconsider its external relations.  On a regional level, these encouraged 
Egypt to end the ideological cold war (Hinnebusch, 2001:114) with oil producing 
Arab states in return for their financial assistance (Luciani, 1990: 96).  On an 
international level, Egypt shifted its foreign policy away from the USSR, the largest 
international donor to Egypt from 1966 to 1972/73, and towards the much 
economically stronger West which marked the beginning of the second paradigm shift 
(Abdalla, 1982; Barnett and Levy, 1991; Hinnebusch, 2001; Ikram, 2006; Alissa, 
2007).  As a result, in 1974, the first economic liberalisation policy was launched; the 
open door policy or Infitah. 
 
5.2.2. Second shift 1974-1985 
The shift of state policies to the West was reflected in the adoption of economic 
liberalisation policies through the 1974 Infitah.  The Egyptian state started to move 
into a post-populist era characterised by reduced social welfare, reduced state support 
for the working class and an increasing empowerment of the state and bourgeoisie 
relations.  These changes resulted in shifting the ruling coalition from workers to 
private employers (Dawisha, 2003).  The latter have gradually gained power and 
some of them benefited from close connections with state officials which have led o 
the formation of a new business elite as explained later.  The former represented a 
significant social base for the Nasserist regime despite their ceremonial representation 
in policy making (Al-Sayyid, 2001:164).  This is because the Nasserist state 
successfully maintained a social contract with labour whereby workers were offered 
socio-economic benefits in return for their co-optation by the state (Posusney, 1997; 
Kassem, 2002; 2004).  Infitah abolished this social contract though state co-optation 
of labour was not altered (Al-Sayyid, 2001; Hinnebusch, 2001; Yousef, 2004).   
 
Infitah‟s new economic measures, together with political changes such as the 
introduction of a multi-party system, gave a liberal outlook to the regime to signify its 
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re-alignment with Western ideologies (Ottaway, 2003; Blaydes, 2008).  Nevertheless, 
these were carefully introduced and practiced in ways that preserved the authoritarian 
position of the state and did not expose the president or the government to any 
competition from social actors (Fahmy, 2002; Ottaway, 2003).  The new policies 
granted Egypt increased opportunities for international aid, especially from the United 
States and the World Bank, estimated to be more than 5.5 million US dollars during 
the period 1970-1977 (Baker, 1990; Barnett and Levy, 1991; Al-Sayyid, 2001; 
Hinnebusch, 2001).  Nevertheless, these also led to cuts in Arab Gulf aid (Crane et 
al., 2009) and hence the leverage of international donors and organisations, 
particularly the IMF and the World Bank, on the Egyptian state has increased.  Such 
influence has become particularly significant since the 1985/86 debt crisis (Harrigan 
and El-Said, 2010).   
 
In 1986, the economy suffered significant losses from oil exports due to the oil crisis.  
This left the economies of the Gulf‘s oil-producing countries in recession and many 
Egyptian workers there were made redundant.  This brought severely reduced 
remittances; an important source of foreign currency to the Egyptian economy, from 
an average of 8.0 to 2.0 billion US dollars in 1986.  These events were accompanied 
by a 90 percent decrease in revenues from tourism hit by terrorist attacks at that time 
(Clark, 2000; Ikram, 2006; Paczyńska, 2009).  All of these shocks came with a drop 
in GDP to 3.7 percent, an increase in the rate of inflation to 14.7 percent and more 
than a doubling in external debt, which rose from 21 to around 50 US billion dollars.  
The IMF agreed to reduce Egypt‘s debts by 50% in return for the Egypt‘s engagement 
in a program of economic stabilisation and structural reform in collaboration with the 
World Bank (Clark, 2000; Ikram, 2006; Paczynska, 2009).  The Economic Reform 
and Structural Adjustment Program was the beginning of the third paradigm shift 
(Alissa, 2007; Harrigan and El-Said, 2010).  
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 5.2.3. Third shift – Post 1990  
The Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Program (ERSAP) had three broad 
objectives.  First to achieve economic stability and regain macroeconomic balance.  
Second, to develop economic growth mainly through the re-direction of public 
expenditure to productive sectors of the economy.  Third, to open the economy to 
private investments and liberalise it from state dominance mainly through the 
program of privatisation23(ADBG, 2000; El-Ghonemy, 2003).  The regime undertook 
further economic liberalisation since then under IMF and World Bank pressures.  As 
in other developing and transition economies (e.g. Bartell and Payne, 1995; 
Greskovits,1998; Posusney and Cook, 2002), privatisation and economic 
liberalisation supported new ruling coalitions with business elites who are able to 
maximise gains under such economic changes as discussed later (section 5.8.1).   
 
Nevertheless, economic liberalisation was not coupled with an equal liberalisation of 
the political system.  Hence, economic reform did not alter the authoritarian character 
of the state but at best led to a semi-authoritarian state (Ottaway, 2003).  Semi-
authoritarian states ―combine rhetorical acceptance of liberal democracy, the 
existence of some formal democratic institutions, and respect for a limited sphere of 
civil and political liberties with essentially illiberal or even authoritarian traits‖ 
(Ottaway and Olcot, 1999:3).       
 
The reform process in Egypt has occurred over three generations, as described by 
Sufyan Alissa (2007:4).  First, from 1991 to 1998 the state took measures to stabilise 
the economy and it engaged in large scale privatisation estimated to represent around 
                                                             
23
 Privatisation refers to the transfer of state ownership of assets and/or more than 50% of shares in 
public enterprises to the private sector together with the opening of the economy to national and 
international private investments (Beinin and Waterbury, 1989; Kurland and Brohawn 1993; Omran, 
2007).   
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30% of state owned enterprises (El-Ghonemy, 2003; Ikram, 2006; Alissa, 2007).  In 
the second generation of reform, 1998-2004, emphasis was placed on enhancing trade 
and related legislations.  This has resulted in Egypt‘s engagement in a number of 
international trade agreements which had a positive influence on GDP growth rates.  
The third generation of reform has started in 2004 with the appointment of a new 
technocratic government composed of large business people and Western-educated 
reformers (Kienle , 2003; Alissa, 2007; Kolb, 2010).  The government accelerated the 
pace and scope of privatisation which was supported with financial sector and 
legislative reforms.  These policies were complemented with favourable external 
factors, most notably foreign aid24 as well as increases in oil revenues and in 
remittances.  As a result GDP reached unprecedented growth rates in many decades 
recording 6.8% in 2006/07 and 7.2% in 2007/08 (ENCC, 2009).  These advances 
were positively recognised by the World Bank which announced Egypt „the world‟s 
top reformer‟ in 2007 (El-Mahdi and Marfleet, 2009:2).  Nevertheless, these reforms 
did not extend to the institutional and economic structures as the country continues to 
suffer from inefficient bureaucracy, red tape and high levels of corruption25.  The 
latter was perceived to be the main impediment for doing business in Egypt, 
according to the Arab World Competitiveness Review in 2010 (Hanouz and Khatib, 
2010).   
 
Another major challenge to reform efforts is their ineffectiveness in realising effective 
social gains (Kienle , 2001; 2003; Alissa, 2007).  Reforms are argued to have been of 
little or no benefits to the average citizen, as for example, these led to increased cost 
of living and unemployment as well as increased redundancies as a result of 
                                                             
24
 Egypt received from the United States $705 million and $397 million, and from the EC $184 million 
and $183 million, in 2004 and 2005 respectively (Alissa, 2007).   
25
 Egypt was ranked  98 out of 105 countries with a score of 3.1- on a scale of 0 to 10 from rampant to 
least corruption levels- on the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index in 2010 
(Transparency International, 2010). 
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privatisation which in turn resulted in the expansion of the informal sector which 
grew at 5.3% per annum from 1998-2006 (Amin, 1995; Kassem, 2002; De Gobbi and 
Nesporova, 2005; Alissa, 2007; Paci and Serneels, 2007; Paczynska, 2009).  Social 
benefits from reform are expected to remain limited as long as key institutional 
actors, primarily employers‘ and workers‘ representatives, continue to be 
marginalised in policy making and implementation which is currently dominated by 
the state and business elites (as explained later) according to the prescriptions of 
international organisations (Alissa, 2007).   
 
Throughout the three paradigms, the state has been the main player in economic 
activities; a role which is still pivotal by international standards despite its reduction 
in recent years (Kassem, 2004; Ikram, 2006).  This characterisation is reflected in the 
VET system which has been dominated by the state with almost no inputs from 
institutional actors (Gill et al., 2000; Abrahart, 2003; ETF and World Bank, 2006).  
This is discussed in the next section together with the challenges facing the current 
system which have continually constrained VET since the 1950s.  The discussion then 
emphasises the means by which VET has been affected by key institutional influences 
as depicted in figure 5.1.  In our case, these include (i) low levels of trust and high 
authority relations; (ii) financial dependence on international organisations; and (iii) 
ineffective state-employer-union relations.   
 
5.3. VET STRUCTURE AND CHALLENGES 
VET in the formal sector has always been provided by the state through (i) formal 
education; and (ii) VET centres.  Other VET sources are private providers, Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs), and the informal sector.  The latter, despite its 
informality, has been a main source of vocational skills through informal 
apprenticeship (e.g. Harbison and Ibrahim, 1958; Cochran, 1986; Gill et al., 2000). 
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Figure 5.1: Institutional influences on VET (informed by Whitley’s Institutional 
Framework) 
 
 
5.3.1. VET as part of Formal Education 
VET is provided as part of the formal educational system by the Ministries of 
Education (MoE) and Higher Education (MoHE).  The former administers three- and 
five- year programs through its 1,600 technical and vocational schools whereas the 
latter administers two-year programmes throughout its 47 Middle Technical Institutes 
(Gill et al., 2000; ETF and World Bank, 2006).  Both ministries control all aspects of 
VET: funding, design, delivery and certification.  For instance, teachers are hired as 
civil servants rather than trainers with practical experiences.  Also, textbooks are 
written by technical school teachers and revised by MoHE syllabi committees without 
workers‘ and/or employers‘ participation (AED, 2008).  Recently there have been 
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attempts to involve employers in curriculum design through small teams of at least 
one professor, technical teacher and one employer.  Nevertheless, employers‘ 
contribution is argued to be small and unrepresentative of the needs of entire sectors 
as indicated by USAID26 (AED, 2008).    
 
As a result, VET has become divorced from reality with ineffective theoretical and 
practical curricula (Gill et al., 2000; Abrahart, 2003; ETF/World Bank, 2006; 
Cochran, 2008).  Practical training is offered in simulated learning environments, 
such as laboratories and workshops.  However, these have two major drawbacks.  
First, the available facilities and equipments tend to be out-dated and of poor quality 
mainly due to low funding (ETF and World Bank, 2006).   
 
For every individual in VET, the state allocates an average of 250 L.E. yet the 
estimated cost per person is 2000 L.E. to 2,500 L.E. Therefore the system is four to 
five times underfinanced (Gill, Fluitman and Dar, 2000).  Second, simulated 
environments are less helpful than on-the-job training.  The latter is rare due to poor 
state-employer-union relations (Mulder et al., 2006).  In the 1990s, an attempt to 
engage private companies in VET was initiated by the Mubarak-Kohl Initiative in an 
important yet controversial attempt by the state to develop VET as part of formal 
education.  
 
5.3.1.1. The Mubarak-Kohl Initiative (MKI) 
MKI was established in the 1990s upon President Mubarak‘s visit to the former 
German Chancellor Kohl where they agreed, inter alia, to establish a dual system of 
education in Egypt with Germany‘s technical assistance.  The ambitious programme 
aimed to establish links between the system of education and the workplace.  The 
                                                             
26 United States Agency for International Development 
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programme offers students in the vocational path practical on-the-job training for four 
days a week and school-based education for two. 
   
MoE lead the implementation of MKI by working closely with the German Agency 
for Technical Cooperation (Gtz).  The programme was put into action in 1995 and 
started as a pilot project in a limited number of cities, schools and private companies.  
These have expanded during 1995-2005 as shown in Table 5.1.  In 2008, with 20,000 
graduates from the programme since its establishment and 85% rate of employability, 
MKI was finally legally integrated into the Ministry of Education under Decree No. 
361/2008 (Grunwald, 2009) and the programme was expanded into a new phase 
intended to enhance the employability of MKI graduates through Mubarak-Kohl 
Initiative-vocational education, training and Employability Programme (MKI-
vetEP). 
Table 5.1: MKI involvement 1995-2005 
Number of 1995 2000 2005 
Schools 2 25 43 
Apprentices 220 4,500 9,300 
Graduates - - 11,000 
Occupations - - 28 
Participating cities 1 20 24 
Participation 
companies 
65 450 1,600 
 
(Amer, 2007:17) 
Despite its success, the MKI team describes their contribution to VET development in 
Egypt as ‗a drop in the ocean‘ (Grunwald et al., 2009:4).  There are currently 2.4 
million students in the vocational track in Egypt and their inclusion requires huge 
national-level reforms (Grunwald and Becker, 2009).  Such reforms are hindered by a 
number of challenges. One is ineffective bureaucracy and the relative inflexibility of 
94 
 
the public system of education in Egypt (Bardak, 2006).  For instance, it took MKI 
thirteen years of piloting before MoE agreed to legally integrate it into the system of 
education in Egypt in 2008.  Another problem is VET‘s unfavourable social image 
and its relative unattractiveness as compared to general education (Grunwald et al., 
2009).  There is also the absence of representative and cooperative employers‘ 
associations with which the MKI could negotiate on a national level (van Eekelen et 
al., 2001; Interview with MKI representative). 
  
 
5.3.2. Public VET centres 
The other source of formal VET is public VET centres.  A number of ministries offer 
industry-specific training.  This practice was introduced in the 1950s when the 
Ministry of Industry offered VET in different industrial sectors through the 40 
training centres of its Productivity and Vocational Education Training Department27 
(ILO, 1957; Harbison and Ibrahim, 1958).  The number of ministries offering VET 
has increased over the years. Today there are as many as 232 industry-specific public 
training centres as in Figure 5.2 (Dhillon et al., 2009)28.   
 
Public VET centres have always been run by the state without any financial or 
technical engagement from employers and/or unions.  As a result VET programmes 
have been insufficient to the requirements of the economy and the insufficiency of 
funds has negatively influenced the quality of outputs (Grunwald et al., 2009).  All of 
which have reduced the credibility of public VET centres and employers have been 
unwilling to cooperate with these centres and/or utilise their outputs (AED, 2008; 
Grunwald et al., 2009).   
 
                                                             
27
 See section 5.5.4 for PVTD establishment 
28 This is an indication of the fragmentation problem referred to in Chapter 2. 
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Figure 5.2: Fragmentation of VET across numerous Ministries and public bodies  
 
(Dhillon et al., 2009:7) 
 
As part of the renewed interest in VET development (as indicated in Chapter 2) the 
state established the Industrial Training Centre (ITC) in 2006 to improve the quality 
of VET.  The ITC operates under the umbrella of MOTI but it has a separate budget 
of around L.E. 500 million per annum (ITC, 2008).  It provides and/or supports VET 
programmes in a wide array of industries with a focus on five labour intensive 
priority trades: Engineering, Wood and Furniture, Construction materials, Food and 
Beverages and Textiles sectors29.   
 
In an attempt to enhance employers‘ utilisation ITC services, the state has largely 
subsidised its VET programmes.  The ITC started by subsidising 80% of VET 
programmes‘ costs and this increased to 90% of costs in 2009 to help employers 
through the financial crisis30; which is high by regional and international levels.  Such 
                                                             
29
 Fieldwork focuses on food and beverages, construction and textile sectors in addition to tourism. 
30 Interview with a senior representative at the ITC.  
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high subsidy levels are not new For instance, in 199831 the state allocated 0.7% of 
GDP to VET.  This sum was used to subsidise 92.7% of VET costs, training levies 
covered 3.7% of the costs and only 3.6% were employers‘ contributions.    
Nevertheless, these subsidies were not coupled with a quality service and thus were 
not effective in attracting employers.  The ITC aims to avoid such an outcome by 
enhancing the quality of its services which, together with the high subsidies, would 
enhance employers‘ interest in utilising their services32.   
 
A major attempt to increase the involvement of employers in VET is the TVET 
Reform Programme33; a match-funded project by the Egyptian government and the 
European Union, of €33 million from each party.  The programme aims to establish 
public-private partnerships or Enterprise-TVET Partnerships (ETPs) to upgrade VET.  
There have been some positive results (Box 1),34 yet the relative success of the project 
to date is controversial35.  There are also discrepancies between the programme 
outputs and its influence on a national level.  For instance, from 2005-2009 the 
programme trained 37,000 workers, job-seekers and certified trainers, a relatively 
large number of trainees for a single programme, but minimal in a labour market that 
expands by 900,000 new entrants on average each year (Assaad, 2007).  One of the 
major reasons for its limited effectiveness is the unavailability of a coherent 
institutional structure to support the programme and sustain it on a national level.  
For instance, there is not a clear structure for the organisation of employers in Egypt 
and hence their representativeness on the programme is very poor (Kassem, 2002).  
The process of incorporating the new concept of public-private partnerships into 
                                                             
31 The data of 1998 are the most recently available data. 
32  Interview with a senior representative at the ITC.  
33 Launched in September 2005 and ends in 2011. 
34 A detailed discussion of the results of the project and its evaluation is beyond this scope of this study 
but an evaluation summary 
35 Interview with ITC senior representative and VET consultant. 
97 
 
Egyptian public sectors is not expected to be a smooth one in a country with a 
relatively inflexible public sector that has been the only player in the market for 
decades and largely lacking institutional prerequisites (van Eekelen et al., 2001). 
 
 Box 1. Summary of the quantitative achievements of the TVET Reform 
Programme  
 
 37,000 students, workers and job-seekers and certified trainers 
 2,600 trainers trained 
 1,100 audits and training needs assessments of private sector enterprise and 
TVER service providers 
 160 skills standards for skill levels 1 to 3 developed 
 110 training packages developed 
 100 in-company training centres established 
 40 decision makers participated in 8 study visits to 65 TVET institutions in 10 
countries 
 30 curricula developed 
 29 training workshops received new equipment 
 26 TSSs received new equipment 
 12 sectoral Enterprise –TVET Partnerships established 
 8 local Enterprise- TVET Partnerships established 
 3 sectoral training councils established 
 
 
(TVET, 201036) 
 
5.3.3. Other Sources of VET 
Other sources of VET include private VET centres, NGOs and informal 
apprenticeships.  The contributions of private VET providers and NGOs37 tend to be 
                                                             
36
 Available online 
37 Defined as ―groups and institutions that are entirely or largely independent of government and 
characterized by humanitarian or cooperative rather than commercial objectives‖ (Korten, 1991:21).  
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limited (ETF and World Bank, 2006; Amer, 2007).  A major challenge is the lack of a 
clear structure and criteria for the delivery, evaluation and certification of VET in 
Egypt.  In other words, the absence of national quality standards (which are currently 
being developed in cooperation with the Scottish Qualification Authority) has 
reduced the perceived quality and reliability of private VET providers and NGOs as 
there are no criteria for assessing their performance (Abrahart, 2003; Amer, 2007).  
However, the role of NGOs and their potential in developing VET is positively 
perceived by representatives from the ITC and MoE38.  Yet, a major challenge is their 
limited technical and financial capacities which confine their scope of influence 
(Clark, 2000; Abdelrahman, 2004; Leila, 2006).   
 
Finally, a major source of VET is informal apprenticeships (Harbison and Ibrahim, 
1958; Cochran, 1986; Klock and Lim, 1998; Gill et al., 2000).  These cannot be 
overlooked in an economy dominated by micro and small enterprises most of which; 
up to 82% according to ILO estimates, operate in the informal sector (El Mahdi, 
2002; Moktar and Wahba, 2002).  Informal apprenticeships offers workers basic 
vocational skills and it has been traditionally based on the experiences of senior 
workers instead of certain curriculum or quality standards (Harbison and Ibrahim, 
1958) and it is not likely to be in line with the latest technologies in the field.  Hence, 
it results in a poorly trained pool of workers with relatively low productive 
capacities.  Such VET levels do not grant workers job opportunities in the formal 
sector and even if they work as part of a formal sector organisation they remain 
informally employed.  Thus, they remain in the informal sector and pass on their 
experiences to other informal apprentices and the system goes on in a vicious cycle 
(Assaad, 1993; Gill et al., 2000).  A common example is the building and 
                                                                                                                                                                               
They offer VET to individuals, mostly from disadvantaged and poor backgrounds, in various trades 
(ETF and World Bank, 2006).   
38 Interviews in Phase (1) – see Chapter 6. 
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construction sector where informal apprentices/workers represent 83% of workers 
(Asaad, 1993; Gill et al., 2000).  This phenomenon has had negative influences on 
the quality of the sector which has a high potential of growth (World Bank, 2009).   
 
The problem of huge informalisation of both the business environment and work 
relations is a serious constraint to VET development (Klock and Lim, 1998; Moktar 
and Wahba, 2002).  These have daunting effects on the motivations of employers and 
employees to invest in the system (Wood and Frynas, 2006) as explained before.  
These are more complicated with the relatively low levels of trust and the paternalist 
style of authority relations, all of which result in a vicious cycle of low employer-
employee interdependence, low levels of delegation, low job security, low pay and 
little incentive to invest in VET.  Informal apprenticeships and more generally the 
informal sector is a major challenge to VET development as shown later. 
 
 
5.4. VET AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS 
 
Like other economic activities, Egyptian VET receives financial and/or technical 
assistance from a variety of organisations, some of the projects are shown in Table 
5.2.  There is no single model for the development of VET but rather each donor 
agency suggests its development model while offering financial assistance arguing for 
alterations to suit the Egyptian context.  Nevertheless, these prove to be of limited 
effectiveness as illustrated by the examples of MKI and TVET reform programme 
due to the incoherence of institutional structures as argued here.  These have also 
added to VET fragmentation which, together with ineffective coordination of donors‘ 
efforts, have hindered rather than supported the development of VET in general (Gill, 
Fluitman and Dar, 2000; ETF and World Bank, 2006; De Gobbi and Nesporova, 
2006).   
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Table 5.2 – Examples of some VET development projects in Egypt in 
cooperation with international organisations 
PROJECT TARGET FUNDING 
Technical & Vocational 
Education & Training 
reform project 
 
 
Blue collar 
 
Matched funding (EU & 
Egyptian Gov.) of € 66 
mil. From 2005-11 
 
Skill Development Project 
$15 mil. Project from 
2004-10: 
 48% Egyptian 
Government 
 44% World Bank 
loan 
 8% SMEs 
Productivity and 
Vocational Training 
Department 
Training centres across 
VET (since 1957) 
 
Government (& 
collaborates with various 
international bodies, such 
as Gtz, Japanese 
International Cooperation 
Agency, City & Guilds) 
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National Skills Standard 
Project 
Developing Egyptian 
Vocational 
Qualifications (EVQs) 
up to level 3 for 105 
trades in 3 key sectors; 
manufacturing (22 
trades), construction (59 
trades) & tourism (24 
trades) 
Egyptian Government 
(the Social Fund for 
Development) & a 
consortium of European 
donors led by the British 
Council. A total of $5.5 
mil. And L.E.5.5 mil. 
(2000-05) 
 
Foreign Trade Training 
Centre 
 
Specialised training 
centres for export 
marketing & promotion 
 
MoTI  (close 
collaboration with the 
Japanese government) 
(Soliman, 2008:7) 
 
5.5. CHALLENGES TO THE CURRENT STRUCTURE OF VET 
 
The above discussion indicates three important structural challenges to VET; (a) high 
centralisation; (b) low levels of coordination and cooperation; and (iii) the informal 
sector. 
 
5.5.1. High Centralisation  
The Egyptian state has always had a dirigiste approach to VET.  The relatively high 
centralisation of VET deprives the system from the inputs of main institutional actors; 
employers and unions.  Low levels of state-employer-union cooperation deprive VET 
102 
 
of important privileges, most notably of effective Labour Market Information39 (LMI) 
which is currently weak (Amer, 2007).  LMI is crucial to the planning of human 
resources development in the country and without the input of workers and 
employers, the reliability of the information provided decreases (Mangozho, 2003; 
Cully, 2006).  In the collaborative German model, which Egypt aspires to apply, VET 
benefits from the employers‘ and workers‘ inputs which enrich the system and points 
out deficiencies (Hollingsworth and Boyer, 1997; Thelen, 2004).  Even with the 
increased role of the state in recent years, the role of collective employer and labour 
bodies in the case of Germany has remained crucial to its effectiveness (Croucher and 
Brookes, 2009).   
 
Even in developmental states, such as South Korea, where the state has assumed a 
relatively high interventionist role and labour was repressed throughout the 1960s and 
1970s (Ashton et al, 1999; kwon, 1994), the involvement of employers and workers 
was inevitable towards the 1990s (Wade, 1990; Croucher and Miles, 2009).  This is 
not the case with Egyptian VET, similar to its African counterparts, and hence labour 
market information, whenever available, is not reliable (Grunwald et al., 2009) and 
VET continues to be developed in segregation from the actual requirements of 
employers and workers.  
 
5.5.2. Low levels of Coordination and Cooperation 
VET is very fragmented as indicated above with minimum levels of cooperation and 
coordination amongst the various Ministries and public bodies involved in its 
provision.  This has left the system with: (i) high levels of duplication of tasks and 
                                                             
39 Defined by the ILO as ―any information concerning the size and composition of the labour market or any 
part of the labour market, the way it or any part of it functions, its problems, the opportunities which may 
be available to it, and the employment-related intentions or aspirations of those who are part of it‖ (Thuy et 
al., 2001:57) 
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development efforts (Bardak, 2006) which becomes more complicated given the 
various aid projects for VET development by international organisations; and (ii) high 
levels of competition for the limited resources and for recognition of achievements 
rather than cooperation, such as the case with the MoTI and MoE (Gill et al., 2000; 
OECD, 2010).    
 
An important initiative to reduce the fragmentation of the system is the Supreme 
Council on Human Resource Development (SCHRD).  The SCHRD was been 
established in 1982 but reactivated in 2000 by another Presidential decree (ILO, 
2010).  The Council aims to represent the major Ministries and social partners, 
employers and unions, in a single body that becomes responsible for all aspects of 
human resources development in Egypt including VET (Abrahart, 2003).  
Nevertheless, the council is largely ineffective and social partners‘ participation is 
argued to be „nominal at best‟ (ETF and World Bank, 2006:22).   
 
5.5.3. Informal sector 
The informal sector refers to those ―enterprises that do not abide by the operating 
rules and regulations on a formal basis, such as acquiring a business licence, 
commercial/industrial registration or maintaining regular account books‖ (El Mahdi, 
2002:1).  The informal economy is a very problematic aspect of the Egyptian 
economy and MENA economies more generally (El Mahdi, 2002; ILO, 2007).  It is 
argued to be a result of IMF/World Bank structural adjustment programmes and 
privatisation (Amin, 2000; 2001; Wahba and Moktar, 2002).  The share of the 
informal economy of total employment in Egypt is estimated to be as high as 55% of 
non-agricultural employment40 (Agénor et al., 2003).  Such a large percentage of 
workers remain without any effective organisation, representation and/or 
development including VET.   
                                                             
40 This problem is shared by other MENA countries; Syria is the country with the lowest  employment 
in the informal sector at 42% of non-agricultural employment (Agénor et al., 2003) 
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These factors have daunting effects on the motivations of employers and employees 
to invest in VET as returns on their investments are not guaranteed (Wood and 
Frynas, 2006).  These are further complicated by the relatively low levels of trust and 
the paternalist style of authority relations which are directly related to productivity, 
firms‘ performance and decisions to invest in VET (Finegold and Soskice, 1988; 
Thelen, 2004; Tzafrir, 2005; Rizov and Croucher, 2009;).  All of which result in a 
vicious cycle of low employer-employee interdependence, low levels of delegation, 
low job security, low pay and therefore low incentives to invest in VET. 
 
5.5.4. Historically Rooted Challenges 
There has been a half-century of experience of the same challenges to VET (Gheita, 
1974; Cochran, 1986; ILO, 1986).  These go back to the Nasserist era when there was 
an increased demand on VET due to various policies, such as import substitute 
industrialisation, nationalisation and the construction of the High Dam (Ellis, 1955).  
The state sought ILO technical assistance to enhance VET effectiveness (Ellis, 1955).  
Some action plans were implemented. For example, a new law was passed that 
necessitated the establishment of advisory committees to advise on the needs of the 
industry.  These regional centres operated under a Central Advisory Commission and 
had representatives both from the government and from the industry.  Workers were 
not represented on these educational councils but were part of the advisory council of 
the Productivity and Vocational Training Department (PVTD) established in 1954 
with ILO technical assistance.  The body was established as a tripartite entity with 
state, employers‘ and workers‘ representatives.  Nevertheless, the proportion of these 
representatives was not balanced; employers‘ and workers‘ representatives were a 
minority as compared to the state.  This was not helpful as employers and workers 
were originally not interested in contributing to VET.  Hence, the whole programme 
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became dominated by the state, former civil servants and government personnel 
(Ellis, 1955; Harbison and Ibrahim, 1958). 
   
Since then, VET development has become limited to the recommendations of the ILO 
and other national and international bodies that analysed the problem as one of VET 
supply and demand mismatches.  VET development has focused on addressing the 
same set of challenges (Gheita, 1974; Cochran, 1986; ILO, 1986).  In other words, 
VET development projects have largely and consistently been failing to address VET 
challenges.  I argue that the primary reason for these failures is that development 
efforts have not addressed the historically rooted key institutional challenges facing 
VET.  These are embedded in a (i) system of trust and authority relations; and (ii) 
financial system, which have not been supportive of collaborative relationships 
between institutional actors. 
 
5.6 . KEY INSTITUTIONAL INFLUENCES 
 
5.6.1. Trust and Authority Relations 
The Egyptian context is characterised by low levels of trust in formal and impersonal 
relations and hierarchical authority relations or in Hofstede‘s typology; high power 
distance41 (Harbison and Ibrahim, 1958; Al Heeti and Brock, 1997; Hofstede. 1997; 
Hatem, 2006); characteristics shared with other developing countries in Africa (Wood 
and Frynas, 2006).   
 
On a political level, the aforesaid dysfunction is reflected in high degrees of 
neopatrimonalism in Egypt. The latter refers to ―a system of rule in which a top figure 
within the state hierarchy governs mainly through a network of personal and informal 
                                                             
41 Egypt ranks 80 in high power distance 
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relations‖ (Bank and Richter, 2010:2).  These personal relationships govern the 
recruitment of political elites who are categorised according to their personal/political 
loyalty to the ruler.  The new elites then rely on their personal relations to recruit 
clients to major political and economic positions. This same pattern continues down 
the political hierarchy (Abdelnasser, 2004; Bank and Richter, 2010).  Such a structure 
increases the chances of clientelism whereby elites could secure access to and 
redistribute state‘s limited resources to their personal clients in return for personal 
gains (Lust, 2009).  All of which adds to corruption, and constrains attempts for 
effective institutional changes that would alter the status quo. 
 
On an economic level, neopatrimonalism and reliance on personal networks have 
formed the basis of private sector development and expansion especially since the 
1990s (Yousfi and Humphrey, 2008; Abdel-Latif and Schmitz, 2009; 2010).  These 
proved to be more beneficial for business people than formal channels. Employers‘ 
associations, in realising individual rather than collective business interests, thus 
distorted the lobbying structure in Egypt (Wurzel, 2004; Alissa, 2007).  This has been 
the case as well with unions whose leaders are privileged with close connections to 
the state and thus have little interest in a genuine representation of workers on the 
grass-roots levels (Kassem, 2002; 2004; Alissa, 2007).  These relationships have not 
been supportive of state-employer-union cooperation as discussed later.    
 
On an enterprise level, low trust levels and paternalist authority relations have been 
reflected in low levels of employer-employee interdependence (Harbison and 
Ibrahim, 1958; Hatem, 2006).  These are more evident in Egyptian enterprises, both 
in the public and private sectors, than in Multi-National Corporations which tend to 
emphasise Western values (Hatem, 2006:204) of relatively high trust, formal 
authority relations and higher levels of investments in workers‘ skills, including VET 
(Harbison and Ibrahim, 1958; Hatem, 2006; Soliman, 2007).  Such relationships have 
107 
 
failed to arouse employers‘ and workers‘ interest to invest in VET as explained in 
Chapter 4.  Hence, VET, has remained primarily influenced, and been largely 
constrained, by the single key institution at the top of the hierarchy; the state.   
 
5.6.2. The Financial System 
Financial reforms as part of the ERSAP in Egypt are directing the system more 
towards capital-based financial systems (Kalhoefer and Salem, 2008) though it cannot 
be argued that it falls precisely within any of the two categories suggested by Whitley 
(1999).  One of the most relevant features of the new reforms is an emphasis on short- 
rather than long-term dealings.  As indicated by Culpepper (2001), these tend to have 
negative influences on VET investments normally long-term.   
 
An important feature emphasised by Wood and Frynas (2006) but not Whitley (1999) 
is the sources of funds into the financial system.  International organisations and 
donor agencies have played an influential role in the Egyptian economy.  Transfers of 
financial resources from international organisations have always been conditional 
upon policy amendments and further liberalisation of the economy, as shown in 
examples from post-communist Eastern European and Latin American economies 
(Gradev, 2001; Upchurch, 2009; Paczyńska, 2009).  Egyptian VET is not an 
exception as these organisations guide investments in VET according to the models 
they propose with minimum coordination amongst the various donors and/or VET 
development projects. 
 
More generally, structural adjustment programmes led by the IMF and World Bank 
have weakened rather than enforced the role of key institutional actors (Posusney and 
Cook, 2002; Friale, 2010).  Workers‘ organisations have been particularly negatively 
influenced by economic liberalisation promoted by international organisations 
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(Upchurch and Weltman, 2008; Friale, 2010).  All of this have negatively influenced 
levels of VET investments. 
 
5.6.3. State-Employer-Union Relations  
State‘s relationships with employers and workers have developed differently 
throughout the three paradigm shifts explained above.  Underlying these 
discontinuities are a set of continuities in an empowered position of state-employer 
relations and emasculated levels of state-labour relations since 1952. 
 
5.6.3.1. State-Employer Relations since 1952 
State-employer relations have completely changed since the Nasserist era.  
Nevertheless, these developments have empowered certain segments and not the 
business community as a whole. 
i. First shift 1952-1973    
At the beginning of the 1950s, the private sector represented 76% of total investments 
in Egypt (Ghoneim, 2003).  It continued to be a major player in the Egyptian 
economy for a few years after the coup especially since, as indicated earlier, 
nationalisation of the private sector was not amongst the objectives of the coup 
(Beinin and Lockman, 1998).  The scope and role of the private sector in Egypt has 
been largely influenced by the Suez Canal nationalisation.  Since then there has been 
an increasing conviction that the state needed to play a more interventionist role in 
industrial and economic development (Mabro, 1974; Beinin and Lockman, 1998; 
Brownlee, 2007).  A wave of nationalisation of foreign enterprises followed and in 
1957 Nasser‘s government established a special agency to manage the newly 
Egyptianised foreign companies.  In the 1960s, nationalisation extended to private 
enterprises owned by Egyptians as well.  Nationalisation has boosted the share of the 
public sector in the economy.  In the 1960s, the public sector controlled around 74% 
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of gross investment as compared to around 28% in 1952 (Ghoneim, 2003; Ikram, 
2006).  
 
By the early 1970s, the share of the private sector in total investments had been 
severely accounted for only 6% of total investments (Ghoneim, 2003).  The 
repression of the private sector did not prove to be economically rewarding. On the 
contrary, it resulted in inefficient mechanisms which have increasingly impeded 
investments and economic development in Egypt up to present (Ikram, 2006; Yousfi, 
2008).  In addition to lack of competition and exposure to foreign markets, the state‘s 
control of investments led to the establishment of large inefficient bureaucracies and 
over-staffed hierarchical organisations (especially as Nasser declared full employment 
of university graduates in the early 1960s).  State‘s investments were not linked to 
productivity or performance levels since these were financed through nationalisations 
and external borrowing (Abdalla, 1982; Waterbury, 1985; Richards and Waterbury, 
2008).  This has developed a largely inefficient productive capacity that was not 
capable of sustaining the economy when these resources dried out towards the end of 
the 1960s.  Finally, the 1973 war with Israel marked the end of the „socialist 
experiment‟ as described by John Waterbury (1985:67) in Egypt and the beginning of 
a new political and economic era under Sadat‘s infitah or liberalisation policies 
(Ikram, 2006; Alissa, 2007).      
 
ii. Second Shift 1974-1985 
Infitah policies were coupled with changes in the ruling coalition.  This marked an 
important point in developing closer state-employer relations in Egypt Post-1952.  
The state encouraged investments from private owners, most of whom were victims 
of Nasser‘s populist policies and therefore were supportive of Sadat strategies.  From 
the state‘s perspective, these were the most important strata of society to the new 
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liberalisation policies (Hinnebusch, 2001; Kienle, 2001; 2003; Yousef, 2004).  For 
instance, in 1971 Sadat issued Law No.34/1971 repealing the government‘s ability to 
confiscate private property without a legal order (Beattie, 2000; Moustafa, 2007).  
This was a positive step towards assuring private investors of the end of the 
nationalisation era under Nasser.  The share of the private sector started to grow and 
during this period the first time since Egypt‘s independence an employers‘ 
association; the Egyptian Businessmen‘s Association (EBA) was formally established 
and registered in 1975 and 1979 respectively (Giugale and Mobarak, 1996; Kassem, 
2002). 
  
Most of the new private activities were concentrated in the service sector (import 
activities in particular), with investment in production decreasing.  This resulted in 
the formation of a huge consumption capacity that was not counterbalanced with 
sufficient levels of production (Beattie, 2000; Hinnebusch, 2001).  This contributed 
significantly to the debt crisis of the mid-1980s (Beattie, 2000; Ikram, 2006).  The 
benefits of trade liberalisation and increased international exposure were limited to a 
relatively small number of Egyptian employers.  With time a new class of private 
employers and owners, similar to the industrial bourgeoisie of before 1952, emerged 
into the business elite. These were closely related to the regime and were able to 
secure their personal interests.  As a result, the levels of clientelism increased and new 
monopolies in the private sector started to be created, such as El-Ezz steel which 
shares around 70% of the steel market (El-Din, 2007) and the levels of corruption and 
lack of competition have been on the rise (Kienle, 2003; Alissa, 2007).   
  
iii. Third shift 1986-2011 
The interpenetration between the state and business elite has gradually increased since 
the Infitah and was reinforced by the ERSAP (Alissa, 2007).  Later in 2007, for the 
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first time since Infitah, the changes in the social contract between the state and society 
were confirmed and formally incorporated into the Egyptian Constitution42.  The 
socialist values that have persisted in the Constitution since 1971(and amended in 
1980) including the state‘s guaranteed role in managing the economy and allocating 
resources through the public sector, were changed  to emphasise the major role of 
market forces and to assign the state a regulatory one (Kienle, 1998; Alissa, 2007; 
Moustafa, 2007).  
 
The ESRAP was a significant turning point for such changes.  Pressures from the IMF 
and World Bank to liberalise the economy were not favourably perceived by state 
officials and elite who feared losing political and economic power and gains to other 
groups.  Hence, the scope and pace of liberalisation remained limited till the mid-
1990s.  Meanwhile, the ESRAP empowered some actors who were close to state 
elites and at the same time supportive of economic liberalisation.  Thus, a new elite, 
one that exhibited its power through influencing access to capital, aid and foreign 
direct investment, started to gain strong hold (Abdelnasser, 2004; Alissa, 2007; Bank 
and Richter, 2010).  This has proliferated in the establishment of the new Policies 
Committee in the National Democratic Party (NDP), the ruling party in Egypt to 
which the President‘s son; Gamal Mubarak was appointed as a president in 2002 and 
which has a number of Western-educated technocrats, academics and businesspeople 
for members (Alissa, 2007; El-Din, 2007; Kolb, 2010).  
 
Nevertheless, the empowerment of these elite is not an indication of an effective 
empowerment of the business community as a whole.  Despite the quantitative 
increase of businesspeople in the parliament ) 71 members in the parliamentary term  
                                                             
42 Especially through Articles 4 and 24 which deal with the nature of the economy and the state‘s role in 
it, respectively (Alissa, 2007). 
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1995-2000 rising from 7 members in 1979-84), it is argued that their representation is 
merely quantitative without any effective involvement in policy making (Hashem and 
El Mikawy 2002: 49, 57).  Also, the interests of small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs), which represent 80% of the GDP and 99% of the non-agricultural private 
sector, are not represented in this ‗business community‘ (Alissa, 2007: 19).  As such, 
the effective involvement of institutional actors business community and unions (as 
shown later), have been curtailed.    
 
The business community in Egypt is relatively fragmented with poor levels of 
organisation, weakening its bargaining position (Hashem and El Mikawy, 2002).  
There are some exceptions, such as the British Egyptian Businessmen Association 
(BEBA43) and, on a regional level, the Alexandria Businessmen Association (ABA) 
and the 6th of October Investors‘ Association, which are relatively organised and have 
been relatively successful in voicing their members‘ demands (Kolb, 2010).   
 
The only employers‘ association with formal capacity to participate in socioeconomic 
policies is the Egyptian Federation of Industries or EFI (Kassem, 2002).  The EFI 
works under close guidance of the Ministry of Trade and Industry.  The Ministry 
considers the EFI to be ―the eye which allows the government to see the problems of 
industry‖ (Kassem, 2002: 71).  Despite its independence of the state, the EFI formally 
represents employers not only locally but internationally  , for example on the ILO 
and its International Labour Conference (ILC).  Other employers‘ associations such 
as the EBA, BEBA and ABA, are sometimes invited to participate in some ministerial 
meetings and discussions yet they do not have any formal influence on state policies 
except through the EFI.  These associations therefore rely on informal networks to 
win the support of the state and (Kassem, 2002).  For instance, BEBA and ABA have 
                                                             
43 (sic) 
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had a relatively active role in supporting VET development in recent years. Some 
ABA members have offered training opportunities for Mubarak-Kohl Initiative for 
instance and BEBA was one of the main sponsors of the Egypt-UK Partnership 
Conference on VET development in December 200844.   
 
State-employer relations have strengthened since 1952 but in an uneven manner.  
Only a limited faction of the business community is able to benefit from 
developments in state-business relations.  The wider business community continue to 
be misrepresented with limited influence on socioeconomic policies, including VET.  
This is part of the segmentation of the economy referred to by Wood and Frynas 
(2006).  The situation is worse within workers‘ organisations.  Labour has not 
enjoyed any improvement in state-labour relations since 1952 and their representation 
in socioeconomic policy making continues to be a ceremonial one.    
 
5.6.3.2. State-Labour Relations since 1952 
Workers‘ participation in VET has never been effective as shown in the examples 
above. Marginalisation of workers from the political and economic arenas has been 
part of the state policies since the military coup in 1952.  This has resulted in the 
development of confused state-labour relations and consequently state-employer-
union cooperation over time 
 
i. First shift 1952-1973    
The working class played an active role in resisting British colonialism in Egypt, 
which came to an end in July 1952 (Chaichian, 1988).  They considered the military 
coup to be a victory for Egyptian labour against colonialism and the bourgeoisie and 
                                                             
44 Refer to Chapter 6 on Methodology and Methods for details. 
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they had high expectations for labour support in the new era (Beinin and Lockman, 
1998).  Nevertheless, the new state worked on issuing laws that aimed to shift unions 
from the pluralism enjoyed before 1952 to state corporatism (Bianchi, 1986).  The 
first set of laws was issued in September 1952 offering more rights to workers in 
response to Kafr Al Dawar incidents when workers went on strike in August 1952 
calling for more benefits (Beinin and Lockman, 1998; Posusney, 1997).  The new 
state reacted furiously to the strikes which ended with the arrest of many workers and 
the execution of the strike‘s leaders (Beinin and Lockman, 1998).  Kafr Al Dawar 
incident, which was a pivotal point in state-labour relations as it demonstrated the 
new regime‘s intolerance to any behaviour that could threaten its control, even if it 
was initiated by and for the benefit of the working class (Posusney, 1997).  The new 
laws were coupled with a decree ruling strikes or any form of organised labour action 
illegal.  This implicit bargain between workers and the state was the beginning of 
what Joel Beinin and Zachary Lockman refer to as the ‗historic compromise‟ 
(1998:455) initiated later in 1954.  Through the historic compromise the state agreed 
to grant workers more economic and social benefits in return for unions‘ submission 
to the state; a strategy which proved to be successful.  As a result, the labour 
movement went under the tutelage of the regime  
 
Another important step towards the overregulation of labour was the establishment of 
the Egyptian Trade Union Federation (ETUF) under the auspices of the state in 1957.  
Workers in the public sector have since been automatically registered in one of the 
twenty three union federations which operate under the umbrella of the ETUF (El-
Mahdi, 2003).  Upon its establishment, the state was not willing to risk the ETUF 
political adherence to other parties, such as the communist party and the Muslim 
brotherhood, and therefore leaders were selected by the state (El-Mikkawy and 
Handoussa, 2002; Beinin and Lockman, 1998).  Such bureaucratisation of trade 
unions has extended to characterise state-union relations up to the current regime 
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(OECD, 2010).  Further support for workers was offered by Nasser‘s regime with the 
establishment of the Ministry of Labour in 1959 (now known as the Ministry of 
Manpower and Migration) in which workers‘ representatives (selected by the state to 
represent workers in the ETUF) were appointed in senior positions (Beinin and 
Lockman, 1998; El-Mikkawy and Handoussa, 2002).  The Ministry of Labour aimed 
at matching job seekers to public sector jobs to keep up Nasser‘s promise of full 
employment to university graduates (Beinin and Lockman, 1998; Posusney, 1997; 
Ikram, 2006). 
 
Working class support to Nasser‘s regime was reinforced with the wave of 
nationalisation that started with the Suez Canal in 1956.  This marked the beginning 
of closer Egyptian-Soviet relations which eventually led to the development of a 
quasi-socialist system or as it became known; the ―Socialist Revolution‖ (Chaichian, 
1988; Ayubi, 1990; Ikram, 2006).   This system offered increased social and 
economic benefits to the working class, part of a largely effective social contract 
popular throughout the Nasserist era.  This social contract had a wider meaning than 
that prevalent in European contexts (Youssef, 2004).  It extended beyond the general 
meaning of collective agreements realised through state-labour bargaining processes 
to encompass a wider set of expectations for the political choices and organisation of 
the economic environment.  For instance, in the 1960s the law required at least fifty 
percent of the seats in the National Assembly and in the management committees of 
public enterprises to be offered to workers and/or peasants (Ayubi, 1990; Kassem, 
2002; 2004; Ikram, 2006).  The social contract counterweighted for the repressive 
labour laws imposed on workers, which explains labour general content at the time 
despite their co-optation by the state.  Nevertheless, the situation changed upon the 
launch of Open Door policy in 1974. 
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ii. Second shift 1974-1985 
The social contract with workers was abolished with the advent of Sadat‘s Infitah 
policies.  Sadat‘s new philosophy encompassed considerable cuts in the benefits 
offered by the government to labour and Egyptian society in general, bringing a series 
of strikes and protests throughout the country.  The most violent of these strikes, was 
in March 1975 in the textile centre of Mahla Al-Kobra; the state violently contained 
the situation, which ended with the arrest of 2,000 workers and death of 35 others by 
the armed forces (Ikram, 2006; Paczyńska, 2009).  Towards the end of the 1970s, 
there were large increases in inflation rates and in the cost of living estimated to be 15 
percent increase per average income (Cooper, 1982; Ikram, 2006).  Such increases 
and further cuts in state subsidies under pressure from the IMF resulted in ‗food riots‘ 
in 1977 which reduced support for Sadat‘s policy especially amongst the working 
class (Hinnebusch, 2001: 127).  
 
On the economic front, the protests resulted in the state‘s decision to slow down the 
pace of liberalisation (Hinnebusch, 1985).  Socially, the Sadatist state attempted to 
contain labour action through a two-fold policy.  The state offered workers more 
social and economic benefits, such as the wages and pensions increases of 1977/78, 
but simultaneously,  tightened controls over labour and unions.  For instance, Law 
35/1976 (later modified in 1981) increased state co-option of unions and their 
executive  elections.  This was very evident in the 1979 union elections, the last 
elections under Sadat, where there was little competition; leftists ended up with 120 
out of 4,000 local union seats and later the 120 members were arrested as opponents 
to the regime. There were hardly any changes in union leadership (Waterbury, 1985).  
 
Therefore, unlike other economic aspects the policies of labour containment and 
control did not change under Sadat‘s regime but rather increased.  Nevertheless, the 
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Sadatist state failed to gain the labour support of the Nasserist state especially upon 
breaching the social contract (Posusney, 1997; Yousef, 2004).  Since then state-
labour relations have been characterised by increased tensions and anxieties which 
accumulated and erupted from 2006 (Beinin, 2009). 
 
iii. Third shift 1986-2011 
Economic liberalisation through the ERSAP has not supported labour and labour 
organisations, as has been the case with other developing countries.  The market-
based or neoclassical model of economic development supported by International 
Financial Institutions (IFIs) considers labour and its collective interest to be a major 
constraint to the operation of the market.  As a result, more measures were taken by 
the Egyptian state to weaken labour organisation (Posusney, 1997; Alexander, 2010; 
Friale, 2010).  . 
  
Union elections were further controlled by the state through Law No.12/1995.  
According to this law, union leaders were allowed to run in re-elections without the 
need to be re-elected in their own firms, having been previously elected to a position 
on the executive board (Kienle, 1998; Kassem, 2004).  The law, however, did not 
allow workers on fixed term contracts to run in the elections.  Most workers in the 
public sector employed since 1985 are on fixed contracts and they have been the ones 
most likely to be negatively influenced by privatisation.  In that sense the new law has 
(i) enforced government control over the elections of union heads; and (ii) reduced 
the representativeness of unions and the ETUF of workers at the grassroots levels 
who are most likely to oppose privatisation.   
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Privatisation was expected to result in the retrenchment of 650,000 by the year 2000, 
according to IMF suggestions agreed to by the Egyptian government (Kassem, 2004; 
Paczyńska, 2009).  The government was hesitant to engage in such large scale 
layoffs, fearing social unrest.  Hence, the pace of privatisation was very limited until 
the mid 1990s under pressures from IFIs to speed up the process.  Then in 1996, the 
government introduced early retirement packages in an attempt to reduce the 
drawbacks of privatisation.  These are aimed at workers who have been employed in 
the public sector for at least twenty years and in the age groups of 50-58 and 45-58 
for males and females respectively45 (Kassem, 2004).  Between 1996 and 1998 the 
government paid around 1,467 billion Egyptian pounds for the early retirement of 
60,000 workers46.  It is important to note that such measures to compensate workers 
are mainly due to state antagonism to social unrest.  It is not due to coherence of 
workers‘ collective bargaining position as workers.  On the contrary, collective 
bargaining continued to be non-existent under such relatively low levels of union 
representativeness of workers (Joseph et al., 2007).  Such incoherence has been 
reinforced with ETUF heads becoming members of the ruling party; NDP and even 
appointed as the Ministers of Manpower (Hinnebusch, 2001; Kassem, 2004).  All of 
these conditions have reduced the independence of ETUF and raised ILO concerns 
about its representatives. 
  
Even workers who escaped retrenchment processes were negatively affected by the 
privatisation of their workplaces.  A major problem has been the withdrawal of the 
guaranteed bonus47 from workers‘ wages by the new private owners.  A popular 
                                                             
45 These criteria were later abolished and early retirement was available for all workers who would 
apply for them.  
46 Packages range from 13-35,000 Egyptian pounds (Khattab, 1998; Kassem, 2002)  
47 ―Guaranteed bonuses‖ or variable pay represents an integral part of workers‘ wages.  It a widely 
spread practice in the Egyptian public sector though it is not governed by law; as an indirect way of 
reducing social benefits.  Hence, workers have always considered these bonuses a part of their fixed pay 
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example is that of Cement Helwan; a group of four sister formerly public companies 
currently owned by an Italian company.  The latter withdrew guaranteed bonuses 
which represented 67% of total workers‘ wage.  Workers objected these changes and 
the ETUF was involved; nevertheless, the company did not respond to workers‘ 
demands until they arranged a sit-in that increased to more than 1000 workers in ten 
days (Clément, 2009).  Only then did the Italian company agree, in 2006, to negotiate 
with the General Union for Workers in Construction and representatives from the 
state; MoMM, attended the meetings and an agreement was reached in 2009 
(Clément, 2009; ETUF, 2009).  Nevertheless, in most cases such an agreement is 
never reached and workers end up either leaving the job or working under such 
unfavourable conditions.  
 
The continuous repression of labour which was magnified as a result of the ERSAP 
resulted in labour eruption by the end of 2006 in the largest workers‘ movement in 
Egypt for more than 50 years with around 1.7 million workers involved (Beinin, 
2009; El-Mahdi, 2009).  It started with strikes in Mahalla, a major textile and clothing 
centre in North Cairo that employs around 25 percent of all public sector workers in 
this field (Beinin, 2009).  In December 2006, 24,000 workers in Mahalla went on 
strike as their demands for pay increases were not supported by ETUF (Al-Nahhas, 
2008; El-Mahdi, 2009).  A series of labour actions have taken place since then, the 
most significant of which was the strike of real estate tax collectors in 2007 
(Alexander, 2010).  They were dissatisfied with the ineffective enforcement of the 
Higher Council of Wages48  which increased pay only for certain job categories 
(CTUWS, 2010).  Nevertheless, their demands were not supported by the ETUF as 
this would have opened the floodgates to similar demands in other sectors.  As a 
                                                                                                                                                                               
who got used to receiving these regardless of their performance.  However, these are not included 
(CTUWS, 2010). 
48 introduced in the new Labour Law No.12/2003 (CTUWS, 2010) 
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result, tax collectors organised themselves independently of the ETUF but they 
struggled for a year and a half until their union was established in April 2009 with the 
support of the ILO and international human rights organisations49 and hence 
becoming the first independent union since 1940s.  The state‘s reaction to this 
incident was inconsistent.  The Minister of Finance agreed to meet with the heads of 
the tax collectors union to negotiate their demands, but the ETUF refused to recognise 
the new union and its heads were critical of the Ministers‘ reactions (El-Mahdi, 2009; 
CTUWS, 2010).  However, regardless of ETUF‘s position, this is a significant 
development in the position of labour post-1952 illustrating a change in state‘s 
reaction and tolerance to labour action.  This could develop to be a turning point in 
state-labour relations especially given ILO support to unions‘ independence and the 
international pressure on the Egyptian state due to its non-observance to ratified 
Conventions No. 87 and 98 (Cammett and Posusney, 2010).   
 
5.6.4. Underlying Continuities  
Underlying the discontinuities throughout the paradigm shifts are some continuities in 
employers‘ and workers‘ positions in the economy.  The private sector has been 
increasingly empowered since the 1950s whilst workers‘ organisations have been 
increasingly repressed and co-opted by the state.  The 2006 wave of strikes have 
occurred two years after the appointment of the new technocratic government as an 
indication of the expanding social drawbacks of the intensive economic liberalisation 
undertaken particularly since 2004 as part of the ERSAP.  The latter has realised 
positive economic growth but has failed to develop social aspects.  This is mainly due 
to the lack of an effective social dialogue between the state and social actors (Alissa, 
2007). 
 
                                                             
49 For more details on the process of the union‘s independence see El-Mahdi, 2009.  
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There are current attempts to enhance the relationship and dialogue between the state 
and key institutional actors; employers and unions, by the ILO through its Social 
Dialogue Project or as it is formally titled the promotion of fundamental principles 
and rights at work and social dialogue (ILO, 2010).  The project was launched in 
2008 and is funded by the US Department of Labour and is expected to end in 2011 
unless granted extension.  The development of effective state-employer-union 
cooperation would have a positive influence on various socio-economic issues and 
labour issues including VET and its development, as depicted from the experiences of 
developing countries as Albania and Romania, and developed ones as Japan and the 
EU (Finlay and Niven, 1996; Winterton, 2000; 2006; Rychly, 2009).  The extent to 
which this can be effectively realised in Egypt is one of the research questions 
addressed here.    
 
5.7. ILO SOCIAL DIALOGUE PROJECT (ILO SDP)  
 
Social dialogue refers to “all types of negotiation, consultation or simply exchange of 
information between or among, representatives of governments, employers and 
workers, on issues of common interest relating to economic and social policy” 
(Kuruvilla, 2006:178).  These can occur on a tripartite or bipartite basis on a national, 
regional or enterprise levels (Bolwell and Weinz, 2008).  Four conditions are 
necessary for ILO SDP development: (i) independent employers‘ and workers‘ 
organizations; (ii) political will and commitment of all the parties; (iii) effective 
recognition of rights to freedom of association and collective bargaining; and (iv) 
supportive institutional structures (Gajardo and Gómez, 2005:1).  As shown earlier, 
these conditions are largely incoherent in the Egyptian case which questions the 
effectiveness of the ILO SDP.   
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Social dialogue is one of the goals of the Decent Work Agenda50 initiated in 1999 
following the 1998 Declaration on fundamental principles and rights at work 
(Kellerson, 1998; Hassel, 2008).  This attempts to set core ILO values which are 
binding for all members regardless of their ratification of relevant Conventions 
(Maupain, 2005; Hassel, 2008).  This step was initiated to avoid complications from 
members who refuse to ratify certain Conventions that they perceive to be intervening 
with internal labour policies or as a source of increased labour costs on a national 
level (Hassel, 2008).  Such complications have particularly occurred during the Cold 
War period (1945-1991).  The USSR was not adhering to the concept of tripartism as 
the state, employers and unions were all represented by members of the Communist 
party.  Opponents of this representation, mainly the US, rejected USSR membership 
in 1954 whereas supporters argued along the lines of universality; all countries are 
equally entitled to join the ILO.  The universality argument won and the USSR 
continued its membership and hence tripartism was challenged, progress in technical 
cooperation was significantly constrained and the ILO‘s overall capacity to influence 
international social policy was doubted (Cox, 1961; Osakwe, 1972; Joyner, 1978; 
Haworth and Hughes, 2003).  
  
The US expressed its discontent with the erosion of tripartism in the 1970s by 
suspending its financial contributions, which represented about 25% of ILO budget, 
and withdrawing from the ILO in 1977.  The US used its financial weight to combat 
USSR empowered position within the ILO (Elliot and Freeman, 2003).  This was a 
top priority at the time as the ILO was increasingly used as a leadership tool for 
transnational dissemination of labour ideologies.  Hence, the Eastern-Western 
competition for hegemony on the international arena was extended to and eventually 
supported by the ILO (Cox, 1971; Osakwe, 1972).   
                                                             
50 Other values are: rights at work; employment and work; and social protection. 
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These struggles continued until the end of the Cold War which marked the end of 
fragmentation of ILO policies across communism and capitalism (O'Brien, 2000).  
The concept of tripartism started to be re-strengthened within the ILO and more 
emphasis was put on technical assistance.  This became particularly important after 
1998‘s Declaration which necessitated ILO assistance to member states to support 
them in meeting core ILO principles and values.  Such obligation to offer assistance is 
also part of the Decent Work Agenda and hence ILO efforts to promote effective 
social dialogue in Egypt.  
 
5.7.1. ILO SDP in Egypt 
The ILO has defined a set of objectives to be achieved through its social dialogue 
project in Egypt.  First is the need to collectively raise workers‘ and employers‘ 
awareness of their rights and obligations at work and to engage them in an effective 
tripartite social dialogue.  Second  is to enhance the independence of the current 
workers‘ and employers‘ organisations.  The remaining two objectives are focused on 
MoMM. The third objective aims at enhancing MoMM capacity to settle labour 
disputes effectively and fourthly to assist MoMM in reforming labour legislations to 
resolve current contradictions between Labour Law No.12/2003 and some of the 
ratified ILO Conventions, such as Convention No.87 (ILO, 2009).   
 
The ILO is facing two major challenges at this point (i) the ILO SDP is not supported 
by coherent institutional structures; and (ii) the project‘s limited time frame51.  The 
project has been operating under these challenges since 2008 and it has yielded some 
results that could be explored to verify the degree of influence on (i) state-employer-
union cooperation; and (ii) VET development.  These are explored from the 
viewpoints of institutional actors and ILO representatives.  These are preceded with 
                                                             
51  There is currently no indication of its extension beyond 2011. 
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an exploration of the mutual perceptions these parties hold of state-employers-unions 
cooperation and inputs VET, thus allowing for the verification of results.  Hence, 
these areas are investigation through the research questions: 
RQ2: What are the mutual perceptions of key institutional actors of state, 
employer and union inputs and cooperation in VET? 
RQ3: In what ways do institutional actors perceive the ILO SDP to have 
influenced state-employer-union relationships and VET development? 
 
5.8. CONCLUSION 
 
Institutional analysis of VET suggests an incoherent set of relationships between key 
institutions and amongst main institutional actors to VET.  These relationships were 
established and deeply entrenched in the historical developments and state 
relationship since the military coup in 1952.  As a result, employers‘ and workers‘ 
investments in VET have deteriorated and the state has remained the main provider of 
VET. The system has continued to be divorced from reality.  The low levels of trust 
and parental authority relations in Egypt have added to the incoherence of state-
employer-union cooperation which has not been beneficial for VET.  International 
organisations have developed an increasingly important role in the Egyptian 
economy.  Nevertheless, their influence on VET development has not been effective 
on a national level and other policies have hindered rather than supported VET 
investments, most notably through structural adjustment programmes.  Hence, the 
problem of VET ineffectiveness is more than skill supply and demand mismatches as 
argued by national and international organisations.  Also, there are current efforts that 
would change some of the current circumstances; the ILO SDP.  The extent to which 
the project can succeed in realising such cooperation is questionable and is explored 
through our two research questions indicated above. 
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6. METHODOLOGY AND METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION 
 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The framework suggested by of Michael Crotty (1998) and refined by John Creswell 
(2003) is used to justify the choice of the research methodologies and methods.  The 
discussion is divided into three parts to discuss (i) Knowledge Claims, in which the 
epistemological, ontological and theoretical perspectives are discussed; (ii) Strategies 
of Inquiry that justify the choice of the research strategy and design; and (iii) 
Methods, which discusses the use of documentation, the sampling frame, interviews, 
focus groups and observations.  Finally, challenges faced in the field are discussed 
under the heading Limitations.  
 
6.2. PHILOSOPHICAL UNDERPINNINGS 
 
Figure 6.1: Knowledge claims, Strategies of Inquiry and Methods leading to 
approaches and the design process 
 
(Creswell, 2003:5) 
126 
 
The choice of methodology and methods is based on a certain theoretical perspective 
shaped by the researcher‘s understanding of what constitutes knowledge: 
epistemology, as suggested by Michael Crotty (1998; 2003).  Crotty‘s framework for 
research design was developed by John Creswell (2003) into three areas; knowledge 
claims (including epistemology and theoretical perspectives), strategies of inquiry and 
methods.  These determine the choice of research approach which guide the research 
design and the process of data collection in the field to address the research questions: 
RQ1: In what ways has the institutional environment influenced VET in Egypt? 
RQ2: What are the mutual perceptions of key institutional actors of state, 
employer and union inputs and cooperation in VET? 
RQ3: In what ways do institutional actors perceive the ILO SDP to have 
influenced state-employer-union relationships and VET development? 
Each of these areas is explored to justify the choices made (figure 6.1). 
 
6.2.1. Knowledge Claims 
Epistemology, according to Maynard (1994:10), ―is concerned with providing a 
philosophical grounding for deciding what kinds of knowledge are possible and how 
we can ensure that they are both adequate and legitimate‖ or as defined by Crotty 
(1998: 3) as ―a way of understanding and explaining how we know what we know‖ 
(Crotty, 1998: 3).  Epistemology is closely related to another philosophical concept: 
ontology (Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Blaikie, 1993; Crotty, 1998; Chalmers, 1999; 
Bryman, 2001).  Ontology is ―the study of being.  It is concerned with ‗what is‘, with 
the nature of existence, with the structure of reality as such‖ (Crotty, 1998:10).  
Epistemological and ontological orientations define the meanings of knowledge and 
reality upon which the research strategies and methods are based.   
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Epistemological orientations can be considered to be falling between two poles; 
objectivism and subjectivism.  At one end, objectivism states ―that meaning, and 
therefore meaningful reality, exist as such apart from the operation of any 
consciousness‖ (Crotty, 1998:8).  On an ontological level, this largely corresponds to 
realism (Guba and Lincoln, 1994).  The latter states that ―the social world external to 
individual cognition is a real world made up of hard, tangible and relatively 
immutable structures‖ (Burrell and Morgan, 1979:4).  These orientations have been 
associated with positivism in which ―social reality exists independently of the 
observer and the activities of social science‖ (Blaikie, 1993: 202).   
 
At the other end is subjectivism, an epistemological orientation where ―meaning... is 
imposed on the object by the subject‖ (Crotty, 1998:9).  On an ontological level, this 
shares the idea of nominalism;  an ontological perspective which holds that ―the 
social world external to individual cognition is made up of nothing more than names, 
concepts and labels which are used to structure reality‖ (Burrell and Morgan, 1979:4).  
These have been identified with interpretivism, a theoretical perspective in which 
―social reality is regarded as the product of processes by which social actors together 
negotiate the meanings for actions and situations‖ (Blaikie, 1993:96).   
 
There are different groupings of these epistemological, ontological and theoretical 
perspectives developed into knowledge claims Creswell (2003) in Table 6.1.  The 
position followed by this research is Social Constructionism.  The rationales for this 
choice and of critical realism as the theoretical perspective are discussed below. 
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Table 6.1: Alternative knowledge claims and key features  
Knowledge Claim 
Positions 
Main features 
Postpositivism 
- Deterministic philosophy – in which causes probably 
determine effects or outcomes.  
- Reductionism – the intent to reduce the ideas into small, 
discrete set of ideas to test. 
- Empirical observation and measurement 
- Theory verification 
Social 
Constructionism 
- Individuals seek understanding of the world in which they 
live and work.  
- Multiple participant meanings 
- Social and historical construction of meanings 
- Theory generation 
Advocacy/Particip
atory 
- Inquiry needs to be intertwined with politics and political 
agenda. 
- Empowerment issue-oriented 
- Collaborative – so as to not further marginalise the 
participants as a result of the inquiry. 
- Change-oriented – involves an agenda for change to 
improve the lives of the participants. 
Pragmatism 
- Consequences of actions – knowledge claims arise out of 
actions, situations and consequences rather than 
antecedents.  
- Problem centred – the problem is most important and 
researchers use all approaches to understand the problem. 
- Pluralistic – as a philosophical underpinning for mixed 
methods studies. 
- Real-world practice oriented 
(Creswell, 2003: 6-12) 
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6.2.1.1. Knowledge claim position: Social Constructionism 
Constructionism holds that ―all knowledge, and therefore all meaningful reality as 
such, is contingent upon human practices, being constructed in and out of interaction 
between human beings and their world, and developed and transmitted within an 
essentially social context‖ (Crotty, 1998: 42).  When such meaningful reality is 
collectively rather than individually constructed by social actors, this is to social 
constructionism.   The latter considers ―the social origin of meaning and the social 
character with which it is inevitably stamped‖ (Crotty, 1998:52).  This position seeks 
deep understanding of the issue of inquiry based on the experiences and perceptions 
of social actors.  This process is developed in interaction with the cultural and 
historical stances surrounding social actors. These are key features that differentiate 
social constructionism from other claims in Table 6.1 and that largely suit our 
purposes as social constructionism would support an in-depth investigation of 
collective perceptions of institutional actors of VET and key institutional 
relationships while incorporating a historical dimension to the problem.  
  
Since reality is socially constructed, the theoretical perspective to social 
constructionism cannot be positivism.  Nevertheless, at the same time social 
constructionism recognises external reality upon which social actors construct their 
own understanding and interpretations of reality.  In other words, reality in social 
constructionism is not created from scratch but rather constructed based on some 
observations (Crotty, 1998; Reed, 1997; Blaikie, 2007).  Hence, this theoretical 
orientation does not fully abide to interpretivism either.  Instead, it shares concepts 
with both theoretical perspectives; positivism and interpretivism, forming a distinct 
theoretical perspective; critical realism.  Critical realism aims at interpreting reality 
―by upholding both the reality of the world outside the mind and the social character 
of our thoughts about it, and by overcoming the chasm between world and mind 
without collapsing them together‖ (Nellhaus, 2006:81).  A core concept to critical 
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realism is the idea of a transformation in the behaviour of individuals based on the 
surrounding social structures (Bhaskar, 1979).  There is a clear relationship between 
social structures and human agency (Pratten, 1993; Reed, 1997).  Nevertheless, it is 
important to note that human agents‘ behaviour is not entirely determined by these 
social structures on the contrary humans interact with these structures and respond in 
ways that suit their situation (Bhaskar, 1989; Reed, 1997; Blaikie, 2007). 
   
Critical realism is used as key institutional actors are expected to interact with 
surrounding institutional structures according to (i) certain realities, such as the 
character of the state; and (ii) their perceptions of reality, such as perceived authority 
relations that dedicate means of dealing with state officials.  For example, in the 
Egyptian case, the autocratic state and paternal relations would shape the means in 
which workers and employers perceive and respond to cooperation with the state in 
VET.   
 
 
6.2.2. Strategies of Inquiry 
The choice of strategies of inquiry is informed with the identified knowledge claims.  
For instance, a study based on positivist claims to knowledge would use experimental 
design as its research strategy and collect data using surveys (Creswell, 2003).  The 
groupings of knowledge claims, strategies of inquiry and methods need to be verified 
against (i) research aims; and (ii) the use of theory. 
 
As indicated earlier, this research aims at exploring the influence of the Egyptian 
institutional environment on VET and the perceptions of key social actors of the 
system and key institutional structures supporting it.  Hence, the main purpose of 
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research strategy and design is to allow for an in-depth understanding of the issue of 
investigation from a critical realist perspective.  This excludes survey design from our 
consideration as (i) it aims at providing breadth rather than depth to the analysis 
(Mabry, 2008); and (ii) themes and concepts still need to be constructed in the first 
place as there is little research on this topic in Egypt (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005; 
Mabry, 2008).  Therefore, the choice is limited to qualitative strategies.  Some of 
these do not meet research aims such as experimentation as the aim is not to test 
certain hypothesis but rather to explore concepts (Bryman and Bell, 2007; Saunders et 
al., 2009).  Also, action research cannot be used as the researcher is not involved with 
participants in a process of change.  Ethnography allows for deep investigation; 
nevertheless, it cannot be considered due to time limitations which would not allow 
for ethnographical investigation over an extended period of time (Marshall and 
Rossman, 1999; Creswell, 2003; Bryman and Bell, 2007; Saunders et al., 2009).  The 
in-depth investigation can also be obtained through grounded theory and case study 
strategies.   The second criterion, the use of theory through a deductive or inductive 
approach, is used to choose between these. 
 
Inductive research aims at ―drawing generalizable inferences out of observations‖ 
(Bryman, 2001:10) whereas with a deductive approach ―the researcher, on the basis of 
what is known about in a particular domain and of theoretical considerations in 
relation to that domain, deduces a hypothesis (or hypotheses) that must then be 
subjected to empirical scrutiny‖ (Bryman, 2001:8).  For our purposes, a mixture of 
both strategies is used (Bryman, 2001; Creswell, 2003; Bryman and Bell, 2007; 
Saunders et al., 2009).  The study is informed by, but not based on, institutional 
theory as it critically deploys concepts from Whitley‘s national business systems 
approach, the institutional framework, while leaving out other irrelevant features 
and/or concepts, such as the eight characteristics of business systems.  Then, new 
themes and concepts from the Egyptian case are developed and finally suggested for 
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integration with Whitley‘s institutional framework.  This inductive/deductive mixture 
cannot be realised through grounded theory which relies on an inductive approach but 
it can be accommodated by the case study strategy (Charmaz, 2005).  Hence, the 
latter is selected as the research strategy. 
 
6.2.2.1. Case Study Strategy 
Case study strategy is defined by Eisenhardt as ―a research strategy which focuses on 
understanding the dynamics present within single settings‖ (Eisenhardt, 1989:534) 
and this involves the ―development of detailed, intensive knowledge about a single 
―case‖, or a small number of related ―cases‖‖ (Robson, 1993:40).  Creswell (2009:13) 
puts it differently, stating that ―case studies are a strategy of inquiry in which the 
researcher explores in depth a program, event, activity, process, or one or more 
individuals‖.  The main element of this strategy or ―the raison d'être of case study is 
deep understanding (emphasis added) of particular instances of phenomena‖ (Mabry, 
2008:214).  Such deep understanding is offered through ―a process of inquiry about 
the case and the product of that inquiry‖ (Stake, 2005:444) based on a conceptual 
structure that address a limited number of research questions (Stake, 2005).  These are 
explored in light of the particularities of the case, such as its context, operations and 
activities of key actors.  Researcher‘s interaction, understanding, description and 
reflection on these particularities help shape the analysis of the case (Silverman, 
2001; Stake, 2005).  In this process, the ability to ―generalise statistically from one or 
a small number of cases to the population as a whole‖ (Stark and Torrance, 2005:33) 
is lost.  Nevertheless, this is not a limitation in our case, which supports the depth 
rather than breadth of results. 
 
In the Egyptian case, an in-depth understanding of institutional influences on VET 
and its development is to be gained by addressing the three research questions.  These 
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involve exploring, integrating and reflecting on the various perceptions of key 
institutional actors of (i) VET problem; (ii) key institutional relationships influencing 
VET; and (ii) the ILO SDP.  The integration of respondent groups and of methods of 
data collection, as shown later, is two types of triangulation.  The latter refers to the 
―process of using multiple perceptions to clarify meaning, verifying the repeatability 
of an observation or interpretation... (or) identifying different ways the case is being 
seen‖ (Stake, 2005:454).  Triangulation aims at enhancing the validity and reliability 
of research of case study research which is one of the strategies most prone to bias 
(Stoecker, 1991).  These concepts are relatively straightforward for quantitative 
research based on positivist perspectives.  A number of parallel terms have been 
suggested for the assessment of the quality of qualitative research as in Table 6.5. 
 
6.2.2.2. Validity and Reliability 
In quantitative research, reliability depends on the extent to which the research 
succeeds in offering consistent explanations for the problem in hand (Stenbacka, 
2001).  The validity of quantitative research (internal and external validity) refers to 
the extent to which the research offers truthful explanations that can be generalised to 
the larger population.  These concepts are differently verified in the case of qualitative 
research.  In qualitative research, the quality of the research depends on the extent to 
which the study offers an understanding of the problem (Stenbacka, 2001; Golafshani, 
2003).  In this case, the reliability of the research is argued to be interpreted in terms 
of the research‘s dependability whereas the internal and external validity of research 
refer to its credibility and transferability simultaneously (Lincoln and Guba, 1985; 
Bryman and Bell, 2003; Yanow and Schwartz-Shea, 2006).  Criteria, in other words, 
that ensures the trustworthiness and authenticity of the conducted research.  Some 
corresponding terms are sometimes used, as suggested by Miles and Huberman 
(1994) in Table 6.2. 
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Table 6.2: Interpretative Approached to Evaluative Criteria: The Classic Texts 
Criterion 
Terms used in 
methodological 
positivism 
Lincoln and 
Guba (1985): 
Parallel terms 
Miles and Huberman (1994): 
Parallel and new terms 
Truth Value Internal Validity Credibility 
Internal 
validity/credibility/authenticity 
Applicability 
External validity/ 
generalisability Transferability 
External validity/ 
transferability/ fittingness 
Consistency Reliability Dependability 
Reliability/ dependability/ 
auditability 
Neutrality Objectivity Confirmability 
Objectivity/ confirmability/ 
utilization/ application/ action 
(Yanow and Schwartz-Shea, 2006: 94) 
 
In this study, the researcher exerted every effort to ensure the study is based on best 
practice in every stage of the fieldwork.  Data collection was well planned before 
undertaking the fieldwork.  For instance, before each interview the research would 
revise the points to be covered in the interview, she would undertake a brief research 
on the person she is interviewing in case he/she has any publications, interviews in 
the newspapers and any material which can enhance the quality of the interview and 
the information acquired.  All the interviews were tape recorded and notes were taken 
throughout the interviews whenever necessary, for example to describe the setting, or 
to record the body language of respondents at different points throughout the 
interview.  The researcher would also confirm her understanding of the responses of 
interviewees throughout the interview to avoid any misunderstanding.  Nevertheless a 
variety of challenges have faced the researcher throughout the study.  For instance, 
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the researcher was not able to approach employers and workers independently on the 
enterprise level as she was intending.  For this purpose, the researcher was aware of 
the high likeliness of interviewee bias.  She tried to counteract this with the use of a 
life history approach where respondents; workers, would have a chance to talk non-
restrictively about their experiences with VET.  She then deduced the information 
needed from their responses.   
 
6.2.2.3. Back Translation 
The researcher attempted to ensure high quality of translation.  For this purpose the 
transcribed interviews were translated and then back translated to ensure the meaning 
has not been altered.  Some Arabic sentences, such as proverbs and idioms, did not 
make sense when literally translated into English.  In these cases, the researcher 
provides a footnote explaining the meaning and impact of such proverbs and/or 
idioms as perceived in the Egyptian context. 
 
6.2.2.4. Triangulation 
Triangulation of (i) data collection methods;  and (ii) respondents was used as a 
means of enhancing research dependability ―by counteracting or maximizing the 
heterogeneity of irrelevant sources of variance attributable especially to inherent 
method bias but also to inquirer bias, bias of substantive theory, biases of inquiry 
context‖  (Greene et al., 1989:259).  Triangulation of data collection methods enables 
the researcher to verify the data collected by one method against that collected by 
another, as shown in Figure6.2. 
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Figure 6.2: Triangulation of data collection methods 
 
 
Triangulation by sources of data ―involves collecting data from different persons or 
entities.  Checking the degree to which each source confirms, elaborates, and 
disconfirms information from other sources honours case complexity and the 
perspectives among participants and helps ascertain the accuracy of each datum‖ 
(Mabry, 2008: 222).  This enabled the researcher to match and verify the responses of 
respondents within the same group and across groups (as shown in Figure 6.3); a 
process which has been undertaken throughout the data collection process (Lincoln 
and Guba, 1985).  The cross-matched responses are also expected to enrich the data 
analysis and offer more insight into the data provided by each of the sampled groups. 
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Figure 6.3: Triangulation by sources of data 
 
 
6.2.3. Methods 
The research takes a deep slice (Daft, 1983) into the various institutional actors on a 
national and enterprise levels and collects qualitative data from the field in three 
phases (Figure 6.4).  The methods selected for data collection across the three stages 
were documentation, interviews, focus groups and observations.  The rationale for 
selecting each method and the ways in which these serve research purposes are 
discussed in two parts.  Part (A) discusses documentation being the first data 
collection method used in the research process.  Then, it illustrates the sample frame 
developed mainly based on data collected from documentation and it illustrates the 
ideal and practiced sampling plans.  Part (B) starts with observations of the settings 
and target groups‘ behavioural and non-verbal cues which would enhance reflection 
on interviews and focus groups.  This is followed by a discussion of the 60 
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unstructured and semi-structured interviews.  Finally, the two focus groups 
undertaken as part of Phase (III) are illustrated.   
 
Figure 6.4: Three Phases of data collection (July 2008- April 2010) 
  
 
Part (A): Documentation and Sample Frame 
 
6.2.3.1. Documentation  
Documentation or archival research provides ―a rich set of data that can be used by 
further investigators to examine empirical questions about populations that may not 
be anticipated when information is first collected‖ (Fisher and Anushko, 2008:100). 
This includes both written and non-written documents.  It retains the advantage of 
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saving on time and costs, which tend be scarce.  However, it has a number of 
constraints: (i) the problem of gaining access; this was the case with some state 
documents in this research; (ii) some material is costly to access; and (iii) the initial 
purpose for which the documents were prepared could be different which can make it 
time-consuming to obtain relevant data (Creswell, 2009; Saunders et al., 2009).  Yet, 
documentation is also useful: (i) as a source of comparative data analysis, especially 
on an international level; (ii) it is a practical means of gathering, comparing and re-
analysing data from different sources, leading to insightful conclusions; this was the 
case in this research as documents of different parties were accessed; and (iii) it offers 
data that is useful for historical analysis which is an integral part of this study 
(Creswell, 2003; 2009; Saunders et al., 2009).  
 
A number of written and non-written documents were used.  The latter included 
presentations on VET and related issues by and/or to donor agencies.  The former 
included unpublished government reports52, MoE memos of meetings with 
international organisations, summaries of action plans for certain VET projects by 
MoE, publications on VET by the ITC and international organisations, such as the 
World Bank and European Training Foundation, historical VET documents through 
ILO archives, conference minutes (the ones attended), administrative records which 
helped in gaining access to interviewees53, research papers (both published and 
unpublished) and newspaper articles54. 
  
                                                             
52 Some of these were published around 6 months later.  MoMM denied the researcher of any access to 
any state documents as explained in section 6.2.3.3. 
53 As this informed the researcher of individuals involved in different projects and she accessed them 
accordingly. 
54 See for e.g. Ellis, 1955; ILO, 1957a; 1957b; Al-Arabi, 1961; AED, 2008; ILO, 2008; MoE, 2008; 
ILO SRO- Cairo, 2008a;  ITC, 2008; Badran, 2009; ILO, 2009; ILO, 2010a; ETUF, 2009; Sayed, 2009. 
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Documentation was used throughout the research process but was particularly 
important in the early stages of the data collection process for two specific reasons.  
First, it was used to provide background information on the policy problem of VET 
and its development in terms of (i) the main issues and challenges faced since the 
1950s with a focus on the past two decades; (ii) major development initiatives 
available in the field; and (iii) the key national and international entities involved.  
These provided an orienting framework upon which Phases (I) and (II) were based 
and that helped direct further investigation in Phase (III).  Second, it was used as a 
reference for experts and professionals in key bodies and associations who would be 
approached to participate in the study.  A list of potential respondents was compiled 
as explained in the sampling frame (see Appendix A).  Some of these candidates 
agreed to participate in the study and data was collected through a mixture of 
interviews and focus groups. 
 
6.2.3.2. Sampling Frame  
The sample frame offers a description of who ideally should be included in the 
sample and why they are included.  Some compromises have to be made between the 
ideal sample frame and practical conditions and limitations in the field, such as access 
problems and resource limitations.  It is important that the frame be comprehensive.  
It should include all of the target population without under- or over-coverage 
(Reimer, 2002).  The former can result in some important opinions, dimensions and 
perceptions being lost, which distorts the results.  The latter can result in irrelevant 
perceptions being included and/or inefficient and time-consuming processes of data 
collection that will not necessarily add value (Reimer, 2002). 
 
It is also important to ensure as much as possible that the information included in the 
frame about potential respondents, such as telephone numbers and email addresses, 
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are up-to-date.  Also, denial of access to these respondents for various reasons, for 
instance if they are not willing to take part in the study or they are not available at the 
time of the research, has to be taken into account in terms of the number and nature of 
respondents in the frame.  In other words, the frame should be big enough to 
accommodate these dropouts and still meet the research objectives.   
 
i. Sample Frame Design 
The following is a representation of the sampling frames of the state, employers, 
workers and ILO representatives.  For ethical issues and confidentiality reasons, the 
names and emails of representatives are not included in the sampling frame as some 
of them have actually participated in the study (see Appendix A).   
 
a. The ILO  
Purposive sampling is used to select officials in the five units that make up Social 
Dialogue located in both Geneva HQ and the ILO Sub-Regional Office for North 
Africa (SRO) in Cairo (see Appendix B).  These include  
1. Industrial and Employment Relations Department (DIALOGUE) 
2. Labour administration and Inspection (LAB/ADMIN) 
3. Bureau for workers‘ activities (ACTRAV) 
4. Bureau for employers‘ activities (ACT/EMP) 
5. Sectoral activities department (SECTOR).  SECTOR activities in Egypt 
include (i) Hotels, catering and tourism; and (ii) Textiles, clothing and footwear55.   
                                                             
55 SECTOR works in conjunction with Dialogue and these, according to the researcher‘s best 
knowledge, are the only active sectoral activities in Egypt at the time of the research. 
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Finally, one department not directly related to the social dialogue programme is 
included in the study; the Skills and Employability department (EMP/SKILLS).  The 
perception of experts in this department would offer useful insights on VET and its 
relationship to social dialogue in general and particularly in Egypt. 
 
b. The Egyptian Federation of Industries (EFI) 
The Egyptian Federation of Industries is used to represent employers in this study, for 
a number of reasons.  First, EFI is the largest and most organised association of 
employers in Egypt.  Second, the EFI represents Egypt in the International 
Organisation of Employers (IOE).  Third, it represents Egypt in the ILO‘s Bureau of 
Employers (and its EFT representative in a regular member/representative of 
employers in the International Labour Conference from 2008-2011).  The last two 
features distinguish the EFI from the second major employers‘ association; the 
Federation of Egyptian Chambers of Commerce (FECC) which represents employers 
dealing in commercial activities on a sectoral level.    Other employers‘ organisations 
are regional ones of limited membership base. 
 
Ideally, a multi- stage sampling method would be used to sample employers.  First, 
cluster sampling would be used to divide Egyptian industries by sector.  Second, lists 
of employers‘ representatives would be obtained from the EFI and a random sample 
would be selected.  The second stage of sampling was not feasible in practice and 
hence purposive sampling was used to access employers‘ representatives in different 
sectors, particularly those on which state VET development projects are focused56.  
 
                                                             
56 Food and beverages, wood and furniture, textiles, tourism and construction. 
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1. What is meant by employers? 
According to ILO‘s key indicators of the labour market, employers ‗are those workers 
who, working on their own account or with one or a few partners, hold the type of job 
defined as a ―self-employed job‖ [i.e. jobs where the remuneration is directly 
dependent upon the profits derived from the goods and services produced...], and in 
this capacity...have engaged one or more persons to work for them in their business 
as...‖employers‖...‘ (ILO, 2002:116).  There is an implicit assumption in this 
definition that owners are managers, which can be true in small enterprises but in 
larger organisations argues for a distinction between principal and agent or owners 
and managers (Berle and Means 1932; Pratt and Zeckhauser 1985). 
 
In this study, employers refer to organisations‘ representatives in the EFI may or may 
not be owners of the organisations (depending on the size of the enterprise and their 
share in it).  Organisations‘ representatives have a significant criterion necessary for 
engagement in projects as significant as the social dialogue; their influential role in 
decision-making within the organisation.  In other words, they have the keys to the 
establishment of the project within their enterprises and therefore their perceptions 
and viewpoints are crucial at this level of analysis.   
 
2. Levels of representation 
There are three levels of representation at the EFI; (i) an enterprise level which 
includes all EFI members; (ii) a sectoral level, including the executive board of each 
chamber; (iii) a national level which include the EFI boards of executives57.  We are 
focusing on the national level of representation and hence on chairmen and managing 
                                                             
57 The board of executives is partially elected; chamber members elect ten representatives 
and a chairman.  The latter then appoints 5 other members.   
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directors in each of the sixteen chambers of the EFI as listed in Table 2 (see Appendix 
A).  Nevertheless, in order to stick to the deep slice approach indicated earlier, I use 
two enterprises in the tourism and construction sectors to verify the responses 
obtained at national level representation.  These sectors are chosen (i) because of their 
importance to GDP growth (see Chapter 2); and (ii) because the ILO focuses on these 
in the short- to medium-terms.  In these two cases, employers are represented by the 
chairman and the managing director, who directly influence decision-making within 
the enterprise, and the Human Resources (HR) manager, who is in immediate contact 
with workers and directly involved in labour affairs within the organisation. But s/he 
is also a member of the management team and culturally very separate from workers.     
 
c. The Egyptian Trade Union Federation (ETUF) 
The same multi- stage sampling method would ideally have been used to sample 
workers through (i) cluster sampling to divide industries by sector; and (ii) random 
sample to select a list of ETUF representatives.  Again, the second sampling stage 
was not feasible in practice and hence purposive sampling was used instead to access 
workers‘ representatives in different sectors particularly those on which state VET 
development projects are focused.  
 
The Egyptian Trade Union Federation represents workers in the ILO, and therefore in 
this study as well, despite the controversy surrounding its representativeness as 
discussed before.  The perceptions of workers‘ representatives, id est. unions‘ 
chairmen and/or vice-chairmen, in different unions are explored in different sectors 
(see Appendix B).  These perceptions only represent the formal sector.   
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Perceptions of workers on an enterprise level are explored in tourism and construction 
sectors.  The purpose of this selection is twofold; (i) to explore bilateral employer-
workers relationship on an enterprise level; and (ii) to verify the responses of the 
board of directors of the ETUF.  Workers are approached through their co-workers 
using convenience sampling to identify those enterprises where the researcher can 
have access to managers and to workers independently.  In this case, workers will not 
be nominated by their managers and thus the chances of avoiding responses biased by 
managerial influence will be higher.   
 
d. The State 
The state (as discussed in chapter 5) includes everything under the umbrella of the 
Egyptian government.  Senior representatives in key Ministries and public bodies 
were approached.  These include MoE, MoHR, MoTI and TOHOMAR and ITC.  
More emphasis is placed on the MoMM as it is the ILO‘s first and major point of 
contact with the Egyptian state and hence the most relevant body for exploring the 
ILO SDP and its influence on VET.   
 
Four central departments report directly to the Minister of Manpower and Migration:  
(1) Central unit for the office of the Minister; (2) Central unit for information, 
documentation and decision support; (3) Central unit for foreign affairs; and (4) 
Central unit for administrative development.  Each of these is responsible for a 
number of other subunits and subsections down the organizational hierarchy (MoMM, 
2010).  There are two other units at the same organizational level, working closely 
with the Minister: (1) Consultants; (2) Boards and committees.  However, information 
can only be obtained from the first level officials; the Minister and then from the 
second level officials; representatives of these departments.  As they are the ones in a 
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position to speak on behalf of these departments, officials in lower levels in the 
hierarchy are not allowed to freely share information with the public.  
 
The MoMM sample should ideally include officials and experts directly involved in 
the ILO social dialogue project.  Lists of these officials and their contacts are not 
publicly available but representatives of the relevant units were to be approached 
independently.  Unfortunately, even personal contacts did not guarantee access to 
MoMM officials, as explained later, which resulted in dropping MoMM perceptions.   
 
The lists of respondents complied in the sampling frame were then approached for 
interviews and focus groups.  It was not possible to access all intended respondents.  
The process and challenges faced throughout the three phases of data collection are 
discussed below. 
 
Part (B) Observation, Interviews and Focus Groups 
6.2.3.2. Observation  
When combined with other research methods, observation can be used to verify the 
reliability of the data collected through other means, such as interviews (Bryman and 
Bell, 2007; Creswell, 2009).  This is one of the techniques that enable the researcher 
to gain deep insights into the respondents, their responses and in the means by which 
the overall context influences these responses, all of which could enrich the research 
(Travers, 2001).  Nevertheless, observation is largely prone to researcher‘s bias, – a 
factor not conditional to this method only - and largely dependent on the researcher‘s 
experiences and perceptions.  Thus, observation – especially participant observation -  
needs to be carefully used and considered together with other methods and the longer 
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the period of time for observation, the better the results would be (Bryman and Bell, 
2007; Denzin and Lincoln, 2005).  . 
 
It was not possible to undertake observation together with interviews and focus 
groups over extended periods in Phase (III) due to access issues and time limitations, 
yet, the study was ethnographically informed.  In that sense I adopt, though to a 
limited extent, unstructured observation.  This technique, as suggested by Jones and 
Somekh (2005), involves taking detailed notes of the surrounding but, unlike in the 
case of structured observation, these occur without a previously prepared schedule 
and, unlike in the case of participant observation, do not include active participation 
of the observer (Jones and Somekh, 2005).   
 
This technique was used to gain better insights into the different contexts where her 
respondents are based; the ETUF, EFI and ILO – which have been visited frequently 
over the research period.  Descriptive and demographic notes were taken throughout 
fieldwork (Creswell, 2003.) These indicated issues such as differences in settings, 
working environment, professionalism, tendencies in behaviour across groups and 
others as discussed below.   
 
i. Setting 
Across the State and public bodies visited, the researcher noticed discrepancies in the 
general atmosphere; these were most notable between the ITC and the MoE.  The ITC 
is in a modern building overlooking the Nile, with a refurbished and open-style office 
atypical of public bodies.  The office was full of professional looking young 
employees, both males and females, and one can hear the English language being 
used frequently amongst them; an indication of their relatively high level of 
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education.  The official interviewer used many English terms throughout the 
interview which is, again, atypical of state officials in Egypt most of whom barely 
speak foreign languages (unless their jobs require them to).  In contrast, the MoE is in 
the old government complex; Mugamma in the busy square of Al Tahrir, Downtown 
Cairo.  The famous government complex was offered as a gift from the USSR in the 
1960s and is typical of any Soviet building of the time.  It was once described as ―a 
concrete hymn to the concrete and harassing bureaucracy of Nasser-style socialism‖ 
as stated by Andre‘ Raymond (cited in Beattie, 2005: 198), a description which is still 
accurate.  The disorganisation of the place is obvious from the entrance of the 
fourteen-floors building, which tends to be busy with thousands of visitors everyday 
(Beattie, 2005; Meyer, 2007).  The official‘s secretariat office is simple; a couple of 
desks, some old furniture and a few facilities, such as a telephone, though not 
necessarily a computer.   
 
On one level, the huge discrepancy between the atmosphere and working conditions 
of the ITC and the MoE reflect Egypt‘s shift in external policy from the East; the 
USSR in the 1950s/60s, to the West; the USA since the 1970s.  Yet on another level, 
these differences do not extend to the working style.  In other words, an ineffective 
bureaucracy still persists in both organisations though to a lesser extent in the ITC 
than in the MoE, as deduced from the officials‘ responses in the interviews. 
 
The ETUF is a large old building in downtown Cairo on the borders of a less 
privileged neighbourhood.  The offices of the representatives are quite simple, with a 
few facilities, such as a telephone and may be an air conditioner and old furniture.  
These were completely different from the senior representative‘s office: a large 
exceptionally refurbished office with a separate space for meetings, a bathroom, 
fridge, and computer.  The whole floor in which his office is located is completely 
149 
 
different from the rest of the building as if one is in a different place; an elaboration 
of hierarchical differences and authority relations in Egyptian organisations.   
 
The EFI headquarters was visited for a couple of interviews as most respondents 
invited the researcher to their offices in different companies and factories across 
Greater Cairo.  The EFI owns a number of floors in a large building overlooking the 
Nile, just above the Ministry of Investment.  It is not usual for a government complex 
to be the headquarters of an independent employers‘ association. Being located above 
the Ministry of Investment makes a statement about the relationship between the state 
and the EFI in Egypt58.  The difference between the EFI and ETUF is an obvious and 
quite expected one and a clear indication of the superior power of employers in labour 
relations.  Finally, unlike the state officials, employers‘ representatives were punctual 
and their secretariats were professional and hence there were not intrusive questions 
asked to the researcher. 
 
The ILO-SRO in Cairo is a refurbished, relatively small three-floor villa in a very 
affluent neighbourhood; Zamalek, surrounded by foreign embassies and consulates 
and intense security.  The researcher spontaneously compared SRO with the World 
Bank office in Cairo in Nile City Towers; in a massive modern and luxurious building 
on the Corniche (one of the most important main roads in Greater Cairo), overlooking 
the Nile.  Such a simple comparison implies the relative weight and power of each 
organisation in influencing development policies in Egypt, as perceived by the 
researcher.   
 
                                                             
58 A point raised in Kassem (2002) as well. 
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ii. Professionalism 
As a young female researcher, I found it easier to communicate with employers and 
ILO representatives.  Across public bodies, the ITC atmosphere was more appealing 
and comfortable as the staff seemed to be used to having young female professionals 
and offered their assistance in Arabic and English (though it is obvious that the 
researcher is Egyptian).  This had not been the case with other bodies, such as MoE, 
MoMM and MoHR, where the staff there dealt with her as atypical case.  This was 
the case with ETUF secretariat and staff as well.  They would immediately start a 
conversation with the researcher. They would begin with general questions, such as 
what do you do, and then they start asking personal questions, such as if the 
researcher is living with her family in London and whether she is living with a 
husband there (as it is not traditional for females to live away from their family place 
if they are not married).  The researcher had always found this completely 
unprofessional but she realised by answering these questions, though she was keen 
not to go into details, people started to be friendlier and were willing to offer more 
assistance.  For instance, some of them provided her with some useful documents and 
asked her to treat these as confidential.  In another instance, the staff explained in 
details the whole VET process as undertaken by this body in reality which highlighted 
some aspects that the researcher would not have known otherwise.  Also, in some 
instances the researcher was invited to have a look at the operations of the unit(s) and 
being friendly with the staff was useful in obtaining detailed explanations of how the 
different things work.   
 
iii. Punctuality  
When interviewing state representatives, there were no guarantees or signs of when 
the researcher would meet the official, despite the former having scheduled an 
appointment beforehand; she frequently had to wait at least for fifteen minutes, 
sometimes three hours.  This did not happen though when meeting the ITC official 
151 
 
who was punctual on the three occasions she met with him.  The longest waiting 
period was in the Ministry of Housing and Reconstruction and throughout the three 
hours, the official‘s secretariat assured the researcher she would soon be seen.  Even 
after the three hours the researcher was not able to see this official who then left his 
office for an urgent meeting elsewhere.  The researcher had to re-schedule the 
meeting and started to look for another official of the same position and expertise as a 
backup in case she did not manage to see this official, which had happened.  There is 
a popular notion in Egypt that the longer one spends waiting to see a person, the more 
prestigious this person shall be. This always did not make sense to the researcher but 
was proven true by this inconvenient experience. 
 
The situation was better at the ETUF. The researcher did not wait more than twenty 
minutes to be seen.  Employers‘ representatives were punctual and keen to stick to the 
timing of the interview.  ILO officials were also punctual, notwithstanding one 
interview where the researcher had to wait for two hours to be seen.  This was a 
disappointment and not expected in such a highly professional environment and due 
to time limitations, the researcher had to follow-up with the respondent in Geneva. 
 
iv. Non-verbal language 
Notes of non-verbal communication were taken throughout the interviews and focus 
groups.  These were taken into consideration when analysing data as shown in the 
next chapter.  Non-verbal communication is very powerful in altering the meaning of 
responses and hence could not have been disregarded.  
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Those observations offered useful insights into the differences in the weights and 
levels of professionalism of institutional actors, all of which informed the data 
analysis process. 
 
6.2.3.3. Interviews 
As Fontana and Frey put it, interviews are ―not neutral tools of data gathering but 
rather active interactions between two (or more) people leading to negotiated, 
contextually based results‖ (2005: 698).  These interactions offer the researcher the 
opportunity to obtain insights into respondents‘ perceptions, thoughts and feelings.  
More insights could be offered through face-to-face interviews through non-verbal 
communication as compared to for example surveys, telephone interviews or online 
interviewing (Bryman and Bell, 2007; Fontana and Frey, 2005).  Nevertheless, this 
also entails interviewer and interviewee bias which I tried to minimise as illustrated in 
section 2.2.3 (Creswell, 2003; Saunders et al., 2009). 
 
Throughout the research process, a mixture of 60 structured and unstructured face-to-
face59 interviews were undertaken.  All interviews were audio-recoded, translated into 
English, transcribed and analysed using NVivo (as shown in the next chapter).  
Interviews lasted for 50 minutes on average (only four interviews lasted for around 90 
minutes and only one was for almost 2 hours60).  Notes of the interviews were taken 
as well (i) as a safety net in case the recorder failed; and (ii) as descriptive and 
reflective notes (Creswell, 2003:189) as discussed later under observations. 
 
                                                             
59
 except for one telephone interview with an ILO representative 
60 This was with a senior ETUF representative. 
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i. Unstructured interviews  
Unstructured interviews were used in the preliminary stages of the research.  Despite 
the risk of obtaining too much and/or irrelevant data by using a method that could be 
misleading, unstructured interviews allow the researcher to deeply explore the area of 
interest (Creswell, 2009; Saunders et al., 2009).  This was appropriate for the early 
stages of the research (Phases I and II) and helped in funnelling down the research 
topic later on.   
   
In Phase (I) the researcher participated in a conference organised by the Middle East 
Association61 and partners62 on Employment and Skill Formation in MENA in July 
2008 in London.  This was important in establishing contacts with MoTI/ITC 
representatives and practitioners in the field.  This was followed by participation in 
another conference, in November 2008 in Cairo, on VET and its development in 
Egypt.  More contacts with state representatives from MoE, MoHR, and TOHMAR 
were established and these were reinforced with personal connections and 
representatives were interviewed later in Phase (I).  I also had the chance to meet with 
employers‘ representatives from BEBA and ABA and was able to secure two 
interviews as a result.  They offered insights into employers‘ perceptions of the 
problem and its impact on the quality of their workforce and subsequently on their 
production; important information at this stage of the study.  They also referred the 
researcher to other EFI employers‘ representatives.  This was helpful especially since, 
unlike with state and workers‘ representatives, the researcher did not meet Egyptian 
employers‘ representatives in the ILO/AOL Arab Employment Forum though she 
attended all of the sessions and the employers‘ meeting on the last day.   
   
                                                             
61 MEA is a London-based non-for-profit association for encouraging mutual trade relations between the 
UK and the Middle East and North Africa. 
62 Such as UK Trade and Investment department. 
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A total of nine interviews were undertaken with state and employers‘ representatives 
(see Appendix B for list of respondents in each Phase); and (ii) a field visit to the 
newly established TVET reform programme was taken.  These interviews took place 
in Greater Cairo and Alexandria.  At this early stage, the role of workers‘ 
representatives was not yet clear and hence I met one senior trainer in TOHOMAR.  
He provided insights into the problem from workers‘ perspective and I realised the 
importance of exploring more deeply the perceptions of workers‘ representatives 
which was undertaken in Phases (II) and (III).     
 
All of the officials were helpful and provided the researcher with published and 
unpublished documents that were helpful in gaining insights into their role in VET 
and the means by which VET development is being approached by different bodies.  
All of them expressed their interest in research on VET and on the relative scarcity of 
research on the topic despite its growing importance.  Nevertheless, they were seldom 
critical of current VET policies by the state.  The relative lack of objectivity the 
researcher perceived in the officials‘ responses is not unusual, especially in 
developing countries, and all of the officials interviewed throughout the study showed 
high levels of subjectivity in their responses.  As a result, the researcher had to ask 
many intertwined questions to arrive at one answer as she realised that she could not 
obtain direct and clear answers to direct questions.  For instance, if asking about the 
role of unions as perceived by the state, she asked about different incidents the 
Ministry or public body had been involved with workers and how they reacted in 
each, then compared their perceptions of the entities‘ reactions to workers in each 
instance, then compared it to the current situation.  In some other instances, the 
researcher relied on documents or newspaper articles and asked for clarification on 
these matters.  However, whenever the officials did not want to comment on one 
issue, they either keep on repeating themselves or simply made it clear they are 
unwilling to discuss this point further.  Some of them asked the researcher to switch 
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off the recorder for them to clarify on a certain matter and request this be ―off the 
record‖.    
 
In Phase (II) I went back to the field to (i) follow-up with state representatives; (ii) to 
investigate the role of NGOs; a role argued to be important by employers‘ 
representatives interviewed in Phase (I).  These took place in March 2009 in Great 
Cairo.  Later in July, three pilot interviews were undertaken with workers‘ 
representatives who were accessed through a workshop organised by London-based 
researchers on recent labour issues in Egypt.  Three independent63 workers‘ 
representatives were interviewed and these acted as part of a pilot to the fieldwork 
undertaken in Phase (III).   
 
ii. Pilot Study 
The pilot study was useful as it highlighted some important aspects for the researcher 
when dealing with workers.  One important issue was the different understanding of 
some main concepts and terms.  For instance, when asked about VET, workers gave 
completely irrelevant answers, mainly because they have not received any formal 
training throughout their working life and could not easily relate to the concept of 
VET as a means to improve one‘s skills levels.  This was already very revealing.  
Another example is the term ―social dialogue‖ of which workers held different 
understandings.  Hence, the researcher realised the need to explain as clearly as 
possible the meaning of important terms and to revise responses to questions with 
workers whenever necessary, to avoid misunderstandings.    
 
                                                             
63 Who used to be members of the ETUF but they quit.  One of them is a senior member of the 
independent union of tax collectors. 
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It was also noticed that Egyptian workers appreciate any attention to their ―cases‖ 
which they do not seem to usually get from their employers and/or the state.  They are 
willing to offer as much information as possible as long as the researcher shows 
sufficient interest and compassion with their conditions and of course as long as they 
are sure she is an independent researcher; not in any direct contact with their 
employers.  They are however not likely to openly criticise the state.  They tend to be 
talkative and are likely to go off point at times so it is important to be alert whenever 
this occurs.  Also, they tend to exaggerate their role in the organisation and the events 
and/or tasks they are part of; thus, it is important to ask the same question in more 
than one form to enhance the validity and reliability of answers.  For these reasons, 
the researcher decided to undertake semi-structured interviews with workers while 
relying on a life-history approach.  In that sense, workers will be able to talk freely 
about their experiences while ensuring the conversation is kept within the boundaries 
of the questions of investigation. 
 
A similar pilot study was not possible to undertake with employers mainly due to 
access issues.  Nevertheless, the interviews undertaken in Phase (I) were useful in 
signalling some issues that I took into account when interviewing employers in Phase 
(III).  These include (i) they are likely to offer diplomatic answers when commenting 
on the role of the state and hence more probing is necessary; (ii) their time is limited 
and hence precision in questions is required to be able to cover all required aspects; 
(iii) to ensure a shared understanding of basic concepts such as VET; and (iv) 
personal connections are important in establishing a minimum level of trust so it is 
better to look for trustworthy referrals (which is not always possible but would give 
an edge). 
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Later in November 2009, I participated in the ILO/AOL Arab Employment Forum in 
Beirut as an independent observer.  This was an important opportunity to (i) observe 
state-employer-union relations under the ILO umbrella; (ii) develop contacts with 
ILO, state and workers‘ representatives some of whom agreed to participate in the 
study (I did not meet any Egyptian employers in the forum); and (iii) undertake 
informal conversations64 with state and workers‘ representatives. 
  
iii. Semi-structured Interviews 
In Phase (III) semi-structured interviews were used as these offer some structure to 
the interview to ensure addressing the areas/questions of concern while maintaining a 
degree of flexibility in the conversation to gain deep insights into the perceptions and 
thoughts of respondents (Guba and Lincoln, 2005).  Also, this structure offers an 
opportunity to compare and contrast interviews‘ results, especially when multiple 
respondent groups are involved, which is not possible with unstructured interviews 
(Creswell, 2003; 2009; Saunders et al., 2009).  The questions focused on  
respondents‘ perceptions of (i) VET as provided by the state, employers and unions; 
(ii) the effectiveness of each party‘s VET contributions; (iii) state-employer-union 
relationships and VET cooperation; (iv) ILO and the effectiveness of its activities; 
and finally (v) ILO SDP and its influence of VET.  Related issues were then explored 
throughout the interviews (see Appendix C for list of codes of relevant issues).  A 
total of (i) 15 interviews were undertaken with employers‘ and workers‘ 
representatives in Greater Cairo (only one interview with MoMM representative and 
another with MoE in Phase (III)); (ii) 15 interviews with ILO representatives in Cairo 
and Geneva65; (ii) 3 interviews with employers on an enterprise level. 
 
                                                             
64
 These were not recoded but notes were taken. 
65 Including follow-ups (see Appendix A). 
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a. State interviews  
MoMM was the targeted entity for state perceptions of VET and ILO SDP in Phase 
(III) as explained earlier; however, it was impossible to gain access to targeted 
respondents.  The responses of MoMM representatives were expected to be 
diplomatic and far from critical on issues of tripartism and social dialogue.  Results 
were also not expected to differ from the state position verified in the literature vis-à-
vis employers and workers.  On the one hand, even these diplomatic or biased 
responses would have added an interesting dimension to the study especially when 
compared to the responses of employers and unions.  On the other hand, it can be 
argued that because of these expected limitations the unavailability of perceptions of 
state representatives will not influence the analysis in a negative manner. 
 
A contact with a MoMM representative developed in Beirut was followed up upon in 
February 2010; however, after his initial consent to put me in touch with other 
MoMM representatives directly involved in ILO SDP, he seemed to be ‗too busy‘ to 
effectively offer any assistance.  Thus, another representative who is a specialist in 
VET and whose name was included in some of the ILO documents on SDP (provided 
by ILO representatives) was approached and an appointment was set up.  After a ten-
minute conversation, the interviewee suddenly ended the interview, saying he was not 
specialised in the area of social dialogue, though the purpose of the interview was 
explained in each of the phone conversations the researcher had with him to arrange 
the meeting.  Instead, he offered to help with the subject of VET and its development 
and to put the researcher in touch with a senior colleague working on ILO SDP.  
 
The phone conversation with his colleague was summed up as: (i) holding a PhD 
herself, she believes that interviews are a waste of time and that surveys and 
documentation would be more effective so she was not interested in talking to the 
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researcher or in referring her to others in the department; (ii) the researcher needs to 
send a letter of request to Her Excellence Mrs. Aisha Abd ElHady, Minister of 
MoMM to get access to materials on ILO SDP (see Appendix B).  The researcher sent 
a letter of request signed by the University‘s Director of Research and headed to Her 
Excellence but unfortunately a reply had not been received.  Therefore, all the plans 
of including representatives from MoMM were impossible to implement and the 
researcher ended up with only one representative from MoMM who had offered 
information only on the VET system without going into the ILO Social Dialogue 
Project in particular.  The researcher was still able to get some perceptions on 
tripartite relationships in regards to VET and its development. 
 
b. Employers‟ interviews 
Employers‘ response rate was around 62%.  Interviews were focused on exploring 
their perceptions of (i) the current VET system; (ii) effectiveness of the ILO SDP; and 
(ii) the influence of ILO SDP on VET and its development.  Employers were 
diplomatic and sometimes contradictory in their responses and hence the researcher 
used to ask a single question in different and intertwined ways to arrive at answers.  
For instance, one employer stated that his relationship with the state is very good and 
then later in the interview when talking about the benefits the state obliges employers 
to give to workers, he started complaining about the state and how distant it is from 
employers and their needs and so on.  Another example, when employers were asked 
about labour actions, such as strikes, in their sectors, they would either ask the 
researcher to switch off the recorder or refuse to comment due to the perceived 
sensitivity of the issue and because they did ―not want to have problems with the 
government‖ as stated by a senior employers‘ representative.  
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Although employers in the sample assented to take part in this study and agreed to 
terms of confidentiality and other ethical issues, they were worried if the researcher 
was a journalist or working for a non-governmental or a human rights organisation.  
She had to re-assure them she is an independent PhD researcher during the 
interviews.  It was noticed that the contact persons who referred her to employers 
helped establish a minimum level of trust that could not had been formed otherwise in 
a low trust context.  Unlike with ILO representatives, it would have been impossible 
to interview these representatives if she approached them independently.   
 
c. ILO Interviews 
The response rate was relatively high; 80 percent, as compared to other targeted 
groups.  The Beirut conference was a useful starting point for establishing contacts 
with ILO officials and I also benefited from personal contacts.  All interviews were 
undertaken in English, apart from two respondents who used a mixture of Arabic and 
English, and interviews lasted for 50 minutes on average.  The researcher started with 
interviewing ILO officials in the SRO in Cairo first to get better insights into the ILO 
SDP before going for interviews with officials in Geneva HQ.  
 
Respondents were asked about their perceptions of two main issues: (i) the ILO SDP 
in Egypt and perceived role and effectiveness of social partners; and (ii) VET and the 
extent to and ways in which the ILO SDP would influence its development, then the 
interviews then flowed into other related aspects as discussed in the next chapter.  All 
respondents were helpful and provided the researcher with useful documents (other 
materials were obtained from the archives of the ILO library in Geneva).  However, 
some respondents were unwilling to discuss certain areas in depth. They either asked 
the researcher to turn off the recorder for more elaboration while making it clear that 
this should be “off the records” or in a couple of instances completely refused to 
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comment, for example on issues of Egypt‘s non-observance of Convention No.87 and 
the current wave of strikes.  Interviewing ILO officials opened up new areas to be 
investigated through interviewing other targeted groups in the study. 
 
The researcher found it relatively easy to communicate with ILO representatives 
compared to other targeted groups in the study, primarily workers‘ representatives.  
ILO representatives were very professional and exhibited: (i) a clear and deep 
understanding of the subject; (ii) appreciation of the value of the research and the 
importance of their contributions through interviews to the study.  
  
d. ETUF interviews 
The researcher met with five union representatives; a response rate of around 22 
percent.  These interviews were the most challenging as compared to other groups as 
the researcher faced not only difficulties in gaining access but also communication 
difficulties.  This is because of (i) being a young and a female researcher from a 
Western university in a male dominated environment which made it difficult to 
establish rapport and to open up respondents who were perceived to be not entirely 
comfortable with me asking them about their work; (ii) they had different levels of 
understanding of main concepts and ideas in the study; (3) they were not as 
appreciative of the value of research as other groups; mainly ILO representatives; and 
(4) the researcher was asked some personal questions (even by senior unions‘ 
representatives) which despite being an unprofessional behaviour, she realised were 
necessary to answer to help establish rapport (see section 6.2.3.2). 
   
All contacts were arranged whilst in Cairo apart from a senior ETUF representative 
who was contacted approached in the ILO/AOL Arab Employment forum and he 
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agreed to meet the researcher later in Cairo.  Once in Cairo, he agreed to participate in 
the study but he had never picked up the phone since then to arrange a meeting.  The 
only resort was to visit the respondent without an appointment in an attempt to either 
meet him or at least arrange an interview date.  Upon showing up in person at the 
representative‘s office she was able to see him immediately without even having to 
wait outside for more than five minutes and the interview went on for almost two 
hours.  This last resort technique seemed to have worked out.  
 
After five interviews with five representatives, the research reached a point of 
saturation.  The researcher was hoping to access two other unions though; the general 
union for workers in textile and for workers in food industries.  However, she was not 
able to meet them because (i) there was some labour instability in the textile sector as 
a result of a case of fraud in one of the newly privatised companies; and (ii) the 
General Union of food industries was undergoing structural changes as the head of 
the union passed away a few days before the researcher tried to contact him which 
also says something about the age of ETUF representatives.  
 
At the beginning of the interviews, all union representatives seemed friendly and 
willing to assist the researcher.  Nevertheless, as soon as the researcher started asking 
about their relationship with the state they started offering diplomatic answers and 
when probed were reluctant to discuss anything further.  Apart from the senior 
representative who seemed to be willing to keep on talking for as long as possible, the 
representatives lost interest quite early in the interview and were unwilling or unable 
to discuss some aspects in details.  They did not seem to understand or appreciate the 
value of the research.  They were wondering why the researcher was looking into 
VET where, from their perspective, there were more important problems to consider, 
such as social benefits, workers‘ rights and others.  Thus the researcher started to ask 
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many questions to address a single aspect of the research, such as their perceptions of 
the influence of certain policies on VET, to counterpoise for their limited responses to 
questions.  One union representative showed an extreme unwillingness to further 
cooperate with the researcher; 35 minutes down the interview, he told the researcher 
he had to go for a late lunch and walked away, leaving the researcher in his office and 
asking her to make her way once she was ready: highly unprofessional and 
unexpected behaviour from a senior union representative.    
 
Another respondent asked for a list of the questions the researcher wanted to ask. He 
then called up one of his staff asking him to prepare a nicely typed document (rather 
than hand written which is still a commonly used technique in their paper work) with 
answers to all of the researcher‘s questions.  He finally asked the researcher to pick it 
up in a couple of days.  The researcher had to show appreciation for his offer though 
she did not find this to be of any value in reflecting the perceptions of the respondent 
so she continued asking the respondent a number of intertwined questions and she 
spared questions about the state till the end of the interview.  The interview lasted 50 
minutes.   
 
Finally, another challenge that was raised in the pilot study was differences in 
respondents‘ understanding of some of the concepts.  For example, when asked about 
social dialogue, he did not refer to state-employer-union relationship but rather to a 
partnership/dialogue between Egypt and the countries of the Nile basin. 
 
Interviews are suitable for exploring the perceptions of representatives of institutional 
actors as the number of these is normally limited.  However, on an enterprise level 
there are larger numbers of workers and hence focus groups are an effective tool for 
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interviewing as many workers as possible in the limited time available for the 
research. 
 
6.2.3.4.. Focus Groups 
Focus groups not only provide an opportunity for respondents to express themselves 
in an unrestricted way (unlike in, say, surveys) but also offer room for the interaction 
of their responses and perceptions in ways that can enrich the discussion and offer 
more insight into feelings and thoughts (Kamberelis and Dimitriadis, 2005).  Two 
focus groups were undertaken to collect data on workers‘ perceptions on an 
enterprise-level.  Each focus group was of 4 participants66 and lasted for about an 
hour each.  These were audio-taped, translated into English, transcribed and analysed 
using NVivo.  I was planning to include at least one company in the tourism sector 
and another in the construction sector for the reasons indicated earlier.  The 
companies were selected using purposive sampling; the researcher was looking for 
companies where access to both management and workers could have been arranged 
independently as to avoid workers being chosen by their employers which would 
affect results.   
 
Such a company was found in the construction sector.  I personally knew a worker in 
the land transport department who agreed to introduce me to his co-workers/builders 
though he remained the main point of contact.  Ten of the workers were invited to 
participate in a focus group (of six to eight people) and nine of them expressed their 
interest.  They were offered workers 30 L.E. compensation (which is 60% of their 
daily pay) to participate in the focus group in addition to transportation costs and 
refreshments.   On the scheduled day for the focus group, workers asked to postpone 
their appointment for three more days and that compensation be raised to 50 L.E. and 
                                                             
66 In one of the groups the fourth respondent did not show up. 
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another meeting was set up.  Then, one day before the re-scheduled meeting, they 
asked for an increase in pay to 100 L.E. and asked the researcher to arrange for a 
mini-bus to pick them up from and back to work and to pay an equal compensation 
for their field supervisor (though he was not participating in the study but he asked for 
this compensation if his workers are to participate in the study).  I could not afford 
these expenses and thus the case had to be dropped after more than three weeks of 
preparations. 
 
The dropped case was replaced with another company in the tourism sector.  It was 
not possible to approach workers independently in the two cases included in the 
study; managers nominated some workers to participate in the two focus groups.  This 
was very challenging as workers needed to be re-assured of the confidentiality of the 
interview.  Even after this, their responses were expected to be influenced by the fact 
that the researcher knew their managers.  This reinforced my decision to use a life 
history approach (as deduced from the pilot study) where respondents would talk 
freely about their personal experiences with VET and how they learnt the vocation.  
This technique was successful in opening them up and they were particularly 
interested that a young researcher from a Western university was curious about their 
personal experiences at work.   
 
Workers were friendly, respectful, did not ask the researcher any personal questions 
and offered many details about different aspects of work.  Unlike union 
representatives, they expressed their views on their relationship with the ETUF freely 
which were critical and sometimes negative but they started to be cautious in their 
answers when probed for more perceptions into this matter.  Thus a number of 
intertwined questions were used to ask about a single matter; a technique used with 
unions‘ representatives as well.  They showed interest in the results of the study; more 
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out of curiosity than for the study‘s importance, and they left their contacts.  Some 
private business was also sought by them as they offered to be of any help in catering 
for private parties. 
 
The researcher had to use very simplified and casual language to communicate with 
workers.  This would have been a more challenging task for workers in the building 
and construction sector and for that focus group (which was dropped) I had started 
looking for a mentor to run the focus group.  Three mentors were approached, 
researchers from an engineering background, but only one was willing and able to act 
as a moderator.  Nevertheless, the mentor was not considered to be necessary for 
workers in the tourism sector since these tend to be more used to dealing with people 
from highly educated backgrounds than their counterparts in the building and 
construction sectors.  Yet, I had to avoid using any terms, such as social dialogue, as 
indicated by the pilot study. 
 
6.3. CODES OF ETHICS 
 
A number of ethical issues were taken into consideration before and during the data 
collection process.  There is not a single set of ethical codes in social sciences 
(Creswell, 2003; Christians, 2005; Saunders et al., 2009).  Nevertheless, there is a 
general consensus on four basic guidelines as suggested by Clifford Christians 
(2005). 
1. Informed consent which is based on two conditions: ―First, subjects must agree 
voluntarily to participate‖ and ―Second their agreement must be based on full and 
open information‖ (Christians, 2005:144).  Both conditions were met in our case as 
(i) all participants fully agreed to offer their perceptions based on the information 
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provided on the purposes of this study; (ii) they all agreed for audio-recording their 
responses; and (iii) the data collected was not used for other purposes.       
2. Deception in terms of deliberate misrepresentation (Christians, 2005:145) of 
research purposes and/or use of data was completely avoided. 
3. Privacy and confidentiality of personal identities has been reassured before 
collecting data and these were kept secure throughout data analysis and reporting 
of findings.  All respondents in the research are anonymous to keep up to this code. 
4. Accuracy and this involves reporting data without any ―fabrications, fraudulent 
materials, omissions and contrivances‖ (Christian, 2005: 145).  This chapter 
illustrates the accuracy with which the research was designed and data collection 
methods were selected and undertaken by providing a detailed account of each of 
these steps and identifying any weaknesses and/or limitations (see below).  The 
same level of details is provided in the next chapter on data analysis that illustrates 
the accuracy with which results were reported.   
     
 
6.4. LIMITATIONS 
 
Every research has limitations that can influence its breadth and depth.  This research 
was restricted by the limited resources available at the time the study was undertaken.  
I was able to visit the field three times throughout the course of the study; 
nevertheless, the longest consecutive period spent in the field was about three months.  
This did not allow for undertaking observations over a prolonged period of time, such 
as six months.  Triangulation of research methods was used to compensate for this 
drawback.  Due to time restrictions more companies were not being included in the 
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enterprise-level analysis.  This was one of the reasons for dropping the company in 
the construction sector as there was not time to arrange with another company.   
 
As a result of time and financial constraints, the research was limited to Greater Cairo 
(that is the two governorates of Cairo and Giza) and Alexandria but could not be 
extended to other regions of the country.  Also, if more time was available, it would 
have been possible to include the final appraisal of the ILO SDP in the study (due to 
end in the second half of 2011 and thus the appraisal would have been ready towards 
the last quarter of 2011). 
 
Other limitations were incurred as a result of uncontrollable external influences, such 
as gaining access to state representatives in MoMM and other respondents in the EFI 
and the ETUF.  As a result, I could not adhere to the plans designed in the sampling 
frame.  Other challenges were incurred in the sampling process at the enterprise level.  
It was not possible to access workers and managers independently and therefore as a 
last resort I asked managers in the two enterprises to allow me to speak to their 
workers.  In an attempt to avoid potential interview bias, a life history approach was 
used in the group interviews but this did not completely remove a probability of bias 
in their responses. 
 
Finally, the study was limited to the viewpoints of state, employers‘ and workers‘ 
representatives on a national level, as shown in the data analysis and findings 
discussed in the next chapter.  More insights into the problem can be obtained from a 
sectoral level analysis and a wider scope of enterprise level analysis.  These can be 
addressed in future research.        
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 7.  DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS   
 
7.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter analyses and discusses findings from the data collected in 2010 (see 
figure 6.4) with the aim of answering the second and third research questions.  The 
chapter is divided into four parts.  Part (1) addresses RQ2 with the aim of exploring 
constituents‘ perceptions of state-employer-union inputs and cooperation in VET.  
Part (2) addresses RQ2 with the aim of exploring constituents‘ perceptions on the ILO 
Social Dialogue Project and the extent to which it has influenced state-employer-
union cooperation and VET development.  Part (3) offers a grassroots perspective on 
the issues discussed in parts (1) and (2) as perceived by employers and workers in two 
enterprises.  Finally, the three parts are linked to gain more insights into relationships 
and probable influences on VET.  
 
7.2. CATEGORISATION, CODING AND THEMES  
 
Data collected were analysed in the following stages: 
1. All interview audio-recordings were transcribed and translated from Arabic to 
English.  The researcher used back translation to ensure meanings were not lost. 
2. Translated transcripts were coded (see Appendix B for a list of the 154 codes). 
3. The data analysis software NVivo (version 8) was used to categorise the data into 
five themes (Table 7.1).  Each theme consists of a number of concepts that were 
compiled from the codified transcripts.   
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Table 7.1 Matching RQs, Perceptions of key institutional actors and Themes 
Research 
Questions 
Perceptions of key 
institutional actors Themes 
PART 1 
To answer RQ 2 
Employers 1. Perceptions of VET and 
its development  
2.Perceptions of state-
employer-union cooperation 
Unions 
ILO 
PART 2 
To answer RQ3 
Employers 
3. Perceptions on the ILO 
and its Social Dialogue 
Project  
4. Perceived influence of 
SDP on VET system  
Unions 
ILO 
PART 3 
To verify 
responses to RQ2 
& RQ3 on an 
enterprise-level 
Employers 
5. Perceptions of employers 
and workers on an 
enterprise level ( 
Workers 
 
4. NVivo models have been used throughout the analysis to offer a visual 
representation of relationships between concepts which offer insights into the 
different dimensions of themes addressed in each section of the analysis.   
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5.  Themes are analysed with the aim of answering the second and third research 
questions: 
RQ2: What are the mutual perceptions of key institutional actors of state, 
employer and union inputs and cooperation in VET? 
RQ3: In what ways do institutional actors perceive the ILO SDP to have 
influenced state-employer-union relationships and VET development? 
 
 
 
7.3. PART (1): RQ2 EXPLORED 
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7.3.1. Perceptions of Employers’ Representatives 
7.3.1.1 Theme (1) Perceptions of VET and its Development  
       NVivo Model 1: Analysis of employers’ perceptions of VET inputs 
 
 
  Employers‘ perceptions of state, employer and union VET inputs 
  S-Inputs: State VET inputs; U-Inputs: Union VET Inputs; E-Inputs: Employers‘ VET inputs; Challenges: 
Challenges facing VET investments     
  Perceptions of: VET-EMP: Education and training for employment; E-EVET: VET effectiveness; E-
QVET; VET quality; VET.COUN: VET councils; RSVET: state‘s role in VET; HELAL: TVET reform 
programme; TRANS.TRAIN; Transformative training EFF.TRAIN: Effectiveness of VET programmes; 
FUNDS: Sources of funds for VET development; RIO: Role of international organisations; TRUST: Trust 
levels; CULT: Cultural issues; POACH: Poaching of workers; ENFORCE: Unenforced articles and laws; 
INCENTIVE Incentives paid to employers to engage in VET and social dialogue; IMPORT: Importing 
foreign labour; MISMATCH: High unemployment and shortages of skills (mismatch problem); 
MISCOM: Miscommunication/lack of awareness; FRAG: System fragmentation; STATECOOP: state 
VET inputs ;CORRUPT Corruption of the system: ; PLAN: Lack of planning ; PERC.TRAIN: VET 
provided by other parties; MKI: Mubarak Kohl Initiative ;ONGOING: Ongoing development and reform; 
HOUSE: In-house training; CURM: Engagement in curriculum development; EMPVET: Employers‘ 
VET participation; LOCAT: Location of training; COOPVET: Employers‘ VET financial cooperation 
;PERC.VET: Social image of VET ;UNIONCENT: Effectiveness of VET centres owned and/or run by 
unions ;UNIONVET: Unions‘ VET inputs.  
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i. Perceptions of State Inputs into VET and its Development 
 
As discussed in Chapter 5, the state offers VET through formal education and VET 
centres.  Respondents‘ perceptions of each are discussed. 
a. The Educational System 
Employers are generally not satisfied with the quality of VET offered as part of the 
system of education.  Some of the perceptions were as extreme as describing the 
whole process as ―useless‖.  Employers interviewed think that the state, represented 
in the MoE and MoHE are concerned with the quantities rather than qualities of 
graduates.  Employers‘ perception in this respect coincides with that of international 
organizations which consider this to be a major challenge to VET (e.g. Abrahart, 
2003; ETF and World Bank, 2006).  For instance, an employers‘ representative in 
tourism comments: 
―The problem is that we have schools and universities that provide a very low 
quality of graduates…. we need to have quality graduates, it is illogical; they 
spend 3 years earning a diploma and then after graduation they know nothing! So 
I have to train them for (at least) 6 months.  Educational standards are 
disastrous‖. 
He suggests the state‘s strategy towards VET development should shift from its 
current focus on adopting quality standards from developed countries with successful 
VET, to a more strategic emphasis on restructuring the VET system as a whole.  He 
comments: 
―the whole system has to be reengineered… they (the state) are currently doing 
quality assurance projects (referring to NAQAAE), „assurance‟ of what exactly? 
There is no quality; the whole content has to be thrown away” (emphasis added) 
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Employers are concerned with the lack of an adequate balance between theory and 
practice.  The system is considered to be mainly based on rote learning and 
memorisation with very little practical training.  An employer in the tourism sector 
comments: 
“(ideally) VET depends on a combination of theory and practice.  Practice means 
that they are trained in the field; in hotels.  This does not happen in Egypt.  They 
keep on learning the theoretical part... with little practice”. 
 
Seven employers referred positively to the Mubarak Kohl Initiative (MKI) as a 
positive step.  The main advantage of MKI is perceived to be the hands-on experience 
it offers individuals.  MKI integrates, in a well planned and structured manner, theory 
and practice in a way that enhances learning, as perceived by employers.  For 
instance, an employer representative in the food and beverage sector states: 
“I personally think that the VET system is very far from what it should realise and 
achieve, apart from Mubarak Kohl (Initiative).  We need to expand more on the 
Mubarak-Kohl initiative or widen its scope on a national level because it is an 
effective programme as it trains on-the-job and has clear parameters and plans”. 
 
Despite employers‘ criticisms of VET, almost all of them distanced themselves from 
the problem as they considered it to be the sole responsibility of the state.  Eight 
employers expressed their unwillingness to cooperate with MoE or MoHE on the 
development of VET and they did not recognise any potential role they could play in 
VET development.  Apart from this general trend, two employers have been found to 
be already cooperating with the state in VET.  Such a level of cooperation is not 
insignificant by regional standards in MENA and as compared to the case of Egypt a 
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few years ago.  Yet, this is not the case if compared to the German case which the 
Egyptian government is using as a benchmark (mainly through MKI). 
 
Both employers; in the tourism and construction sectors, have been invited by senior 
state representatives to represent employers on the boards of executives of some VET 
colleges on a regional and/or a national level.  Both agreed to take part in these for 
two reasons, as reported; (1) they were selected from a wide range of employers by 
senior state representatives; (2) they hoped they could bring about some change to the 
status quo.  The employer‘s representative in tourism has been a board member for 
about 3 years.  He is mainly concerned with his inability to bring about any effective 
change to the current system due to its relative inflexibility.  He describes his 
experience with a VET college: 
“Finally, they (the VET college) started to consider the viewpoints of employers in 
curriculum design.  They established a council and invited employers of diversified 
experiences in the field to benefit from their contributions and I was selected (as 
an employer representative on the board of executives)… but all of these things are 
time consuming and when you undertake research (to improve the VET system) 
you can end up with an initiative that will be put in the drawer (rather than used in 
policy making), why should I waste my time then? I am a private sector employer!  
(for example) We asked them to reintroduce students‟ interviews (as a criterion for 
enrolment).  It took them ages to agree to do so and in the end they amended it 
only partially (not as suggested by employers). due to their (the state) concerns 
about social inequality and equal opportunities!!!” 
 
A more positive experience was reported in the construction sector where the 
employer has been able to positively influence curriculum development.  He describes 
his experience with the MoE: 
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“we have been working for 2 years now with MoE on a programme of partnership, 
we managed to work on a couple of schools; we work with them on curriculum 
(development) and they provide us with qualified labour in the field of mining.  
And… it (the experience) has been promising”. 
 
In summary, all employers‘ representatives are dissatisfied with the quality and 
effectiveness of VET as part of the system of education.  They however consider the 
system and its delivery to be the entire responsibility of the state and they have not 
offered to cooperate in the design, provision, evaluation or development of VET apart 
from two employers who already cooperate with the state.  However, their 
perceptions of the effectiveness of this cooperation are different.  One probable 
explanation could be the nature of the sector within which each operates but this is a 
hypothesis that needs to be verified through further research into this point.  Unlike 
the educational system, employers tend to be more involved in VET training centres.  
This is not to say however that their involvement is perceived to be effective, as 
discussed below.  Employers‘ perceptions on the quality and effectives of VET 
centres are slightly better than of the educational system. 
 
b. Training Centres 
When exploring perceptions of VET centres, employers‘ interviewed fell into one of 
two categories.  First, a group who has worked with VET centres before and has 
direct relationships with them; this includes three employers.  Second, a larger group 
of 7 employers; they are aware of the availability of state-owned VET centres and 
related programmes but have never been in direct contact with any of these.  Both 
groups agree that VET in the educational system needs a long time to be effectively 
reformed.  For instance: 
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“Looking at the progress (of VET) on a national level, we still have a long way to 
go”. 
So they regard VET centres as a quick solution to the problem of VET, for instance a 
common response was along the lines of this comment: 
      “The ITC (Industrial Training Centre) provides training and this is a quick 
solution.” 
 
In the first group, employers had different experiences with state-run centres.  For 
instance, a representative from tourism stated: 
“(he has been a member of) a council in MoE for about 10 years ago (which was 
established) to find ways of improving the quality of technical and vocational 
education as it is useless” (emphasis added) 
Yet, after ten years development efforts are not perceived to have been fruitful, as: 
 ―There are some developments in curriculum but these are not in line with 
(market) developments‖. 
Two employers within this group reported a positive experience in working with the 
ITC which is an affiliate of MoTI, for instance one of them reported: 
“We have regular meetings and strong connections with MoTI… and at the same 
time we deal with other bodies... such as the ITC with which we work closely”. 
 
According to these employers, the MOTI has offered them technical assistance 
through the ITC and the IMC (Industrial Modernisation Centre) in the form of (i) 
international consultants to help with restructuring the business; and (ii) VET 
programmes to upgrade the skill level of their workforce.  The state covers 90% of the 
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costs of the programmes and employers only pay 10%; a relatively large subsidy by 
regional and international standards (see chapter 5).  One of the employers made it 
clear that he could have never afforded these services if they were not so heavily 
subsidised: 
“Honestly, I am one of the companies who have greatly benefited from these 
(state-run VET centres) services… We have participated in developing the 
technology centre for marble (VET centre) and we understand what it takes to 
export foreign technologies and machinery and so on.  The centre is responsible 
for importing technology from Italy or from other developed countries to Egypt.  It 
has been there for 5 years and 80 companies have benefited from its services as 
compared to 1000 marble companies in Egypt.  We created 1000 job opportunities 
and we offered VET; we do not ask for any qualifications (as a criterion for 
training) but the willingness of the trainee to work (is not sufficiently available) 
and we offer a job opportunity after finishing the training course of 100 dollars per 
month and during the training we offer 30 dollars per month pocket money… (all 
of this) is financed by the IMC...  The IMC is the body that creates the VET 
programme… and they (the IMC) offered me an English consultant, he is acting as 
a vice- CEO, he and his team are here to restructure the company and its 
operations, it (the programme as a whole) costs 1,200,000 L.E.; I only pay 
120,000 L.E. and the IMC pays the rest of the package, I could not have otherwise 
offered this”. 
 
 
Employers‘ limited utilisation of state-run services is perceived to be mainly due to 
the lack of awareness and ineffective communication of ITC services to employers, 
from the viewpoints of employers‘ representatives in the first group who think the 
ITC and EFI should play a more effective role in disseminating such information.   
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The second group did not recognise any kind of employers‘ engagement in VET 
centres and more generally they were only able to recognise two VET 
centres/development programmes; the ITC and the TVET Reform Programme 
respectively, despite the tens of programmes available for VET centres and its 
development as discussed earlier. 
 
Two employers perceive the TVET Reform Programme (see Chapter 5) to be a good 
attempt to change the status quo and increase employers‘ engagement.  The remaining 
five employers‘ representatives are critical of the programme and its effectiveness as 
after more than five years of operation since its launch in 2005 they still cannot 
recognise its influence.  Some of them criticised the vague vision of the programme 
and the contributions of member employers:  
 “The concept of TVET (Reform Programme) has been a bit lost... (the 
programme aims) to reform VET from the perspective of the private sector and 
according to its needs... (but) I still have some restrictions (on its operation and 
direction)… they (participating employers) are in a coma; they are inactive in 
Human Resource Development and they ask for silly (basic) things, such as 
people with good English language skills!‖.  
 
All employers‘ representatives in the second group did not have positive perceptions 
of the ITC though they all referred to it as an example of state efforts in VET centres.  
For instance, a senior representative in the EFI chamber of construction industries 
reported ineffective cooperation with the ITC and gives an example: 
“(the ITC asks the Chamber): „we (ITC) an upcoming seminar, can you please 
give us your database to contact member employers?‟ and so forth.  But our (the 
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EFI and the ITC) role should be different; we should have specialists to diagnose 
the problems of employers and ascertain their needs (for the ITC to be able to 
effectively assist employers)”. 
 
This comment is made by a senior employers‘ representative; his statement that ―we 
should have a specialist to diagnose the problems of employers and ascertain their 
needs‖ is a strong indication of the incoherence and ineffectiveness of the current 
employers‘ association which he represents, as part of the EFI. 
 
Employers also commented on the ITC programme for transformative training.  The 
latter helps individuals to shift from one field to another through intensive courses 
and training on basic skills required on an entry level in certain vocations, for a period 
of three to six months.  This training is then complemented with on-the-job training in 
enterprises.  Transformative training is one option that the state and its ITC resorted 
to for solving shortages of skilled workers.  Employers perceive the programme to be 
a practical short-term solution yet they would rather like the MoE and MoHE to do a 
better job in delivering quality VET in the first place to save on:  ―time, money and 
effort‖. 
 
Hence, in general employers have unfavourable perceptions of state-run VET.  
Employers in the first group consider ineffective communication of the state‘s VET 
services to employers to be a major constraint.  However, employers are usually very 
attentive to any sort of assistance that can help improve their performance especially 
if it is offered at a highly subsidised rate as in the case of VET which the ITC 
subsidises by 90%.  A probable interpretation could be their unwillingness to share 
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information about their businesses with the state, especially given the low levels of 
trust as indicated in this analysis, rather than ineffective means of communication.  
 
ii. Perceptions of unions‟ inputs  
Employers‘ representatives do not recognise unions‘ role and inputs in to VET.  They 
see little reason for involving workers in VET and its development as Egyptian 
workers, from their viewpoints, never point out areas of deficiencies and never ask for 
any training to upgrade their skills.  A representative in the construction sector 
comments: 
“The worker always thinks he is Number One… Do you expect him to come up to 
me (the employer) and say I need to be trained in this or that?! How come? No 
(Egyptian workers) could ever come up and say they need training”.  
Another employer representative who had previous experience with MKI does not 
recognise the value of engaging workers on boards of VET, as they won‘t add value 
since:  
“People (workers) in Egypt never say they do not know”. 
Employers however referred to informal inputs by supervisors and workers‘ 
representatives.  The same employer comments later in the interview:  
“Workers‟ inputs are likely to be informal (emphasis original-author)”. 
It seems that workers‘ representatives offer employers feedback on VET and general 
performance levels, yet employers do not seem to be willing to formally approve of 
workers‘ role and inputs.  One possible explanation is the relatively high hierarchical 
and authority relations in Egyptian organisations as discussed above.  Hence, since 
formal recognition of workers‘ inputs to VET would strengthen workers‘ position and 
power, employers tend to reject such contributions formally.  Instead, employers rely 
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on informal consultation from workers‘ representatives so that they receive feedback 
on workers‘ performance, VET needs and other issues while preserving the 
hierarchical structure within the enterprise and limiting the perceived scope of 
workers‘ inputs.  
 
Two unions own VET centres though with limited capacities due to financial 
constraints.  When employers were asked about their perceptions of these, their 
responses were mostly negative, for instance one employer replied: 
―Is this a question to be asked? …they do not have one training centre (in this 
sector)!”  
 
The reaction of other employer representatives was similar and comments such as: 
―They have only one centre and it is (body language indicating it is useless)”, were 
very common.  The ETUF with all its 23 unions is perceived only to be concerned 
with demanding more benefits.  For instance, an employers‘ representative in the 
tourism sector comments: 
“They (unions) do not realise the importance of training.  Listen, this mindset; the 
person who appreciates the importance of training, need to be exposed to the 
international arena, to be aware of how things are like outside (Egypt), to have 
seen similar products in other countries (and how they are being delivered) and 
how (skilled) employees are, as long as they (unions and workers) are just limited 
to the local/national level, their ceiling is not very high; they do not think they 
need training.  Unfortunately, the trade union of tourism does not appreciate 
training, they are more concerned with how to get more benefits for workers, how 
to increase pay and so on”.  
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Only one employer was positive about the VET centre owned by the General Union 
of Workers in Construction and Woodwork, developed using financial aid from an 
American body.  Nevertheless, he perceives the outputs of the centre to be limited and 
of negligible influence on a national level.  He comments: 
―These offer training to workers from companies and organisations, one of the 
good centres in Mokatam, it is very good, but the productivity of the centre, I do 
not have statistics, but it is not effective on a national level… they invited me to 
have a look at the centre and it is good, they have workshops and machinery and 
trainers… (but) all of these are available but with a largely limited scope‖.  
 
The same employer however had a different response when asked about his 
company‘s relationship, and more generally the sector which he represents, with 
unions‘ VET centres, for which he replied: 
“There is no relationship.  But if anyone wants to contact the union to ask them 
(i.e. other companies in the chamber) to train their workers (body language 
meaning - they can go on), but we do not ask them to train our workers, we do our 
training in-house”.  
 
Hence, employers‘ representatives have unfavourable perceptions of unions‘ 
capacities to contribute to VET.  They are very negative about the involvement of 
workers and their organisations.  Though supervisors are informally consulted to 
point out strengths and weaknesses on an enterprise level, employers do not formally 
approve of their inputs.  Formal recognition of unions‘ inputs could strengthen 
workers‘ position which employers reject. 
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iii. Perceptions of employers‟ inputs 
This section explores employers‘ perceptions of their own role in VET and its 
development.  First, their perceptions of VET and its value in general are discussed.  
Second, their perceptions of their inputs into VET are explored. 
 
All employers‘ representatives agreed that the importance of training is widely 
unappreciated in Egypt.  VET is not considered to be a high priority issue on 
employers‘ agenda as stated by employers‘ representatives, for instance: 
“The mindset of VET is completely non-existent in Egypt.  Employers do not want 
to invest in VET and workers also do not want to invest; not money but their time”. 
 
Various justifications were offered to explain employers‘ neglect of VET.  For 
instance, some employers argue that workers tend to be unwilling to engage in VET 
or any type of skill development, for instance an employer comments: 
 “there is no appreciation by workers to (the value of) training”.   
 
Another employer representative has the same point of view and describes workers‘ 
attitudes towards VET programmes: 
 “People (workers) consider training to be a „trip‟… they leave their job and they 
go to a 5-star hotel, they have coffee breaks and luxurious lunches (and that is 
all)... I have personally seen these things‖. 
 
Another justification is cultural influences.  The latter are perceived to undervalue 
VET and the importance of skill development in general.  Some employers argue 
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along the lines that the Egyptian worker ―always thinks he is Number One‖ as 
indicated before and therefore workers think they do not need training.  To them, the 
development of production through training programmes is out of the question, as one 
employer comments: 
―We have a problem in Egypt regarding labour and the culture of work… The 
mindset of work and improving production does not exist in our culture‖. 
 
Such misappreciation of VET is related to the low prestige of VET in society, as 
discussed in the literature review.  Employers think that such an unfavourable social 
image has reduced the demand for VET programmes and undermined the value of all 
related activities including re-training or transformative training.   
One employer gives an example from the tourism sector: 
“There is no demand… for certain types of jobs in the (tourism) sector, due to 
culture.  No one wants to work as a waiter or as a chef; they feel it undervalues 
them, from their point of view”. 
 
Another explanation of  employers‘ low inputs to VET is the low levels of 
competition in the Egyptian market.  Thus, employers are not keen to improve their 
quality levels as consumers have limited options in the market.  Moreover, in some 
instances in “immature markets” , companies are likely to compete on price and thus 
they focus on cutting costs which discourages them from   investing in upgrading 
workers‘ skills through VET programmes.  Employers (and ILO representatives as 
well – as discussed later) have brought up this issue, for instance one of them 
comments: 
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―It is (the Egyptian market) an immature market… the private sector abroad, due 
to high competitiveness, they know they will go bankrupt if they do not train… but 
Egyptians do not understand the value of training‖. 
 
The tourism sector, mainly driven by the private sector, is an exception as (i) it targets 
international customers; and (ii) it faces international competition.  Hence, quality 
standards are very high in comparison to other sectors, such as construction for 
instance.  Employers in the tourism sector are making every effort to enhance VET 
levels in  their workforce which is currently a major constraint to the development of 
the sector as explained in Chapter 2.  The state is relatively supportive of such 
initiatives due to the importance of the sector to economic growth and as argued by 
Richter and Steiner (2008), due to the neo-patrimonial nature of the state.  For 
instance, employers‘ representatives in the Chamber of Tourism play an active role in 
VET development.  Some inputs from employers have been difficult to implement, 
such as the introduction of interviews as a criterion for acceptance in colleges of 
tourism in Egypt67.  Nevertheless, there have been positive changes in other areas, 
such as curriculum development, as indicated by the employers‘ representative: 
“We changed curriculum (in cooperation with the Ministries of Education and 
Tourism) of (a number of) higher technical colleges and universities of tourism in 
Egypt, against a benchmark of 5 Western colleges and according to the needs of 
the market; this is on the top management level”. 
 
In other words, employers‘ inputs are considered to be ―limited trials in a limited 
number of programmes” rather than a well articulated programme of employers‘ 
inputs , as argued by a senior employers‘ representative.  The MoE and MoHE started 
                                                             
67 see (i) in section 3.1.1.1 
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to engage employers in their committees and to consult them on matters related to 
curriculum development; however, employers‘ inputs are not always effectively 
implemented due to the relative inflexibility of the system and the relatively high 
levels of corruption, neo-patrimonialism and clientelism, all of which constrain any 
change to the system.   
 
Nevertheless, it is misleading to assume that employers do not play any role in VET.  
Three employers reported the provision of some kind of technical assistance.  
Employers‘ experiences have not always been positive in this regard as shown below 
but when their inputs are taken into account by decision makers, the results tend to be 
rewarding.  For instance, an employers‘ representative who worked on Mubarak-Kohl 
Initiative (MKI) comments: 
“The Curriculum used to be supply driven, but afterwards we tried to make it 
demand driven...  For example, we did this in El Marg (a small city in Egypt) 
where there is a demand for insurance salesmen, so we developed a VET centre for 
this (through MKI)”. (emphasis added) 
In this example, the state represented by MoE and Gtz have taken employers‘ inputs 
into consideration which resulted in a new VET programme that meets the needs of 
employers in the small city of El Marg.  The influence of a neo-liberal analysis of 
VET problems (as discussed in the literature review) is obvious in the employers‘ 
representative description of the problem as one of supply and demand mismatches.  
Yes, but the example is positive and that should also be noted. 
 
In addition to the state‘s limited engagement of employers in VET, employers 
themselves are only willing to share  a limited amount of information.  Employers‘ 
representatives reported their reluctance to share information about their companies 
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and their needs in VET terms.  All of them reported their uncertainty about  how this 
information would be used by the state and their competitors and thus they prefer to 
keep their inputs in VET, especially in technical issues, to a minimum.  An 
employers‘ representative describes member employers (from different sectors) 
saying: 
“they (employers) do not want to provide information.  They do not trust how this 
information will be used.” 
This issue of trust is one of the main challenges that limit employers‘ inputs into 
VET.  These are directly related to low levels of cooperation amongst employers and 
between employers and the state, as discussed later in Theme (2), together with the 
generally relatively low levels of trust in the Egyptian context.  
 
The situation with employers‘ financial inputs into VET systems is even worse.  A 
senior employers‘ representative comments: “The private sector is a recipient; 
employers do not pay anything (to VET development)”.  They can refuse to cooperate 
in funding VET even if they have to pay 5% of the total costs of VET development 
programmes; a percentage considered by state representatives to be negligible68.  An 
employers‘ representative gives an example from his own experience:  
“(VET) courses are free and they (employers) do not contribute anything.  I was 
able to obtain a grant from USAID (for VET) with a subsidy of 95% and employers 
were only required to pay (the remaining) 5%.  They refused to cooperate in this 
programme.” 
He also calls for better and more formalised employers‘ financial cooperation and 
suggests the development of a formal: 
                                                             
68
 Unlike other contexts where employers‘ VET contributions are calculated as a percentage of 
turnover, for example large British corporations typically spend 3% of turnover on VET, in Egypt 
employers are asked to cover 5-10% of the cost of particular programmes.    
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“training fund to achieve financial sustainability, as in France for example, with 
the training levy.. but here the government is funding and subsidizing the private 
sector, even when the training is offered (almost) for free they (employers) still do 
not want to engage (in VET)”. 
The training levy has been already introduced in the new Labour Law 12/2003 in an 
attempt to oblige employers to cooperate in financing VET.  This article compels 
enterprises employing more than ten workers to pay a-one percent levy on their net 
profits to the training fund of MoMM.  Some companies are paying the levy while 
others are not, and the levy yields on average 350 million L.E. per annum 
(AfDB/OECD, 2008).  Employers reacted strongly against this article upon its 
introduction in 2003.  Currently, a number of businesses have brought court cases 
against the unlawfulness of this article relying on some loopholes in the law.  Almost 
all of the employers interviewed agreed that this article ―does not make sense‖, for 
instance a senior employers‘ representative comments: 
“The 1% is not taken for training.  We train our people... I pay 2 - 3% (of profits) 
on VET so why would you take another 1%from me.  If there are companies that 
do not provide VET, you can start taking from them, but it does not make sense to 
be providing my workforce with quality training and then you take from me (an 
extra) 1% levy which I have no  idea what you (MoMM) will end up doing with 
it”.   
 
Whenever employers need to provide VET to their workers, they do so independently 
without any cooperation with either the state or, whenever available, unions‘ centres.  
For instance: 
“There is no relationship (with unions‟ VET centres)… We do not cooperate with 
them, because we meet our needs using our own capacities, but the problem we 
face is when we need to employ new workers”. 
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This viewpoint is shared by all employers‘ representatives interviewed.  Three 
employers; two international hotel chains and a large company in food and beverages,  
invest considerable amounts in training their workforce. For instance, an employers‘ 
representative in food and beverages comments: 
“We spend a lot on training (VET).  If I want someone to work in agriculture, I 
can employ someone with a Bachelors in Commerce and then train him in 
agriculture, because there are no (qualified) people (graduates) in agriculture.  
For instance, no one is trained as a veterinarian, so I send them abroad for a 6-
months training or I can get some experts and sometimes I get trainers from India 
and Pakistan because their level of education is better”. 
Other employers use less professional techniques for VET or  do not invest much on 
in-house training.  For example, in the textiles sector one employers‘ representative 
comments: 
“we employ them and then they work on the job, he (the new worker) may or  may 
not like the job.  That is why, a large percentage of the new hires do not continue 
and they leave and a few people remain”.  
There are however more serious reasons why they leave the job than simply  disliking 
the job as indicated by this employer; such as the low wages and bad working 
conditions particularly in the textile sector, which is why this sector has one of the 
highest turnover rates in Egypt and the highest rates of strikes and labour action (as 
discussed in Chapters 4 and 5). 
 
In summary, employers‘ representatives tend to underestimate the value of VET.  
Their inputs are mostly in the form of technical rather than financial cooperation.  
They are limited in scope and effectiveness.  Other challenges perceived to hinder 
VET and their contributions to the system were referred to by employers‘ 
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representatives.  
 
iv. Challenges  
Amongst the challenges identified by employers‘ representatives is the fragmentation 
of VET; an issue also pointed out by literature (e.g. Abrahart, 2003; ETF and 
WorldBank, 2006; Dhillon et al., 2009).  Employers referred to two types of 
fragmentation.  First, fragmentation of the bodies responsible for VET in Egypt; an 
employer comments: 
“each entity has its own model.. fragmentation (of the system) is a real problem.. it 
is a waste of time, money and effort”. 
Second, fragmentation of VET development efforts or in other words lack of 
coordination between VET development projects on a national level and across donor 
agencies.  For instance, a senior employers‘ representative criticised fragmentation of 
VET development across international organisations, such as the EU and Gtz.  He 
described Egyptian VET as a ‗net‘ open to different experiments and he wonders why 
Egypt does not stick to one kind of VET system; most likely because the state 
welcomes most of the assistance offered by international bodies.  All employers share 
the same perception.  The senior representative comments: 
―you are of course aware of TVET project which is based on the European 
experience of ETPs and partnership between public and private bodies.  This is 
also another experience, just like any other grant received (such as) Mubarak-
Kohl, TVET Reform Project; VET development is) similar to a net.  Why do we not 
stick to one system? We just do not! We have no „system‟; there is bombardment, 
even when you talk about the dual system of Mubarak-Kohl, this cannot work in 
Egypt”.   
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VET fragmentation (and relatively high  dependence on foreign aid in the 
development of VET) has negative influences on the communication of  development 
programmes and efforts across stakeholders.  The non-existence  of a single body 
responsible for VET reduces the effectiveness of information dissemination and this 
is evident from employers‘ low recognition of VET programmes as discussed earlier.  
In another instance, a senior employers‘ representative discussed with the researcher 
an example of a cooperative VET development project between the ITC and the 
chamber he represents in the EFI.  From his description of the project, the researcher 
recognised that he was talking about the TVET Reform Programme and not the ITC 
as he indicated.  So he comments: 
“There was a project between the EFI and our chambers, between PVTD and the 
ITC whereas there would be a direction of some schools to be transformed into 
sectoral schools to provide workers in the fields in which labour are required” 
When asked whether this is the TVET Reform Project, his answer was “maybe it is”.  
A senior representative in his position is expected to be at least aware of the project 
which the chamber he is representing is engaged in.   
 
VET fragmentation also results in another challenge; ineffective strategic planning.  A 
major question raised at this point is who is in charge of VET planning?  The 
fragmentation of the system makes it difficult to find answers to these questions.  
VET planning is thus negatively perceived by employers‘ representatives which 
hinder their willingness to invest in the system and/or cooperate in its development.  
One of the employers takes the matter of planning to the extreme; he comments on 
the Egyptian state tendency to be reactive rather than proactive to events which leads 
to inconsistent strategies and constraints development.  He comments: 
“We follow a management-by-crisis strategy in Egypt; we do not have (effective) 
„planning‟… Everyone takes on a position (as a government official) destroys what 
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the person before him did and starts building from scratch, because there is no 
strategic planning, no foundations, no consistencies in strategies”.  
As a result of ineffective planning, employers perceive VET to be producing large 
numbers of individuals in fields that are not necessarily needed in the workplace, or at 
least not in h these quantities.  An employer representative in the field of tourism 
gives an example to elaborate this shared perception.  He comments on how the 
educational system produces large numbers of managers and a much smaller number 
of technicians whereas it should be the other way round.  He explains: 
  
“the (human resources) pyramid is upside down; we have 29 universities and 
higher technical colleges and 3 VET centres, which means these provide loads of 
managers but many  fewer workers on the first line of production”.  
 
Employers‘ representatives reported that they and/or other employers they know 
resort to importing labour mostly from South East Asia.  Only one senior employers‘ 
representative perceived this trend as a threat not only to VET development but more 
generally to ―national security‖, as he comments: 
“Employers suffer from this problem (low VET quality) and some employers 
started to resort to labour from South East Asia.  I think this issue is linked to 
national security”. 
The remaining 9 employers‘ representatives consider this to be a practical solution to 
the problem of inadequate VET.  An employer in the construction sector, together 
with other employers in the field, suggested this as a solution to the prime minister.  
He comments: 
“There is another suggestion in a meeting that I attended with the Prime Minister, 
employers were complaining about the availability of land for expansion and lack 
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of technical workers and some employers asked to import workers; Indians for 
instance”.   
 
Corruption is another challenge to VET and its development.  Employers‘ 
representatives have repeatedly referred to privatisation to exemplify corruption and 
conflict of interests; a significant impediment to the development of the VET system: 
―the whole system is corrupt… there are some beneficiaries who benefit from the 
status quo… therefore, they do not want any change‖  
 
Finally, employers consider the lack of incentives to be another important constraint 
to their decisions to invest in VET and more generally in social dialogue.  From their 
point of view, the government needs to provide them with more incentives, such as 
reduced taxes, and better access to foreign markets. For instance an employers‘ 
representative comments: 
“There should be incentives; anyone who has a trained labour force, with work 
licences, would have to pay less social benefits, they would deduct training costs 
from  taxes, for example, these are just some idea, would be given a priority in 
exporting, in subsidies”. 
 
Though employers are the main and first beneficiaries from a better trained 
workforce, they are still complaining about the government‘s low levels of incentives 
which they argue discourages them to engage in VET development.  The private 
sector in Egypt already obtains a lot of benefits.  An ILO expert commented on this 
issue and wondered: 
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―In a situation whereby you are practically not paying taxes, where the minimum 
wage is 120 L.E., the social cost, e.g. the accumulation of pensions are based on that, 
what type of incentive would you like to receive (to be incentivised)? (he paused for a 
few seconds)... (so there are) no mechanisms for incentives‖. 
 
 
7.3.1.2 Theme (2) Perceptions of state-employer-union cooperation in VET 
 
NVivo Model 2: Analysis of employers’ perceptions of institutional actors’ 
cooperation. 
 
 
 
  Employers‘ perceptions of state-employer-union cooperation 
  E-: Employers‘ perceptions; EER: employer-employer relationship; SUR: State-Union Relationship; 
SEUR: State-Employer-Union Relationship; EUR: Employer-Union Relationship; POACH: Poaching of 
workers; TRUST: Trust levels; COLLECTIVE: Collective bargaining. 
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Employers‘ perceptions of stakeholders‘ inputs into VET are directly related to the 
perceived state-employer-union relationship and levels of cooperation.  These 
bipartite and tripartite relationships are discussed below. 
 
i.  State-Employer Cooperation  
At first, employers‘ representatives reported strong and mutual relationships with 
direct Ministries and public bodies.  Then, when questions were focused on 
perceptions of state-employer collaboration with regards to VET, responses were 
different.  Employers were particularly asked about their relationships with MoMM, 
MoE and MoHE.  Whilst these are not the only Ministries involved in VET, these are 
the key ones as indicated in the literature (see Chapter 5).  Also, their services are not 
targeted on specific fields or sectors.  For instance, the Ministry of Housing and 
Reconstruction is involved in VET but its services are mainly targeted to the building 
and construction sector.  On the contrary, the services of MoMM, MoE and MoHE 
are supposed to target all sectors and employers regardless of their nature of activity.  
Reference to MoMM is also particularly important as it is the body representing the 
state in the ILO and its Social Dialogue Project. 
 
Only 3 employers‘ representatives reported some kind of cooperation with Ministries 
other than their direct Ministry; mainly MoMM, MoE and MoHE.  These are the 
same employers who had positive perceptions on the state role in VET centres.  For 
instance, one of the employers reported that he and his colleagues in the Chamber 
discuss workers‘ issues with MoMM as he comments: 
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“we (representatives of employers) look into workers‟ problems and discuss these 
with MoMM” 
Another employer representative comments on his associations‘ cooperation with 
MoMM and inputs to VET curriculum development: 
“we are acting as a facilitator as we do not have direct control over (curriculum 
development in) colleges, academies or VET centres (but) we work with MoE, 
MoHE, MoMM and the market”.   
And the third one comments: 
“we have been working for 2 years now with MoE… on a couple of schools, we 
work with them on the curriculum.. and I am involved in the committee responsible 
for curriculum development, which has been promising”. 
 
The majority of employers (the remaining 7) reported good relationships with 
Ministries directly related to their activities but they did not recognise any 
relationship with MoMM, MoE or MoHE.  For instance, an employer in the field of 
housing and construction comments: 
 “(There is) No relationship with MoMM... We have regular meetings with the 
Ministry (of Housing and Reconstruction)... and at the same time we deal with other 
parties.. such as the ITC with which we work closely”.  
 
Low levels of cooperation between Ministries in general were  referred to by some 
employers.  From the latter‘s perspective, ineffective communication and cooperation 
between state representatives on a Ministerial level is reflected in companies‘ weak 
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relationships with Ministries in different fields, even if these are as important as 
MoMM, MoE and MoHE to VET 
A couple of employers expressed very negative views of MoMM in particular.  Such 
a perception was only reported when respondents were probed on specific areas of 
their relationship with MoMM as regards VET, such as the training levy in the new 
Labour Law 12/2003.  The 2 employers expressed their mistrust of  MoMM‘s 
efficiency in allocating funds collected from the training levy.  For example, a senior 
employers‘ representative in the food and beverages sector comments  
  ―The 1% is not taken for training... I do not have an idea what you (MoMM) will 
end up doing with (training levy) (a few seconds pause).  There is no trust between 
us and MoMM.  I personally have no trust”.  
 
It has been noticed that employers with positive perceptions of state-employer 
relations (across directly and indirectly related Ministries) tend to have positive 
perceptions of state inputs to VET system, especially to VET centres (see section 
7.3.1.2).  The stronger state-employer relations, the higher the tendency for employers 
to be updated with state services and subsidies to VET development programmes in 
the field.  Thus, the chances of them positively perceiving, or at least recognising,the 
state‘s efforts in VET and its development are higher.  Similarly, employers with 
negative perceptions of state-employer relations reported negative perceptions of 
state‘s inputs to VET systems.  Ineffective employer-state communication reduces the 
tendency for employers to be aware of state efforts in VET development.  Hence, the 
chances of them negatively perceiving the state‘s inputs into VET are higher.  
Therefore, it can be concluded that there is a positive relationship between 
perceptions of state-employer relations and of state‘s inputs into the VET system.   
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ii. Employer – Union Cooperation 
Employers‘ representatives in general do not positively perceive their relationship 
with unions; a common perception internationally.  Unions are largely perceived as 
bodies that exhaust companies‘ resources without adding any value to productivity or 
performance.  An example of an employer‘s perspective on this:  
―The role of unions in Egypt (is limited to) the rights of workers… the relationship 
(between employers and unions) will not be successful unless there are mutual 
benefits for both parties. (But at the moment) it is not a win-win situation‖.   
 
Employer-union cooperation is perceived to be limited to the resolution of disputes 
whenever these occur on a sectoral and/or enterprise levels.  EFI representatives 
respond to unions‘ complaints on a sectoral level via negotiations, as described by a 
senior employer: 
 “(we) represent employers in the council of solving disputes and disagreements.  
If there is a disagreement they (the council) ask for an employer representative, so 
we send a representative from the relevant chamber to solve disputes in a friendly 
manner (before resorting to a court order for example)”. 
 
Employers‘ representatives do not expect the relationship with unions to go beyond 
these limits into active engagement and/or collaboration in the business and its 
production processes, including VET.  Nevertheless, this is not to say that union 
representatives69 do not enjoy good relationships with employers‘ representatives.  
One of the employers‘ representatives in the textile sector stressed  the fact that 
employers in his sector enjoys good relationships with union heads who tend to 
prioritise employers and their rights over workers‘ demands.  He stated: 
                                                             
69 Union representatives here refer to senior ETUF officials as indicated before.  
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“I think people in charge of the union are on very good terms with employers.  
They (union representatives) have set certain standards for this (employer-union) 
relationship; the more they strengthen their relationship with employers, and the 
more they support the employer‟s position, and not the worker (emphasis added), 
they more they guarantee job security for workers.  So this is the vision of the 
General Union for Workers in Textiles.  I would like to tell you that when we have 
problems as employers, we find the union with its board (of executives) preceding 
us in defending employers‟ rights because they are convinced that when they 
defend the employer... they guarantee the continuity of workers on their jobs.  So 
there are no disagreements (with unions)”.  
 
This comment is an indication of the ineffective representation of ETUF ; an issue 
raised by the ILO.  It also indicates the ineffective mechanism of collective 
bargaining as unions tend to defend the rights of employers and not workers which 
signifies  some levels of corruption and conflict of interest within the ETUF.  All of 
which helps explain the exceptionally high levels of strikes in the textile sector (see 
Chapter 5).  
 
In summary, employers‘ negative perceptions of employer-union relations, reinforced 
by ineffective communication and lack of transparency, weaken any potential 
cooperation between both parties in VET.  Such an incoherent relationship is 
historically rooted (see Chapter 5) and thus less likely to change in the short to 
medium terms. 
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iii. State – Union Cooperation 
Employers‘ representatives consider the state to be giving more attention to workers 
and their rights than to employers.  This contradicts unions‘ perceptions of state-
employer relations, as discussed later, as they consider the state to be more supportive 
of employers than workers.  A balanced relationship is considered to be vital at this 
point as pointed out by: 
 ―I should give employers their rights just as I give workers their rights” 
From employers‘ perspectives, state support to unions is limited to problem solving.  
Employers consider the state, represented in MoMM, to be overwhelmed with solving 
workforce issues, such as unemployment, migration and privatisation-related 
problems, than with setting long-term strategies for VET development of Egyptian 
workers, an employer comments:  
―they (MoMM) are trying to solve current and short term problems but they do not 
have a (strategic) plan‖.  
According to the literature, the state with the assistance of international organisations 
is offering much support to VET development to enhance skill levels of Egyptian 
workers.  Nevertheless, these efforts are not recognised by employers; an indication 
of ineffective communication and/or the relative ineffectiveness of VET investments.  
The latter issue is related to Hollingsworth and Boyer‘s (1997) ideas of Social 
Systems of Production; what is the competitive advantage of the economy, what skills 
and VET investments are required to maintain  this advantage and so forth.  This is an 
important area of investigation worth exploring in future research.  Finally, limited 
state-union relationships challenge the extent to which the MoMM can effectively 
collaborate with unions to develop VET systems; an issue explored later from the 
viewpoints of other constituents.  
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iv. State-Employer-Union Collaboration  
Employers‘ largely negative perceptions of their relationship with the state and unions 
and of state-union relationships can only lead to negative perceptions on state-
employer-union relationship and collaboration.  Employers‘ representatives failed to 
recognise any form of tripartite cooperation between themselves, the state and unions.  
They perceive tripartite cooperation as some kind of social and/or charity work which 
is far from the real meaning of tripartism and social dialogue (as discussed in details 
in Part 2).  A common comment about state-employer-union relationship is along the 
lines of this comment: 
“social dialogue is an obligation on employers; employers always have... a social 
responsibility towards their workers” 
According to employers‘ representatives, tripartism, social dialogue and corporate 
social responsibility hold the same meaning.  On the contrary, according to the ILO, 
the social dialogue and tripartism it attempts to promote in Egypt is not simply an 
obligation on employers to meet corporate social responsibilities but it is rather a 
broader and more sophisticated process.  Arriving at a mutual understanding of the 
concept of social dialogue and its purposes is critical to the success of the ILO SDP. 
 
v. Employer – Employer Cooperation  
Levels of employer-employer cooperation are directly related to their levels of 
investments in VET as discussed in the literature.  Only one of the employers‘ 
representatives had positive perceptions on employer-employer relationships in the 
field of mining (a sector known for its strong employers‘ associations on an 
international level).  He reported some cooperation from employers, although it is still 
on a very limited scale: cooperation amongst 80 out of almost 1000 companies in the 
field.  He comments: 
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―We (his company and others in the field) have participated (with the state) in the 
development of the technology centre for marble (VET centre)… The centre has 
been there for 5 years and (only) 80 companies have participated and benefited 
from this centre as opposed to 1000 marble companies in Egypt”. 
  
Nevertheless, this and similar examples are exceptions to the general perception of 
largely ineffective employer-employer cooperation, as reported by the other 9 
employers‘ representatives.  A senior representative says:   
“Unfortunately, there is no cooperation between employers in Egypt”.  
As a result, employers are not eager to communicate with one another.   Even within 
chambers, employers‘ representatives report low levels of interest in holding the 
monthly meetings and in some sectors, such as Building and Construction, meetings 
cannot be held for as long as two months or even more.  On this matter, a senior 
employers‘ representative comments: 
“theoretically, a monthly meeting (with employers in the chamber) and sometimes 
once every two months.  But the agenda and topics of discussion (are not 
necessarily clear) (with  very pessimistic body language)‖.  
 
Only one employer, across those with unfavourable employer-employer perceptions, 
expressed his willingness to establish cooperative relationships with employers in the 
field. He comments: 
 ―We are working as separate islands, every one of us works alone, there is no 
cooperation... why do we not join forces and complement each other instead of 
competing?”. 
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vi. Poaching of Workers  
Lack of cooperation between employers on a sectoral level is one of the direct reasons 
for this issue which all employers‘ representatives in this study referred to as a 
―serious problem”.  For example, a representative in the construction sector 
commented: 
“A lot of people (employers) complain about this issue, it is a very common and 
critical issue… that negatively influences VET (and its development)…. There 
should be a moral agreement not to poach workers from other employers”.  
 
It happens that workers leave for as small an increase in pay as 10 L.E..  So 
employers resort to a number of techniques to incentivise workers to stay with them:  
“Some employers oblige workers to sign contracts with penalties (if they leave the 
company after training70)... and (other employers) attract them (workers) with 
good pay, good working conditions and more benefits”.    
Lack of industry-wide collective agreements encourages employers to compete on 
wages.  The poaching of workers discourages employers to invest in VET and they 
are likely instead to rely on the skill reserves in the market in the form of competitors‘ 
workers.  Public policies to develop VET can offer a way out of this dilemma where 
the state would take on the lead for developing VET and more generally skill levels of 
the workforce, as suggested by Becker (1964).  However, this can only be effective in 
an ideal situation with high levels of transparency and trust between constituents, 
which is not how things are in Egypt.  Also, the experiences of developed countries 
suggest that a minimum level of cooperation between tripartite constituents based on 
a minimum level of trust between the parties is required for the provision of effective 
VET.  
 
                                                             
70 This is an illegal practice but still some employers do it. 
206 
 
vi. Trust Relations  
Employers do not have high levels of trust in workers, the state or in each other.  
They are not willing to share information with other employers whenever invited by 
the EFI or the state, even if this is expected to be beneficial to their businesses, as in 
the case of VET development.  One employers‘ representative gives the example of 
an incident where employers were complaining about the low levels of VET. When 
invited to share their perceptions on how to improve the situation, it was found that: 
“they do not want to provide information.  They have no trust; how this 
information is going to be used and by whom”.   
These explain employers‘ unfavourable perceptions of the role and potential 
cooperation with the state and unions in the provision of VET which are likely to 
negatively influence the potential success of social dialogue and ILO SDP.   
 
7.3.2. PERCEPTIONS OF UNION REPRESENTATIVES  
 
7.3.2.1. Theme (1) Perceptions of VET and its Development  
Unions‘ perceptions of VET and of the contributions of the state, employers and 
unions to VET development are explored in this section, as shown in Model 5.  This 
is followed by a discussion of perceived constrains to VET development. 
207 
 
 
NVivo Model 3: Unions’ perceptions of VET inputs 
 
 
i. Perceptions of State‘s Inputs 
 
  Unions‘ perceptions of state, employer and union VET inputs 
  S-Inputs: State VET inputs; U-Inputs: Union VET Inputs; E-Inputs: Employers‘ VET inputs; 
Challenges: Challenges facing VET investments     
  E-: Empl yers‘ perceptions; EMPVET: Employers role in VET ;EMPCOOP:  Employers VET 
cooperation levels; UNIONVET: unions VET role; CURM: Engagement in curriculum 
development; CENTRE: Whether the union has its own VET centre; TRAINER: VET teachers 
and trainers; QVET: VET quality; HELAL: TVET reform programme ;RSVET:  state role in 
VET;TRANS.TRAIN: Transformative training; SCHRD: Supreme Council for Human 
Resources Development; ENFORCE: Unenforced articles and laws; REJECT: Rejection to 
answer the interviewer (or request to switch off the recorder);WLICENSE: Work licence; 
DISCREPANCY: Discrepancies between Egyptian laws and ratified/core ILO Conventions; 
FUNDS: Sources of funds for VET development; WAGE: Wage levels. 
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a. The Educational system 
Union representatives also have unfavourable perceptions of VET and its quality.  
They consider the state to be more concerned with the quantity than the quality of 
VET outputs. A union representative comments: 
“The Ministry of Education (MoE) is concerned with achieving (certain) numbers 
of student enrolments in VET, so for MoE to deliver quality training.. (silence and  
body language indicating that it is a challenge)”. 
They perceive VET to be focused on theoretical than practical knowledge and even 
the former is not perceived to be of high quality.  Thus, individuals leave VET with 
low levels of skills and knowledge, together with a poorly perceived qualification.  
One of the comments on this respect: 
“Graduates from technical colleges and universities are just some kind of décor71, 
they do not know anything” 
Rapid technological changes complicate the problem as some vocations have become 
obsolete and been replaced by others that rely on advanced tools and materials.  The 
relatively outdated VET in Egypt; in terms of curriculum, machinery and tools, makes 
it difficult to deliver graduates in these new specialisations.  A union representative in 
the field of building and construction gives an example: 
“(VET) provides graduates in vocations not required by the Egyptian economy 
(anymore)  ... (some vocations) started to become obsolete due to new technologies 
and developments.  For instance, we used to use wood for making scaffolds but 
now scaffolds are made of metal and are controlled by computerized system..so 
they (workers) need to learn these new developments and technologies in the 
vocation”. 
                                                             
71
 Meaning their qualification is decorative; of little practical value.  Although they have the 
qualification, they do not possess the skills, knowledge or experiences expected to be offered by such 
an education. 
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b. Training Centres 
In general, union representatives consider state owned VET centres to be a practical 
and relatively effective way of upgrading workers‘ skills.  Unlike employers, union 
representatives did not refer to the ITC or the IMC, an indication of the 
marginalisation of unions in the process of VET development run by MoTI.  Union 
representatives however referred to the PVTD and the TVET Reform Programme.   
 
ETUF has been engaged with the PVTD and its activities since its establishment in 
the 1950s, hence their favourable perceptions of PVTD outputs.  For example, the 
ETUF has been directly involved in supplying PVTD with trainers72.  A senior union 
representative comments: 
“trainers are employed (in PVTD) through the union.  There are certain 
qualifications (required), for example they should be graduates of technical 
schools and colleges and are teachers (not practitioners)”. 
However, this role has been gradually reduced and the ETUF is now only concerned 
with selecting trainers from the pool of union members.  A senior union 
representative says: 
“we used to pay close attention to trainers and we used to... provide qualified 
trainers but this system has been cancelled”. 
Due to this long-established relationship, union representatives favourably perceive 
PVTD and its outputs.  For instance, a senior union representative assured the 
researcher:   
                                                             
72 The quality of VET teachers or trainers is one of the main challenges facing VET in Egypt, as argued 
in the literature (e.g. see Gill et al., 2000; Abrahart, 2003; ETF and World Bank, 2006).   
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“I can tell you that something like 90% of trainees from the PVTD centres find 
jobs straight away”. 
But they find jobs in the public sector, which is not an indicator of the quality or skill 
levels of these workers, as efficiency is not a criterion for recruitment in the public 
sector (Ikram, 2006; El-Mikawy and Handoussa, 2002).  PVTD trainees have fewer 
chances of finding jobs in the private sector which is concerned with the quality and 
skill levels of workers, especially since private sector employers have unfavourable 
perceptions of the PVTD (see Chapter 5).  
 
The TVET Reform Programme recognises the potential role of workers in VET 
development, but workers‘ involvement is not yet effectively articulated.  The 
programme was mentioned by one senior union representative; he was commenting 
on the high costs of VET and its development when his assistant, who happened to be 
in the office at this point in the interview, commented:  
―this (TVET Reform Programme) is not a serious project, they have already 
invested 40 million Euros73 where is all of this money gone?” 
The senior representative did not comment on this implicit reference to corruption but 
he had a clear facial expression indicating his consent with this statement.  He chose 
not to discuss this further.   
 
Union representatives referred to transformative training which has been considered 
by the government, represented in MoTI, to be one of the short-term solutions to the 
problem of mismatch unemployment and it has already implemented this approach 
through the ITC.  Union representatives perceive the idea of transformative training to 
                                                             
73 According to the ETUF the programme is 66 million Euros. 
211 
 
be a good initiative by MoTI.  However, all of them agreed that the idea is not 
popular amongst young workers.  From their viewpoint, young individuals are not 
keen to change their field of specialisation, especially if they are university graduates, 
to have a technical and/or vocational job.  They expect more comfortable and 
prestigious jobs .  A union representative comments: 
“young people are not receptive to the idea of transformative training… they 
want to sit on desks in air conditioned offices… they want „easy‟ jobs” 
 
ii. Perceptions of Employers’ Inputs 
Union representatives do not positively perceive employers‘ inputs to VET systems.  
From unions‘ perspectives, employers do not appreciate the value of VET and hence 
are unwilling to invest in it.  For instance, a senior union representative comments: 
“Employers themselves do not want to send their workers to be trained... The 
philosophy of VET in companies is problematic; to send their workers (on VET 
programmes) is to „waste‟ their time in training, so the mindset and appreciation 
of VET is still lacking”. 
 
Union representatives also criticised employers‘ unwillingness to financially support 
VET despite employers‘ complaints about the unavailability of required skill levels in 
the labour market.  A union representative comments: 
“Employers should (financially) share in VET programmes… when you 
(employers) complain you cannot find labour with required skill levels, you need 
to be prepared to invest in VET; so you should take people, train them and invest 
in them”. 
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iii. Perceptions of Unions’ Inputs 
Unions‘ input into the VET system and its development is generally less than that of 
employers but still is relatively high by regional and international standards.  Two 
unions own VET centres; the General Union for Workers in Wood and Construction 
and the General Union for workers in Land Transport.  The latter provides basic 
training to drivers.  The former established its VET centre with an American grant 
and it is of a relatively high quality and technological standard.  There is some form 
of cooperation between the union‘s VET centre and MoMM as indicated by the union 
head: 
“(some trainees) are referred to us by MoMM.  Those are fresh graduates from 
technical colleges and universities who did not have the opportunity to have 
practical training”. 
Apart from these two unions, others do not expect to have their own VET centres as 
they do not consider VET to be within the scope of their responsibilities.  They are 
rather concerned with enhancing members‘ awareness of important work-related 
issues.  For instance on union representative comments: 
“A union should not have a VET centre.  Training centres that the ETUF owns are 
centres for enhancing the general knowledge of union representatives and 
members, such as how to negotiate, work insurance, health issues and other things 
that have to do with the union‟s work but not to do with the specific task or 
vocation of members.  Such specified training takes place within the company and 
each company has its own conditions”. 
 
From unions‘ perspective, an important contribution to VET is their representation on 
the Supreme Council of Human Resource Development (SCHRD).  As discussed 
before (Chapter 5), the SCHRD, at least in theory, is the main body responsible for 
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VET development on which key VET stakeholders are represented.  Employers and 
ILO representatives are critical of SCHRD effectiveness.  Nevertheless, union 
representatives appreciate being part of SCHRD‘s board of executives, though they 
did not provide a relevant answer as to why they think such contributions are 
effective to VET development.  So when asked about their involvement in designing 
VET, a senior representative comments: 
“I am a member (of SCHRD)… It has been formed under the auspices of the prime 
minister and the minister of MoMM is responsible for its operation, and the 
minister is responsible for solving the problems of the workplace. Whenever there 
is a problem, he gathers the three parties to discuss these problems.  And all of 
these issues are limited by material capacities”. 
He was probed as to why this is an important contribution to VET from his point of 
view, and how the SCHRD has been effective, but for the four different questions he 
was asked about this point, irrelevant answers were given, for instance: 
“We do not have to establish VET centres to train.  Candidates can have their 
academic education in educational institutions and then once they finish I (the 
state; he is not talking about unions here) can try to agree with companies on 
taking certain numbers of individuals to be trained.  The PVTD were the first ones 
to do so”. 
 
Union‘s inputs to the design and delivery of VET are very limited.  Their role in 
developing curriculum is negligible, if existent at all.  For instance, a senior union 
representative gave an irrelevant answer when asked about union‘s role in curriculum 
development, after a few seconds of silence he replies: 
“I will tell you what kind of curriculum.  When I have a problem, I consider the 
problem, its dimensions and its requirements, to be able to solve this problem.  I 
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should have a reference to all VET centres and their capacities.  The ones which 
are productive and are effectively producing labour, the skills which are not 
provided by these centres, can we upgrade these and how can we do these, who is 
going to deliver the training? Therefore I need academies and colleges to provide 
me with trainers.. it is a chicken-or-egg question”. 
 
ETUF contributions to VET are relatively high in comparison to unions in the MENA 
region.  Nevertheless, their inputs are limited in comparison to employers‘ 
representatives.  This tendency can be largely explained in terms of the historically 
rooted hierarchical social structures, as discussed before74.  Other reasons could be: (i) 
unions are not given the opportunity to effectively express their views and even when 
represented in bodies such as SCHRD, they are largely ineffective; and (ii) because 
unions themselves do not consider engagement in VET and its development to be of 
their concern.   
  
iv. Challenges:  Ineffective Enforcement Mechanisms 
Union representatives pointed to a number of issues for which the lack of 
enforcement has directly and/or indirectly influenced VET.  All union representatives 
commented on the work licence which, according to the new Labour Law 12/2003, is 
a formal requirement for employment and it is only issued to workers who meet 
certain levels of VET.  This article can positively influence VET by encouraging both 
employers and workers to invest in quality VET programmes; however, the article 
remains unenforced.  A union representative comments on this matter: 
“Labour Law No.12/2003 states that each and every worker should have a work 
licence to be able to practice their vocation.  In order to get this licence, the 
                                                             
74 e.g. Cooper, 1982; Beinin and Lockman; Posusney, 1997; El-Mikawy and Handoussa, 2002; Ikram; 
2006. 
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worker needs to undergo a training programme may be an intensive one for 3-6 
months and accordingly he gets this licence.  Therefore, in the future employers 
will not be able to take up any employment contracts unless workers do have this 
licence, like any country in the world… in future employers will be obliged to 
invest in training their workers”. 
 
He refers to the work licence as a future matter that would eventually be practised and 
would eventually influence VET, although it is already present in the constitution.  A 
more senior representative argued that the work licence has been effective, especially 
in the construction sector.  The senior representative comment below contradicts these 
points, as he reports: 
“this issue (work licence) is in operation with foreign entities and international 
agreements, the problem in Egypt is: who adopts this project.. this project is in 
operation especially in the sector of construction”. 
However, the representative of the General Union for Workers in Construction stated 
that the licence has not been enforced yet.  The latter viewpoint was also reported by 
ILO representatives.  The licence is only practised in land transport.  All drivers need 
to have a driving licence which is obtained once workers undergo necessary training 
and register with the General Union for Workers in Land Transport.  This has 
positively influenced both union membership and VET in that field: 
“According to law, every three years in order to renew their driving licences, they 
(workers) need to pay union membership as well as the social insurance75…And 
(therefore union membership) expands quite naturally”. 
 
                                                             
75 A practice established since Nasser‘s populist regime. 
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Employers‘ and workers‘ reluctance to invest in VET is another challenge reported by 
union representatives.  According to them, after privatization and openness of the 
market to the private sector, employers have relied on experienced public sector 
workers.  Today this reserve of workers is running out and employers need to invest 
in VET.  However, a lot of employers have relied on poaching which has become a 
very common practice with negative results.  For example, it encourages companies 
to compete on wages which are low on average and discourages employers‘ 
investments in VET.  A union representative comments: 
“When investments flew into Egypt and we opened the door to private investments, 
private companies relied on public sector workers; the government invested in 
these people and it trained them…He (the employer) should invest and share in 
VET… (employers) argue why should I train workers and then they leave me and 
go to another employer… you cannot really find a solution to this problem. (One 
solution is) to oblige the worker to agree in writing to work for the employer for a 
number of years after the training programme”. 
 
Workers‘ unwillingness to invest in VET is perceived to stem from low wage levels.  
Despite the availability of a Supreme Council for Wages (see Chapter 5), it has been 
largely ineffective in setting minimum wage levels for Egyptian workers (CTWUS, 
2010).  Therefore, a lot of workers end up working at least two jobs at two different 
places, an example is given by public sector workers though those working in the 
private sector are not better off: 
“public sector employees who earn about 300 -500 L.E. per month.. they just go 
and sign in the morning (for attendance) and in the afternoon they leave to work 
elsewhere where earnings can be 500 times as much as what they earn from this 
public sector job”. 
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Although some VET centres offer trainees pocket money, these do not exceed a third 
of what they normally earn.  Enforcement of the work licence and minimum national 
wage levels are expected, at least in theory, to support VET in two major ways.  First, 
it will oblige employers to invest in VET, as they will need to have licenced workers.  
Second, workers will have the time and resources to invest in VET and their 
investments will be rewarded in the market.  Nevertheless, these theoretical 
implications cannot be guaranteed in reality where law enforcement is challenged by 
low levels of transparency and high levels of corruption.  Hence, the extent of 
effective law enforcement will dictate the degree of positive influences on VET. 
  
7.3.2.2. Theme (2) Perceptions of state-employer-union cooperation in VET 
 
NVivo Model 4: Analysis of unions’ perceptions of state-employer-union 
cooperation 
 
 
 
  Unions‘ perceptions of state-employer-union cooperation 
  U-: Union perceptions; SUR: State-Union Relationship; SEUR: State-Employer-Union 
Relationship; SER: State-Employer Relationship; EUR: Employer-Union Relationship; RIO: 
Role of international organisations. 
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i. Employer-Union Cooperation 
Unions do not consider employer-union relationship, where they exist, to be based on 
cooperation towards the achievement of mutual benefits.  They consider employers to 
be exploiting workers without giving them enough compensation, including pay, 
health and social insurance and other benefits.  They also point out to employers‘ 
reluctance to the establishment of unions in enterprises; a tendency for employers on 
an international level.  However, in Egypt, penalties for organising workers on an 
enterprise level can be as severe as losing one‘s job, as reported by workers.  Some 
employers oblige workers to sign blank resignation letters upon their hiring (Cammett 
and Posusney, 2010), making it easy to fire workers whenever convenient, for 
example if they attempt to organize colleagues.  This is explained by a workers‘ 
representative: 
―If the employer notices that some workers are trying to organise others in the 
enterprise, he will threaten workers... employers oblige workers to sign application 
six (resignation letter) upon signing the work contract which makes them 
redundant... so if the worker decides to do anything against the employer or to 
report any violations (at work) to any party, the employer can just bring out this 
piece of paper and simply lay him off”.   
 
Only one instance of employer-union cooperation was reported.  The General Union 
of Construction and Woodworks workers has succeeded in establishing three 
collective agreements with three cement companies in the private sector (see Chapter 
5).  Negotiations started as a result of the sit-ins organised by workers in the three 
factories.  Unlike the privatised company, the union could not afford to hire 
experienced lawyers and thus it relied on its own representatives. The union‘s limited 
experience in collective bargaining has limited the benefits obtained.  Nevertheless, 
this is a positive example of employer-union dialogue on a national and a regional 
level.   
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On the VET front, instances of employer-union cooperation are limited to (i) the 
General Union of Workers in Construction; and (ii) the General Union of Land 
Transport, which have their own VET centres.  The latter enjoys a more powerful 
position than the former vis-à-vis employers because (i) all licensed drivers are 
members of the union; and (ii) the union does not interact directly with employers 
with regards to workers‘ benefits and rights as indicated by the union: 
 ―employers meet our needs because they need (licensed) drivers; because the 
benefits we ask for do not involve direct interaction with the employer.. so the 
interaction is more between drivers and the union; no direct contact with the 
employer”. 
 
ii. State-Employer Cooperation  
Unions‘ representatives perceive state-employer cooperation to be relatively high 
which is not considered to benefit workers.  All union representatives referred to the 
process of privatisation in which the state is perceived to be pleasing national and 
international investors at the expense of workers.  They reported that although 
negative influences on labour could have not been intentional, the state could have 
avoided these problems by being more attentive to workers‘ rights during the 
privatisation process.  For instance, a union representative comments: 
―The state made a number of „facilitated policies‟ to encourage investments.  They 
allowed investors to lay off „extra‟ workers in privatised companies and to 
compensate workers with what became to be known as „early pension‟76... the state 
did not put enough guarantees to protect our rights, and the state is still 
responsible for this issue‖. 
                                                             
76 See section 5.6.3.2. 
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Union representatives call for effective punishment mechanisms by the state on 
employers who do not take into account the needs and rights of workers as indicated 
by law.  One union head states:  
―the state should be able to confiscate and nationalise any company that violates 
the labour law, but of course these are against national policies, against 
investment policies and against freedoms‖. 
 
Employers, as discussed above, do not seem to appreciate state support which, 
according to unions‘ representatives, exceeds the support provided by the state to 
unions in some instances such as the case of privatisation.    
 
iii. State-Union Cooperation  
Responses of unions‘ representatives were diplomatic as they reported a generally 
―good relationship” with the state but later in the interview they were critical of state-
union relations during privatisation.  Also, they were not able to exemplify on such 
good cooperative relationships, apart from one representative.  He referred to state-
union cooperation through the union‘s VET centre.  He comments:   
―We have cooperative agreements with MoMM, with the Federation of 
Contractors (this is in EFI77) and with MoTI.  The most important partner is MoTI 
because it offers trainees good pocket money (and) good training‖.  
 
But it seems that MoTI is not “the most important‖ partner as stated since later in the 
interview the same unions‘ representative did not recognise the role of MoTI in his 
comment: 
                                                             
77  this is largely denied by employers‘ representatives in the chamber though. 
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 ―We only deal with the MoMM.. there is no cooperation with other ministries‖. 
A union representative called for ―coordination between the MoMM, the ETUF and 
MoE‖ especially with regards to VET.  However, he considers the main reason for the 
lack of these relationships to be ―routine” and the relative inflexibility of the system; 
a challenge also cited by employers‘ representatives. 
 
Union representatives criticised the negligible levels of state-union cooperation 
during privatisation which led to unfavourable consequences for workers.  All of 
them referred to the loopholes in privatisation contracts that reduced workers‘ rights.  
For instance, public sector workers are entitled to a 10% share in profits.  After 
privatisation, some companies refused to distribute the 10% arguing that there is no 
indication whether this is a percentage of gross or net profits.  On that matter, a senior 
union representative comments: 
“at the time of privatisation... (the state) did not change the laws to enable workers 
to obtain their rights... as long as there are profits, workers are entitled to 10% (of 
profits)... (but) Law No. 159 should entitle workers to have their 10% share 
without any intervention from the annual meeting of shareholders (as it is the case 
in some privatised companies)… (but) the state does not want to cause problems.  
We are the ones who enable our workers to have their rights”. 
 
iv State-Employer-Union Cooperation  
Some union heads acknowledge the existence of a tripartite relationship, for instance 
a workers‘ representative gives example of the Supreme Council for wages (see 
Chapter 5) on which state, employers and unions are represented.  This is a very good 
example of tripartism but it turns out later in the interview that: 
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―This council was agreed upon about seven years ago (emphasis added), we 
agreed on the establishment of this committee under the auspices of the prime 
minister, thus an agreement was reached between MoMM.. EFI.. and ETUF but 
until now the meeting to agree on paying social benefits to workers has not been 
set yet... if the framework from the very beginning is not practiced, so... (a pause of 
silence) we as workers are very happy that we are cooperating with employers, but 
employers (are not willing to cooperate)‖ 
 
Another union representative reported employers‘ unwillingness to engage in a 
bilateral dialogue with unions, as advised by MoMM.  The representative comments:  
“MoMM intervened (in the dispute)... and concluded that both parties need to 
discuss the problem, so if one of the two parties does not want to engage in a 
dialogue, so what then?!” 
 
In theory, there is some state-employer-union cooperation but this is not the case in 
practice.  Most employers are reluctant to agree to any form of dialogue with unions.  
This is not surprising given the unfavourable employers‘ perceptions of ETUF and its 
role in VET and more generally as a social partner, as discussed earlier.  The 
inefficiency of workers‘ organisation in Egypt; rooted in post-1952 developments and 
widened by economic liberalisation (see chapter 5) has reinforced the inefficiency of 
bilateral and trilateral relations in Egypt, which have negatively influenced VET.  
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7.3.3. PERCEPTIONS OF ILO REPRESENTATIVES  
7.3.3.1 Theme (1) Perceptions of VET and its Development  
 
NVivo Model 5: Analysis of ILO perceptions of VET and its development 
 
 
 
 
  ILO perceptions of state, employer and union VET inputs 
  ENFORCE: Unenforced articles and laws; CULT: Cultural issues; DISCREPANCY: Discrepancies 
between Egyptian laws and ratified/core ILO Conventions; PROBS: Problems and challenges facing 
VET;CORRUPT: Corruption of the system; MISMATCH: High unemployment and shortages of 
skills (mismatch problem);POACH: Poaching of workers; HELAL: TVET reform programme; 
RSVET: Role of the state in VET;TRANSTRAIN: Transformative training; QVET: VET quality; 
EVET: VET effectiveness; MKI: Mubarak Kohl Initiative; APPRENTICESHIP: Informal 
apprenticeship; UNION.VET: Unions‘ inputs to VET;CENTRE: Whether the union has its own VET 
centre; TRAINER: VET teachers and trainers; EMPCOOP: Employers cooperation and inputs into 
VET; EMPVET: Employers‘ VET participation. 
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i. Perceptions of State’s Inputs to VET and its Development 
 
In general, ILO representatives consider the Egyptian state to be taking positive but 
very slow steps towards enhancing VET.  The ILO works primarily with MoMM but 
in the field of skill development including VET, the ILO works and communicates 
with other state bodies, such as the Ministries of Tourism, Education and Investment. 
 
a. The Educational System  
 Like employers‘ and workers‘ representatives, ILO representatives perceive VET to 
be falling short of meeting its objectives as it is quantity rather than quality oriented.  
Quality VET is difficult to attain given the range of functional problems faced by the 
system as indicated by a senior ILO representative:  
“the institutionalised VET (system) should perform its role; (at the moment) they 
are not doing their job… the problem here, and this is not limited to Egypt, is that 
VET systems are either not working or are producing qualifications that are far 
from what is needed by industry… you have VET schools which do not exist, or are 
no longer working, or of curricula that are not updated, or teachers who are not 
motivated and so on and they produce low quality”. 
 
According to ILO representatives, the Egyptian state is facing a twofold challenge as 
it needs to enhance the quality of VET while: (i) coping with the increased numbers 
of individuals joining the system; and (ii) upgrading the skill levels of individuals 
who are already working.  An ILO expert is not confident the state‘s capacity to cope 
with these challenges, as he comments: 
“First, the system producing skills is simply not capable of coping with this 
enormous demographic increase.  Second… before you are capable of producing 
programmes, schools, teachers etc, i.e. a new educational system, these people are 
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entering the labour market... the system has lost its capacity... (it) cannot cope with 
these quantities” 
 
ILO representatives particularly referred to MKI as a major attempt by the Egyptian 
state to enhance VET.  All of them agree on the high quality of the project designed 
and implemented by Gtz in cooperation with MoE.  They were critical though of two 
aspects.  First was the attempt to replicate the German model in a completely different 
context as Egypt, for instance: 
“I personally I think it was a conceptual mistake; thinking of replicating something 
which is unique, which is based on unique circumstances”. 
Second was the reluctance of MoE to expand the scope of MKI on a national level.  A 
senior ILO expert comments: 
“Egypt is trying to adopt the German (VET) model through MKI.  I am entirely 
sure it has been a success. It has been run in an excellent manner by the Germans 
together with MoE... (but) the question is: after 15 years of piloting such an 
experience, which is a typical tripartite and a social dialogue response to the 
mismatch of skills in the labour market, I am wondering why MoE is not adopting 
it?” 
The ILO representative recognises the difficulty of implementing the German VET 
model in Egypt.  He describes it as a ‗conceptual mistake‘ due the unavailability of 
effective institutional structures capable of supporting the dual system and hence the 
MoE is not adopting it on a wider national level.  His comments raise concerns about 
the ability of the ILO SDP to establish an effective tripartite dialogue in such an 
incoherent institutional framework that could be effectively recognised and supported 
by all constituents. 
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b. Training Centres 
Similarly, ILO representatives perceive the quality of public owned VET centres 
unfavourably.  A major constraint on the development of these VET centres is 
perceived to be the fragmentation of the system and development efforts.  A senior 
ILO representative gives an example of the state‘s success in developing of 105 skill 
standards in association with the British Council.  This achievement however had 
soon been challenged with the fragmentation of the system as the government had 
been searching for a public body to sponsor and support the project and continue its 
development.  The project was passed on to different bodies and ended up in the 
hands of a foreign (it is not international) organisation; the Scottish Qualifications 
Authority.  According to him, this bombardment “means we are far away from 
anything on the ground (anytime soon)”.  He referred to this instance, saying: 
“In Egypt… 105 skill standards have been developed by the British Council in the 
beginning of (the year) 2000 and was out in the hands of the SFD (Social Fund for 
Development) which then passed it on to MoTI and then MoTI was trying to decide 
whether these should be further developed by TVET (Reform Programme) 
supported by the EU or by PVTD department or to be developed internally… then, 
it recently came to my attention that the ITC.. which is also very much connected 
to MoTI, decided to involve the Scottish Qualifications Authority to produce other 
skill standards” 
 
ii. Perceptions of Unions’ Inputs   
Unlike employers‘ and some union representatives, ILO representatives, appreciate 
the importance of unions‘ inputs to VET and its development.  For instance, an ILO 
representative comments: 
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“The viewpoints of senior workers are important... to improve production and to 
provide feedback based on the experiences of the people who are actually working 
on production lines, which is important for overall (VET) improvement”. 
 
The ILO is trying to enhance workers‘ awareness of their role in VET and more 
generally in other work-related issues, as part of the ILO activities in Egypt which 
include, amongst other things, the ILO Social Dialogue Project as discussed in Part 2.  
At the time being, unions‘ inputs to VET are perceived to be relatively low mainly 
due to unions‘ lack of appreciation of their role in VET and its development:   
“Unfortunately, workers (and their representatives) are not aware of their role in 
VET”. 
 
ILO representatives were critical of SCHRD, which union representatives were 
pleased to be part of, and its effectiveness in representing social partners.  For 
example, a senior representative comments (after whispering and wondering why the 
researcher has asked him about the SCHRD): 
“The Supreme Council... has not, so far, been able to have an influence on (VET) 
as expected, is it because of its composition, or because the players have different 
weights as institutions and their institutional weight is mirrored in their 
willingness and capability to participate in team roles (a pause and  body 
language indicating he does not know)”. 
 
iii. Perceptions of Employers’ Inputs  
In general, ILO experts do not consider employers in Egypt to be willing to 
participate in VET systems. For instance, a representative comments: 
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―I think in the short run, the answer (to employers‟ engagement in VET) is:  very 
simply - they do not engage in VET.  De facto; they do not do it, they take 
initiatives but they do not want to engage in consultation.  For many different 
reasons, all of them are good ones, but of course as a rapid response… this is not 
a socially viable way of doing things (emphasis added)‖.  
 
Employers‘ inputs are perceived to be largely non-existent for a number of economic 
and social reasons, such as low levels of competition in the Egyptian market and 
employers‘ interest in maintaining low wages levels.  On this, an ILO expert 
comments: 
“In certain industries, what makes Egypt different in the eyes of (national and 
international) employers now; Egypt is a good stock of cheap labour and so even if 
you are not entirely competitive on production processes you can regain 
competitiveness in the final price; not by maximizing production but by minimising 
costs (including primarily labour costs)”. 
These issues and a number of other social reasons (discussed below under challenges) 
give employers little reason to invest in VET, especially in a context where 
competition is based on price.  This is completely different from the German case in 
which competition is based on quality rather than price and thus consistent 
development of the workforce is an important requirement and a worthwhile 
investment.  
 
A few exceptions have been reported by ILO representatives working in SECTOR78.  
SECTOR is working on raising the levels of competitiveness of two sectors; tourism 
and textiles/ready-made garments.  In these sectors, employers are perceived to play a 
                                                             
78 SECTOR is one component of the Social Dialogue Project as discussed in the literature. 
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more active role in VET and its development since they are competing with 
international players, as discussed in Chapter 2.  According to ILO representatives 
working on these projects, employers are more willing to cooperate with the state to 
raise the levels of VET as they understand the positive influence such a policy can 
have on upgrading the quality of their workforce required for enhancing their national 
and more importantly international competitiveness.  The same interpretation has 
been provided by national and international bodies, such as the Egyptian National 
Competitiveness Council (2009; 2010), the OECD (2010) and the World Economic 
Forum (Schwab, 2010).  For instance, in the sector of Tourism, employers 
represented in the Egyptian Tourism Federation play a role in VET as their staff need 
to be effectively trained to offer a high quality service to tourists; international 
customers.  An ILO expert comments: 
“Egyptian Tourism Federation, with the assistance of the American Hotel and 
Lodging Association and the Irish Training Authority, has developed skills 
standards, they have about 120 trainers in place and by the end of this year they 
told me they would have managed to train 100,000 people, which is just a drop in 
the ocean to be honest, but the industry is very clear on this matter; if they want to 
increase rates of tourism and to keep this somehow sustainable, beside other issues 
such as infrastructure which they are not very much able to influence, the major 
issue is service quality… and therefore they are heavily investing in this 
(upgrading service quality) with funding from the government; the Ministry of 
Tourism”. 
 
 
iv. Challenges 
Fragmentation is perceived to be the main challenge facing VET and its development; 
a perception shared by employers‘ and workers‘ representatives.  The system is torn 
between numerous national and international initiatives and is characterised by its 
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―disaggregation‖ rather than coherence, for instance an ILO representative 
comments: 
“we are facing an inherent problem in Egypt which is the disaggregation of the 
system into a number of parallel systems, the proliferation of policy making points 
and lack of coherence of the system ... a characteristic of Egypt”. 
 
The limited level of employers‘ VET input is another challenge faced by the system.  
All ILO representatives call for an increased role of employers in VET who need to 
ensure that the workplace offers reasonable opportunities for learning and 
development of their workforce.  This matter is becoming increasingly important 
given the increased need for quality VET as the current system cannot effectively 
meet current demand for skills in the economy.  An ILO representative comments: 
“the (VET) system... is not effective; traditional VET could hardly meet the 
demand and particularly (given)... the rapid changes in the economy...  Therefore, 
there is an increasing role given to the workplace; for initial training, re-skilling, 
up-skilling, refining; fine tuning”.  
 
Whenever available, employers‘ cooperation is perceived to be more on technical 
than financial fronts.  For instance, employers are perceived to be reluctant to 
contribute to the costs of VET programmes but they welcome their representation on 
boards of VET colleges or centres.  Yet, they still have some reservations on technical 
cooperation; they are unwilling to cooperate with workers.  These put limitations on 
the scope and effectiveness of employers‘ inputs and potential role in VET.   
 
The relative weakness of the ETUF is perceived to be another impediment to VET 
development.  In other words, unions are not considered to be collectively strong to 
231 
 
either contribute effectively to VET system or to exert pressures on employers to 
encourage them, amongst other things, to invest in VET.  For instance, ILO 
representatives comment on the weak position of workers‘ collective bargaining; it is 
the role of the ETUF which is largely deficient in this respect.  Weak collective 
bargaining increases the difficulty of securing workers‘ basic rights, such as fixed 
pay, as in the example below.  As compared to Tunisia for instance, collective 
bargaining of the ETUF is very weak and it fails to secure an improved pay for 
Egyptian workers who in some vocations tend to ―pay the employer to employ them; 
in return for offering them the place and opportunity to work‖ as indicated below.  
Without securing basic rights, it is difficult to expect workers to invest in VET as (i) 
the return on their investments in skills is not guaranteed in the labour market; (ii) 
they prefer to invest their time in a job to compensate for the low wages (as indicated 
in the previous section).  These problems are all interlinked and an important factor is 
weak collective bargaining as indicated by an ILO representative who comments: 
“the union (needs) to establish collective agreements with employers‟ 
representatives, e.g. the EFI.  In Tunisia, there are 2050 collective agreements in 
different sectors… (In Egypt) There are hundreds of thousands who work without 
wages; their wage comes from tips. Some workers pay the employer to employ 
them; in return for offering them the place and opportunity to work.. (e.g.) in 
petrol stations, these workers pay  the owner of the station in order to put on the 
uniform and start working and then he (the worker) makes his earning from tips 
(after covering the expenses paid to the employer at the beginning)”. 
 
This is an extreme example that sums up the situation with collective bargaining in 
Egypt.  Workers and their organisations are not strong enough to secure minimum 
wage levels and similarly they are not any stronger in pushing employers to invest in 
workers‘ VET.  Unions are marginalised in the workplace despite laws and ratified 
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ILO Conventions empowering their position, since these are not enforced or 
practiced.   
 
Even on an international level, Egypt has failed to enforce Conventions No. 87 and 98 
on the freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining, despite their 
ratification; an act that has put the country on the independent list of countries to be 
investigated in the ILC.  Egypt‘s non-observance of these Conventions is perceived to 
negatively influence workers‘ role and inputs into VET and more generally to 
different aspects of work.  Discrepancies between Egyptian legislations and ratified 
ILO Conventions is a dilemma which the ILO has been trying to solve and which 
have direct and indirect negative influences on the VET system (see Theme 3 for 
more details).      
 
ILO representatives did not criticise the state‘s, employers‘ and unions‘ inputs into 
the VET system as much as they have criticised the institutional framework within 
which the system operates.  These structural deficiencies challenge the concept of 
tripartism and coherence of work relations which in their view is a major, if not the 
major, cause of deficiencies in the VET system and in its development.  
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7.3.3.2. Theme (2) Perceptions of Constituents’ Collaboration 
 
NVivo Model 6: Analysis of ILO perceptions of state-employer-union relations 
 
 
 
 
 
i. Employer-Union Cooperation  
The perceptions of the ILO on bipartite relationships between employers and unions 
are not very different from that of union and employers themselves.  They all share 
the perception that such bipartite relationships do not cohered. 
“EFI rejects... to engage in a dialogue with workers.. (there is) no cooperation... 
There is no pressure on them (employers) to engage in a dialogue with workers” 
This is a serious concern as an effective social dialogue cannot be realised without 
effective employer-union cooperation and dialogue.  
  ILO perceptions of state-employer-union relations 
  I-: ILO perceptions; SUR: State-Union Relationship; SER: State-Employer Relationship; EUR: 
Employee-Union Relationship; SEUR: State-Employer-Union Relationship. 
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ii. State- Employer Cooperation 
 ILO representatives perceive state-employer collaboration in VET to be limited 
despite the relatively strong state-employer relationships.  They consider the state to 
be exerting little pressure on employers to cooperate effectively in VET.  The 
numerous benefits offered to employers make it difficult to provide additional 
incentives to motivate them to engage in VET and more generally in social dialogue:  
 
"In a situation where practically you (employers) are not paying taxes, where the 
minimum wage is 120 L.E., social costs such as the accumulation of pension, is 
based on that (very low wage level); what type of incentive would you like to have 
(to be willing to engage in VET and social dialogue)?" 
 
ILO representatives call this an ultimately  ―political decision”.  Thus, whenever 
political willingness for a wider engagement of employers in VET and in a social 
dialogue becomes available, the state will find ways to incentivise employers and 
enhance their engagement.  
 
iii. State- Union Cooperation 
ILO representatives consider the state to be in relatively high control of the ETUF 
and its activities.  As discussed before, the state closely supervises elections of the 
ETUF board of directors and allows only selected candidates to apply for these 
positions (Beinin, 2009).  The issue of representation as an obstacle to effective 
engagement of workers in VET and more generally in a social dialogue is an 
argument supported by all ILO representatives interviewed.  In a case where the 
ETUF is representing the interests of the ruling party; the National Democratic Party 
(NDP), rather than the interests of workers, it will not matter whether the ETUF is 
represented on VET and social dialogue or not.  To elaborate on this argument, a 
senior ILO representative comments: 
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"In the Egyptian labour law, you can find tripartite... labour structures but these 
are not practiced… each (party) should „theoretically‟ represent an interest group 
definite from the others.  But when the three (social partners) come from the same 
political party (the ruling party; NDP), and have the same ideology ... (body 
language indicating his surprise and wonder and he continues his rhetorical 
questions) we wonder, is there really a tripartite structure? It is not what you name 
it, but is there actually a tool to discuss different interests and to try to build up a 
new vision where everyone expresses their interests and try to improve 
conditions?". 
 
As discussed before, the issue of ETUF independence of the state has been raised by 
the ILO Committee of Experts as a case of non-observance to Convention No.87.  It 
is still a debatable issue and the ILO is working with the Egyptian government on this 
matter. 
 
iv. State- Employer-Union Cooperation  
The level of cooperation between different parties in VET is perceived to be relatively 
low given the negligible inputs of unions and employers to the system.  Low levels of 
cooperation are linked to the overall relatively ineffective state-employer-union 
relationship in Egypt as indicated by ILO representatives (which is a major reason 
why the ILO has initiated its Social Dialogue Project and at the same time a main 
challenge for the success of the project).  The main obstacle to an effective tripartite 
relationship on a national level is perceived to be employers‘ unwillingness to 
cooperate with workers and unions.  ILO representatives directly involved in the 
social dialogue project in Egypt are concerned with the EFI rejection to cooperate 
which threatens the potential of social dialogue and tripartism in general: 
“There is some kind of willingness from MoMM; being part of the state... it is 
concerned with… the social stability of the country and this is not necessarily a 
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concern for employers.  Therefore, the social dialogue is delayed regarding the 
bilateral relationship; employers-workers… And therefore, tripartism as well, if 
one of the three parties is rejecting (cooperation) so there is no social dialogue 
and this issue is well known to the state and to the ILO; the rejection comes from 
employers”. 
 
Only one ILO representative is positive about state-employer-union relationship.  He 
refers to the textile sector, where levels of conflict are high and in these instances the 
union is used to keep workers as quiet as possible by trying to reach a settlement with 
other partners.  He does not elaborate on the perceived effectiveness of the current 
dialogue.  However, he thinks tripartism and its expansion will depend on the pace 
and scope of privatisation.  He comments: 
“there is already a dialogue between employers, workers and the government; not 
only MoMM but the other ministries concerned.  But the expansion (of tripartism) 
will depend on the number of companies (involved in the project) and the outcome 
of the restructuring of the textile sector; privatization”. 
 
In summary, current levels of state-employer-union collaboration in Egypt are 
considered to be largely deficient. The only partial exception is textiles, where levels 
of turnover and conflict are high and the union is used to control this, echoing the 
historical reasons for the development of stronger dialogues internationally.   More 
generally, tripartism is perceived to be formative and insufficient to support a social 
dialogue.  This is due to two main reasons; (1) the parties not representative enough; 
(2) tripartism is only active on paper; in other words, there is a real enforcement of 
tripartism in Egypt. 
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7.4. PART (2): RQ3 EXPLORED 
Part (2) aims at answering the third research question79 by exploring themes (3) and 
(4).  Theme (3) explores ILO perceptions of the ways in which and means by which 
the ILO SDP can influence tripartism and eventually VET development in Egypt.   In 
this process, the objectives of the project, the approach it follows and the constraints 
that challenge its success are explored from the viewpoints of ILO representatives.  In 
theme (4), perceptions of employers‘ and unions‘ representatives on ILO SDP and its 
impact on tripartism and VET system are explored and finally are matched against the 
perceptions of ILO representatives.    
 
7.4.1. Theme (3) Perceptions ILO Representatives of ILO SDP 
The ILO SDP aims, as suggested by its official title80, to promote awareness about 
constituents‘ rights to engage in a process of consultation and dialogue regarding all 
aspects of work, including VET.  This section starts with exploring the perceptions of 
ILO representatives on the situation in Egypt regarding tripartism and on how the ILO 
Social Dialogue Project is expected to change the status quo and how the ILO is 
planning to do so.   
 
Analysis of ILO perceptions of the ILO SDP is divided into three categories: 
(I) Objectives – Priorities of the ILO SDP in Egypt since it has been launched in 
2008.  This includes the tools, approach and evaluation procedures used by the ILO 
in Egypt to attain SDP objectives.   
                                                             
79
 RQ3: In what ways do institutional actors perceive the ILO SDP to have influenced state-employer-
union relationships and VET development? 
80 Promoting fundamental principles and rights at work and social dialogue; ―The project is designed to 
promote appropriate legal environment and a culture of consultation and dialogue based on the 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work embodied in the ILO Declaration of 1998‖ (ILO, 2010).  
The project is known in Egypt as the ILO Social Dialogue Project (SDP). 
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(II) Constituents‘ cooperation – Perceptions of ILO representatives of the 
willingness of the state, employers‘ and workers‘ representatives to cooperate and 
engage in the project.  
(III) Challenges – Perceived obstacles that have constrained the project and its 
development in Egypt. 
 
The three categories are related both directly and indirectly.  In particular, there is a 
direct and strong relationship between the second and third categories.  ILO‘s 
perceptions of constituents offer reasonable justification for why the ILO considers 
some constituents amongst the major constraints to the SDP and its success in Egypt.  
7.4.1.1. ILO Perceptions 
i. Objectives 
Objectives of the ILO SDP in Egypt are discussed in section 5.7.1 but in this section 
the focus is on how these objectives are approached in practice.  ILO representatives 
were keen to make it clear that the ILO SDP in Egypt does not and cannot aim at an 
immediate or a highly effective institutional change with regards to tripartism and 
social dialogue.  Instead, the project lays the bricks of change by raising constituent‘s 
awareness of the value of tripartism and dialogue.   
“It is a long process... (and) you have a (limited) time frame; 2 years, you need 
(at least) 11 years and this project will end in 2011!!... Therefore, we will use this 
(limited) time to build capacities and to raise main concerns (about the problem 
of the lack of social dialogue) and to put pressures, to draw attention to the 
problem: we cannot go into effective social dialogue if we do not have the right to 
organise, if we do not have the freedom to elect (i.e. core ILO Conventions) and 
so on.‖ 
  
239 
 
The ILO in Egypt uses a variety of tools to enhance constituents‘ awareness levels.  
ILO technical assistance in social dialogue mainly involves delivering seminars, 
undertaking workshops, providing constituents with materials about the subject and 
all three constituents are expected to take part in these both individually and 
collectively.   
 
Raising awareness about social dialogue has not gone as smoothly as it could have 
been or had been in other contexts, such as Jordan for example.  In Egypt, MoMM 
and unions have no problem in receiving ILO inputs through different approaches but 
employers, represented in the EFI, are reluctant to attending tripartite 
seminars/workshops, which is quite challenging from an ILO perspective:  
“Employers do not send their representatives... (so) it is very hectic; you have to 
keep on changing your approach (to constituents).”  
In some instances and sectors, the ILO has been putting some pressures: 
“I have to put pressure on both parties (workers and employers) to get them to sit 
down together whereas if you are aware of your work, and aware that you need to 
communicate with others for your own interest, you will not need to be pushed by 
anyone”. 
Respondents did not give a specific example of such ‗pressure‟ when probed to talk 
more, but in general the ILO puts pressure on employers through MoMM and the 
whole process is balanced according to a number of political and economic 
considerations.   
 
The ILO has been adapting its approach to political and socio-economic changes in 
Egypt.  One of the most important adaptations has been the inclusion of the 
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Federation of Egyptian Chambers of Commerce (FECC) as representatives of 
employers in the ILO SDP instead of the EFI: 
“(We) had a meeting with chambers (FECC) and they seem to be more willing 
(than the EFI) to engage with the project” 
ILO representatives refer differences between FECC and EFI positions to the ILO 
SDP to variations in their general ideologies, politics and leadership.  The ILO would 
have preferred the EFI though, as it is the formal representative of Egyptian 
employers in the International Organisation of Employers (IOE) and in the ILO.  An 
ILO senior representative comments: 
“I think this is more of an ideological issue and that comes mainly from their 
leadership.  There might be different views amongst members of the EFI (but) I 
think EFI leadership is a little bit hesitant to engage fully with the project.  This is 
definitely a challenge”. 
 
The dialogue is currently progressing with representatives from MoMM, ETUF and 
FECC.  Workshops are being carried out to unify constituents‘ understanding of 
tripartism and social dialogue.  The ILO SDP manager reports:  
“I met all the chambers, general and sectoral union representatives... And I 
discovered that each party perceives the term „social dialogue‟ differently!”. 
 
A shared understanding of social dialogue is a key to project success.    On the one 
hand, employers perceive social dialogue as a set of incentives and benefits to 
enhance workers' satisfaction and loyalty to the enterprise.  In other words, it is 
considered to be some form of a gift-exchange relationship, along the lines suggested 
by is limited to George Akerlof (1982).  On the other hand, unions define social 
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dialogue in terms of increased intervention in decision-making which means more 
power and rights for workers.  One union representative reported another 
understanding of social dialogue.  He assured the researcher his union has a social 
dialogue and defined it in terms of regional cooperation: 
“There is an agreement between Nile Basin countries in the field of land transport, 
we developed an African union of the 10 countries to enhance workers‟ awareness 
of their rights, and to support and to protect their rights in different countries of 
the union and so on”. 
None of these definitions fully encompass the meaning of social dialogue the ILO is 
trying to promote in Egypt.   
 
Another ILO SDP objective is the amendment of national laws with regards to 
Conventions No. 87 and 98 in particular (as explored later).  Egypt suffers from a 
clear discrepancy between national and international legislation regarding these 
Conventions.  An ILO representative comments:   
“you cannot agree to certain laws and then… violate them... they have to see what 
is preventing them (from adhering to these conventions), they just have to be ready 
for the change themselves.  We can only assist technically”  
 The ILO SDP is making a slow progress in that respect but the Egyptian government 
is receptive to at least some of the propositions:  
“We are not redrafting the labour law.. (we aim) to introduce some amendments... 
based on the comments of the Committee of Experts.. mainly with (regards to) 
conventions 87 and 98…we have just started on these (changes).. the government 
is receptive... (but) it is early to decide”. 
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The degree to which the ILO succeeds in attaining its objectives is dependent on the 
responsiveness of constituents.  So far, the state and ETUF are on the one extreme 
supportive of the ILO SDP.  On the other extreme, the EFI is unsupportive of the 
project and it is early to decide whether the FECC can counterweight for EFI‘s lack of 
engagement.  Differences in constituents‘ levels of engagement are expected to be 
more favourable amongst workers than employers in all countries but in the Egyptian 
case such discrepancies are high in relation to other MENA countries. 
  
ii. Constituents’ Cooperation 
a. The State 
The Egyptian state; primarily MoMM, has been very cooperative with the ILO in the 
ILO SDP.  To have the ILO SDP operating in Egypt is a positive step in itself and it 
shows the willingness of the state to realise at least some changes to the status quo 
regarding tripartism.  According to a senior ILO representative, MoMM has been 
responsive to ILO efforts to strengthen its capacity to handle tripartite relations and 
disputes, he comments: 
“we are trying to focus on their (MoMM) capacity to present and settle labour 
disputes... we have been active with MoMM... not just in the head quarters (in 
Cairo) but in governorates.   The main focus is on dispute resolution and to do so 
you need to train people on international labour standards, the ILO standards and 
international legislations”. 
Another level of state support for ILO SDP is available in the pressures it attempts to 
exert on employers to push them to respond to the ILO though this has left the state in 
a critical situation.  On the one hand, the state needs to support employers to 
encourage national and foreign investments in Egypt and on the other hand it needs to 
exert pressure on employers to adhere to ILO international labour standards, 
including social dialogue.   
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b. Employers 
From an ILO perspective, employers in Egypt are largely uncooperative and 
unwilling to engage in any form of tripartite dialogue; a major challenge facing the 
ILO in Egypt and particularly regarding the ILO SDP.  For instance, in the ILO/AOL 
Arab Employment Forum in Beirut 2009; the researcher observed that all unions‘ 
representatives attended the forum whereas around only one third of employers‘ 
representatives showed up in the meetings, although the same number of invitations 
was extended to employers‘ and workers‘ representatives.  An ILO expert comments 
on this issue: 
“It boils down to the fact that unions see a higher importance in the ILO than 
employers.  That does not mean that the ILO is not important to employers‟ 
organisations, but as compared to workers‟ organisations (it is)”.   
 
c. Unions 
Unlike perceptions of employers‘ engagement, ILO representatives are more positive 
about the unions‘ position.  The ETUF support for the ILO SDP has been ensured by 
all ILO representatives; an expected reaction to a project that aims at granting 
workers more rights and benefits. 
 
Nevertheless, from an ILO perspective the ETUF does not have the full capacity to 
effectively engage in a social dialogue because of a number of structural weaknesses.  
These can be summarised as deficiencies in core rights; freedom of association, 
collective bargaining, independence and representativeness of unions.  Thus, ILO 
needs to work on building these capacities or perquisites for social dialogue in the 
first place as indicated by the ILO SDP project manager: 
“we cannot develop a social dialogue without the availability of some pre-
requisites.  One of the main ones is the right to organise workers... we cannot go 
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for social dialogue if they (workers) do not have (independent) unions.... we need 
to prepare constituents (to engage in a dialogue) and to raise the main issues; do 
we have free, democratic, independent trade unions?.. Employers, government and 
unions will say yes.  But unfortunately, this is not the case because if we take 
international labour standards as a scale to measure to what extent they are 
independent – (then) they are not”. 
 
The ineffectiveness of workers‘ organisation in Egypt and the deficiencies of the 
ETUF are amongst the major challenges facing the ILO SDP.  ILO perspectives on 
these are analysed below together with their viewpoints on other challenges including 
employers‘ limited cooperation, the legislative framework and Conventions‘ non-
observance. 
 
d. Challenges 
From an ILO perspective, employers‘ and workers‘ organisations share a serious 
deficiency that challenges ILO SDP and more generally the ILO work in Egypt; their 
levels of representativeness.  An ILO expert comments: 
“The major challenges, as in most Arab countries, the independencies of workers‟ 
and employers‟ organisations and how representative they are of constituents”. 
This is a serious challenge, as: 
“a dialogue should be between representative bodies and not formative ones” 
 
The extent to which the ILO attempts to influence the representativeness of parties 
varies from one project from one country to another.  In Egypt, the pressures from 
ILO to enhance EFI representativeness are still limited.  Nevertheless, the ILO 
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continues to consider EFI the most representative body of employers in Egypt.  An 
ILO representative comments:   
“What we do in the ILO is that we work typically with the most representative 
employers‟ organisations.. we do not change the organisations we deal with every 
year”. 
 
Together with the issue of representativeness, the ILO faces a number of challenges 
particular to individual constituents and to the general legislative framework. 
 
1. Challenges: Employers  
ILO representatives both in the Cairo office and in Geneva HQ consider one of the 
main constraints to development of the ILO SDP to be employers‘ negative position 
vis-à-vis tripartism.  One representative comments: 
“the social dialogue is delayed regarding the bilateral relationship; employers-
workers.  And therefore tripartism as well; if one of the three parties is rejecting 
the concept so there will not be a social dialogue and this issue is well known to 
the state and the ILO; the rejection comes from employers”. 
Another representative adds:  
“I think the (EFI) leadership is a little bit hesitant to engage fully with the 
project”. 
Employers and more particularly business elites are more concerned with maintaining 
the upper hand in labour market dealings and thus it is not surprising to find them 
reluctant to engage in a project that calls for a bipartite dialogue under the close 
supervision of the state and the ILO. 
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 From an ILO perspective, it is challenging to offer EFI effective incentives and/or 
pressures to engage in social dialogue as they are already receiving numerous benefits 
from the state which are high by international standards, as discussed before.  Hence, 
ILO representatives call for the importance of exerting pressures on employers not 
only by the state but by workers and their unions.  Employers‘ opposition is justified 
by an ILO representative: 
“There is no pressure on them (employers).  The percentage of union membership 
(i.e. union density) is weak and therefore they do not feel any pressure! (in 
general) Relationships between and within countries are managed by interests.  
Unless they (employers) feel their interests are threatened, for example if workers 
strike and delay production, they will not respond to workers‟ needs... (the ETUF) 
organises more than 8,850,000 workers while the working class in Egypt is 
24,000,000.  So there is a huge gap”. 
 
The FECC81 is perceived to have been more responsive to ILO SDP than the EFI.  
Yet, ILO representatives would have preferred the EFI to take part in the project as it 
is (i) perceived to be stronger than the FECC in terms of membership base; and (ii) it 
is the official employers‘ organisation represented in the ILO.  For instance, ILO 
expert comments:  
 
“definitely it should have been more helpful to have the EFI as a stronger partner 
in this project.  Also, because from an ILO perspective; the EFI (is the body that) 
represents employers in the ILO conference and meetings, so from our perspective 
we would like them to engage in the project”. 
 
                                                             
81 Which the ILO SDP resorted to in the first half of 2010. 
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2. Challenges: Unions  
The ETUF has been facing difficulties in organising workers in the formal sector.  An 
ILO representative comments:  
 ―(the ETUF) organises (around) 8,850,000 workers while the working class in 
Egypt is 24,000,000.  So there is a huge gap82‖. 
Weak representation causes a series of problems; a weak position for workers, weak 
collective bargaining and social dialogue.  However, an additional fundamental 
challenge is the inability to organise workers in the informal sector; a huge sector that 
undermines all workers in the employment relationship.  The ILO is currently 
concerned with workers‘ organisation in the formal sector, as stated by an ILO 
representative: 
“we have a problem in organising formal workers in the formal private sector 
(before dealing with the informal sector) because employers are not interested in 
unions and there are insufficient efforts from unions to establish unions in the 
private sector”. 
 
Freedom of association and collective bargaining, mainly the ratified ILO Convention 
No. 87, is perceived to be one of the main challenges.  In 2008, the first recognised 
independent union since Nasser‘s regime was established; the union for real estate tax 
collectors.  Though it is recognised by some state bodies, such as the Ministry of 
Finance where the Minister met with union heads to negotiate their demands, the 
ETUF still denies its existence which clearly contradicts Convention No. 87.  
Recognition of other unions independent of the ETUF is considered to have a positive 
influence on the strength of workers‘ actions in Egypt and to enhance their bargaining 
powers and their representation on a national level as argued by the ILO expert: 
                                                             
82 Though on regional and international terms, the gap is not very huge. 
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“When workers in ETUF feel that they can find alternative ways and means (of 
representation), they (the ETUF) will improve their performance and they will 
enhance representativeness of workers especially in the private sector.  Workers‟ 
representation in the private sector is very weak, although the private sector is 
now growing with all the privatisation etc... reaching balanced relationships 
within the organisation is very important”. 
 
ILO representatives have emphasised that it is the state‘s rather than the ILO‘s 
responsibility to enhance the independence of workers‘ and employers‘ associations 
as prerequisites for effective dialogue.  The ILO is in a position to only offer technical 
assistance, as indicated by an ILO representative: 
“Therefore, we (ILO) will use the time (of ILO SDP) to build capacities, to put 
pressures and to raise concerns that this is the problem: we cannot go into 
effective social dialogue if we do not have the right to organise, if we do not have 
the freedom to elect and so forth.. (but) who should deliver these changes? It is the 
Egyptians and not the ILO”. 
 
Similarly, the ILO does not offer ETUF an agenda to act upon to realise the intended 
changes.  Instead, it attempts to reinforce their activities, as indicated by ILO experts: 
 “We work with the ETUF according to their requests.  We do not intervene in 
deciding on their needs, each country has its own needs, and each party has its 
own needs.  We meet the needs of members and (ILO experts) try to help them to 
enhance their capacities in issues of concern.  For instance.. (the ILO) delivers 
seminars on international labour standards and to raise their awareness”. 
Technical assistance offered by the ILO, though significant in some areas of work, 
such as child labour, is still relatively limited to realise the intended changes with 
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regards union representation, freedom of association, right to organise and eventually 
social dialogue.  It is true that the ILO does ―not intervene in deciding on their 
(ETUF) needs” but as an international organisation it has indirect tools to exert 
pressure to push the situation forward. The coming period needs to witness more of 
these pressures to enhance the effectiveness of the project.  Such pressures can take 
different forms, such as labour market and its efficiency are amongst the most 
important indicators of a country‘s business climate and international competitiveness 
(e.g. OECD, 2010).  Thus, putting Egypt on this list of independent cases to be 
investigated by the Committee of Experts in the ILC and the results of this 
investigation can have a negative influence on attracting foreign investments to the 
country and hence it is a means of exerting pressures on the Egyptian state.   
 
The reasons why the ILO has taken this action at that time and not long before are 
unclear.  One probable reason is that the ILO started to receive more complaints from 
national and international activists and human rights bodies about the situation with 
the freedom of association in Egypt.  Another could be political reasons necessitating 
this action at this point in time despite the availability of such violations since the 
Nasserist era.  This has already been argued to have happened in the cases of other 
countries, such as the Burma case and the Colombia case (e.g. Collingsworth, 2002; 
Potter, 2005).  The former has been the subject of a commission of inquiry and 
consequent follow-ups due to forced labour.  The latter has had severe violations for 
the freedom of association; nevertheless, it has never had a commission of inquiry by 
the ILO83.    
 
                                                             
83 For more details on the cases and the argument refer to Potter (2005); Collingsworth, 2002. 
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3. Challenges: Legislative Framework 
Contradictions between Egyptian legislation and ILO ratified Conventions is a major 
challenge to ILO SDP.  As indicated earlier, freedom of association, workers‘ right to 
organise and other rights are severely curtailed in Egyptian legislation.  An ILO 
representative comments on this matter: 
“Workers have the right to freely establish unions and organise themselves 
whenever they need to do so.  Egyptian laws do not give these rights.  Also, on the 
level of decision-making within unions, financial freedom etc. all of these rights 
are included in Convention 87 and these are either not available in the Egyptian 
law or are contradictory to some Articles in the Convention”. 
 
Another example is the right to go on strikes which is not available to Egyptian 
workers as they need to give notice and have permission from authorities before they 
go on strike.  This was one of the reasons for the severe wave of strikes that started in 
200684. 
“national law provides that workers should give a notice of the strike before going 
on one.  This contradicts the Conventions because what leverage the worker has; 
the worker negotiates if he does not find approval of his demands, wages and so 
on, strike is the only tool that he has in his hands to put pressure on the employer.  
If you require the worker to give a notice to the employer, it weakens the position 
of the worker.  This is also one of the problems; the Committee of Experts is saying 
they should not be required to give notice of the strike”. 
 
Both examples contradict ILO Convention No. 87 ratified by Egypt.  The issue is 
complicated and needs numerous legislative amendments.  On the one hand, 
                                                             
84 For examples on similar actions in other contexts, see for example See Batstone, 1985; Keil, 2003. 
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amending national laws to accommodate these discrepancies is one of the objectives 
of the ILO SDP in Egypt.  On the other hand, the current legislative framework 
constraints the development of tripartism and social dialogue.  This raises the 
question as to whether an effective social dialogue on a national level can be achieved 
by the end of the ILO SDP, which if not extended will end in 2011.  
 
7.4.1.2. Perceptions of Employers’ and Workers’ Organisations of the ILO SDP 
 
 NVivo Model 7: Analysis of employers’ and union’s perceptions of the ILO SDP 
 
 
i. Perceptions of Employers’ Representatives 
  Employers‘ and Unions‘ perceptions of the ILO SDP 
  TRIMEET: The tripartite meeting; DIALOGUE: Perceptions of ILO SDP; SEUR: State-
Employer-Union Relationship; RU: Role of unions; EUR: Employer-Union relationship; EER: 
Employer-Employer relationship; TRUST: Trust levels; SEUR: State-Employer-Union 
relationship; COLLECTIVE: Collective bargaining; URILO: ILO services to unions. 
252 
 
Employers‘ representatives were either not in favour of the ILO SDP or not aware of 
the project.  The FECC representative was the only exception; he held positive 
perceptions of the ILO SDP.  He reported ILO readiness to deliver seminars and 
workshops to enhance employers‘ awareness of social dialogue and its value while 
incurring all associated costs.  He comments: 
“The ILO is ready to cover all costs; they will undertake the seminars in a hotel, 
and they will offer accommodation and travel expenses to participants.  As long as 
we are not incurring any costs and we will do some kind of activity (through this 
project), so that is fine”.  
Unlike other representatives, the FECC representative does not consider seminars and 
workshops to be a waste of time.  Nevertheless, he did not comment on the extent to 
which such awareness-raising workshops could effectively lead to enhanced tripartite 
relationships which raises doubts the potential effectiveness of the ILO SDP.  He was 
clear though that the ILO SDP is considered to be ―some kind of activity‖ that can be 
undertaken without incurring any costs.  Another implicit reason for engagement with 
the ILO SDP is the attention FECC would receive as a result that would (i) strengthen 
its position vis-à-vis the EFI; and (ii) enhance its relationship with the state.   
 
Across the rest of employers‘ representatives, seven employers had a very limited 
idea of the ILO SDP and more generally ILO activities in Egypt.  Their comments 
were along the lines of: ―I do not know‖; ―maybe there is something (ILO SDP) going 
on‖ or ―not as far as I know‖.  A senior employers‘ representative reported negative 
perceptions of the ILO and the role of international organisations in general: 
“Unfortunately, International Organisations.. are white-collar people who come 
up with reports, but to what extent are these influential? What is the real impact of 
their projects? (body language to show inability to find an answer)”. 
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The remaining two employers‘ representatives were critical of the project and its 
approach in promoting tripartism and social dialogue in Egypt.  They seem to oppose 
workers‘ involvement in VET and other work-related as, from their viewpoint, 
empowerment of workers would ―bring about wildcat strike action‖, for instance: 
“I am not convinced with these things (ILO SDP) at all... I have met with them 
(ILO representatives) many times and they asked for my cooperation and all of 
these European matters... they (the ILO) will bring about workers‟ outbreak 
because at this time as you know there are the issues of Mahala85, there are many 
disturbances and issues of human rights are raised and so on. (a pause with an 
angry body language and voice tone) Every country has its own circumstances.”  
 
They were also critical of the approach followed by the ILO in promoting the project 
in which the ILO is perceived to be exerting pressures on the state to push employers 
to meet with workers under ILO supervision.  Interestingly, this pressure which 
employers are complaining about is perceived by ILO experts and unions‘ 
representatives to be insufficient for an effective engagement of employers in social 
dialogue.  Some employers argue that the social dialogue is a personal obligation that 
no one should impose on them.  The role of the state and the ILO in their viewpoint 
should be limited to the provision of ‗guidelines‘ on how to better engage workers in 
the workplace.  A senior employers‘ representative comments: 
“It is very reasonable to talk about a social dialogue but the manner in which it is 
practiced is a very important issue.  They (the ILO) will mess up the whole project 
because of the manner in which it is being practised in Egypt; top-down 
enforcement (forcing employers to) sit with workers, talk to them... I can do this 
voluntarily, not by force...You (the state and the ILO) can give me guidelines and 
then it is up to me (whether to apply it or not).  But do not come up to me saying; 
                                                             
85 It has been undergoing a wave of strikes since 2006. 
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you (the employer) are a partner and should have a dialogue with all other 
constituents.  Workers should not talk, the state should not talk; I am the (only) one 
who should have a say! It is my money.  I would do it (ILO SDP), (only) based on 
conviction.. not by force”. 
The EFI representative in the ILC criticised the manner in which the ILO and the state 
try to impose social dialogue onto employers and he added:  
“MoMM highly exerts pressure (on employers) to attend these meetings, and even 
the pressure from the ILO and I am going to say these in the coming (ILO) meeting 
in March, I said this before and I am going to say it again; the social dialogue 
cannot be practised in that manner”. 
They suggest the ILO should follow a different approach; to negotiate with each party 
individually.  So the suggestion is: 
 
“to sit with each party on its own.  And to make it clear that you (ILO) do not aim 
to oblige employers to fund the social dialogue but to raise employers‟ awareness 
of the need to put a percentage of their income into social dialogue”. 
In this case, these would be considered individual negotiations instead of a social 
dialogue; this is exactly what employers at the EFI request.  Their engagement in a 
dialogue with social partners translates, in their viewpoints, to increased costs as it 
will open the floodgates to workers‘ demands.  The advantages social dialogue can 
bring to employers in terms of enhanced productivity for instance cannot compensate 
for the costs they would incur from this process, from their point of view, and thus 
there is little reason for them to change the status quo.  There is also a fear of 
increased labour action if workers and their unions are empowered by tripartism and 
social dialogue and as reported by an employers‘ representative “we do not want to 
see the boot on the other foot”.   
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ii. Perceptions of Unions 
In general, union representatives positively perceive ILO and its activities.  For 
instance, ILO is efforts in the tourism sector where it works with the state, employers 
and unions (through SECTOR- see Chapter 5) to establish standards for health and 
safety to enhance the sector‘s international competitiveness.  Union representatives 
also reported favourable perceptions of ILO role in exerting pressures on the state to 
give workers more rights, such as the right to collective bargaining, through ratified 
conventions.  However, the extent to which ratified conventions are enforced is 
limited; one of the challenges to effective tripartism and social dialogue from unions‘ 
perspective as discussed before.  A senior union representative adds: 
“we understand that these (rights granted to workers through ratified ILO 
conventions) are likely to be artificial at the beginning and it is then the role of the 
union to strengthen these structures but in reality the situation is different (due to 
limited enforcement)” 
 
Nevertheless, union representatives were critical of ILO attempts to promote freedom 
of association, despite being one of ILO ratified core Conventions, as this would lead 
to pluralism.  The latter would threaten ETUF hegemony over workers‘ organisation 
in Egypt which has been reserved since the 1950s.  For the same reason, the ETUF 
has been denying the independence of the real estate tax collectors union.  Hence, 
there is no wonder why union representatives are not in favour of such a change.   
 
A senior representative offered a different argument to support unions‘ opposition.  
He argues that such pluralism is not available in other developed countries such as the 
USA.  He is sceptical of ILO attempts to promote pluralism in Egypt, as from his 
perspective, the ILO has an interest in doing so; a more important role in labour 
issues and more generally foreign investments in Egypt.  He comments: 
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“There is only one union in the USA86.. Italy had 3 unions and these were 
integrated into one union, so how come you are asking me (the ETUF) to have 
multiple unions (through freedom of association)? Of course, there is an interest 
for the ILO in doing so because then it will be the one in control of the system... in 
control of investments and in favour of these investments, most of which come from 
abroad”. 
 
 
7.4.2. THEME (4): PERCEIVED INFLUENCE OF ILO SDP OF VET AND ITS 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
ILO, employers‘ and union representatives interviewed do not see a direct 
relationship between the ILO SDP and VET development, at least in the short to 
medium terms.  Their perceptions are not surprising given the analysis of their 
perceptions of VET, state-employer-union cooperation and the ILO SDP.  
Nevertheless, the ILO SDP is perceived to be a probable means of enhancing VET on 
the long run.  The ILO SDP project manager comments on this aspect: 
“We do not do Vocational Education and Training through this project.  We are 
looking into capacity building for unions and employers though I think it (VET) is 
an area of interest to both... (but) it is not my specialty.  Usually I refer to the 
specialist office in charge of this area but yet no one (not employers, unions or the 
state) requested VET from the project.. But as an area where we can practise 
social dialogue – definitely yes”.  
 
                                                             
86 The respondent is wrong here. 
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VET is expected to benefit from enhanced levels of cooperation between employers, 
workers and the state as discussed before.  However, constituents have unfavourable 
perceptions of tripartism and the prospects of establishing a social dialogue in Egypt.  
The dialogue is constrained with a number of institutionally embedded challenges that 
need not only a body for technical assistance like the ILO but more importantly it 
requires the political will to engage in such changes.  The political will is dependent 
on a number of internal and external political, economic and social considerations.  
Hence, the influence of ILO SDP on VET development is perceived to be incoherent 
in the time being.   
 
7.5. PART 3: EMPLOYERS’ AND WORKERS’ PERCEPTIONS ON AN ENTERPRISE 
LEVEL 
The responses shown in parts 1 and 2 are verified on an enterprise level in part 3.  
Two enterprises in the tourism sector were successfully accessed after dropping the 
enterprise in the construction sector. Both enterprises were selected using purposive 
sampling where the researcher would have been able to access managers and workers 
independently.  Nevertheless, it was difficult to secure interviews using this 
technique.  The researcher found it difficult to access workers in particular as (i) they 
were sceptical of the research and its purposes even when the researcher was referred 
to them by co-workers, in an attempt to establish a minimum level of trust; and (ii) 
despite an initial agreement to take part in the study they were reluctant to actually 
meet the researcher and negotiations to set an appointment went as long as three 
weeks before coming to nothing.  Therefore, the researcher approached enterprises 
where she was able to secure interviews with top management and then she requested 
to meet with their workers.  In the first enterprise, the kitchen department was the 
most accessible and thus the same department was chosen in the second enterprise for 
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purposes of comparability.  A total of two focus groups (of 4 workers each87) and 
three in-depth interviews with managers were undertaken in these enterprises. 
 
7.5.1 Employers’ Perceptions of VET and State – Employer Cooperation 
 
NVivo Model 8: Analysis of employers’ perceptions on the enterprise level 
 
 
 
At the beginning of the interviews, employers‘ representatives diplomatically 
reported “good relationship(s)” with the state represented in the Ministry of Tourism.  
                                                             
87 In one of the focus groups, the fourth participant was late so he did not actively participate in the 
focus group. 
  Employers‘ perceptions – on an enterprise level 
  E-: Employers‘ perceptions; SUR: State-Union Relationship; SEUR: State-Employer-Union 
Relationship; EUR: Employer-Union Relationship; SER: State-Employer Relationship; EER: 
Employer-Employer Relationship; RIO:  Role of international organisations; DIALOGUE: Social 
dialogue and ILO SDP. 
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However, when probed, they mentioned a distant relationship with MoMM and did 
not recognise any relationship with other Ministries and/or public bodies particularly 
with regards to VET, including MoE or MoHE.   
 
One of employers was particularly critical of MoMM and its reactive strategies.   
From his perspective, MoMM deals with problems as and when these arise rather 
than having a strategic work plan in different aspects, including VET.  This is 
perceived to hamper cooperation with MoMM as there ―is not a clear agenda‖.  He 
also extends the critique to the educational system which he thinks wastes 
opportunities for enhancing employment levels due to the lack of a clear direction 
(detailed perceptions of VET are discussed below).  When asked about his 
relationship with MoMM, he replies: 
“There is not a long term strategy; whenever a problem comes up they try to solve 
it... they (MoMM) react to problems (not proactive)...  And there is not a clear 
agenda for hospitality and tourism education; there is not a long-term educational 
strategy.  Although if the state invests in hospitality and tourism education, it can 
absorb large numbers of people (that could help solve the employment problem) 
because these are international jobs, e.g. Cooks can work anywhere”.  
 
As regards VET, employers‘ representatives did not report any form of effective 
cooperation with VET centres owned by the state or by the Egyptian Tourism 
Federation.  It should be noted that in theory, the Egyptian Tourism Federation 
represents employers in the field, but employers have referred to it as a state body 
rather than a representative of their interests.  Both companies fulfil their VET needs 
using their own training programmes both on- and off-the job, such as workshops and 
seminars.  However, one of the representatives reported a previous attempt to 
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cooperate with the Egyptian Federation of Tourism in VET programmes but this was 
a disappointing experience for him, as he reports: 
“I delivered a presentation (about the company‟s work) to the Minister (of 
Tourism – as part of a larger event) and he suggested I should get in touch with 
them (the Egyptian Tourism Federation), so I contacted then but they showed no 
interest (in cooperating with me)... (as) they seem to be smarter than I am 
apparently! (a sarcastic justification for the Federation‟s lack of interest in 
cooperating with his company). (Then) I went to the SFD (Social Fund for 
Development) and delivered a presentation and I prepared a proposal (as 
required), as they provide employers with grants given by the French and others, 
but no one got back to me”.    
 
Employers perceive the state and its educational policies to be responsible for current 
VET ineffectiveness and poor quality; a perception shared with EFI representatives as 
discussed in Part 1.  They referred for example to the hospitality and tourism colleges.  
These do not provide individuals with sufficient practical know-how as they focus on 
memorisation and rote learning.  The theoretical content is outdated and is delivered 
in Arabic though most of the terminologies in practice are either in English or French 
and workers deal with international customers.  One of the employers comments:      
 “It is a problem of education... these (VET) colleges and academies focus on 
theory more than practice...... the educational system provides outdated material 
not in line with developments in the industry and ours is one where they are 
constant developments.. and they focus on theory more than practice... another 
problem is that all of these material are in Arabic whereas they need to learn the 
job jargon (which is in French and English)”. 
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7.5.1.1. Perceptions of Employers’ inputs to VET 
Both enterprises develop and deliver their own VET programmes.  They try to select 
people with the ―right attitude‖; individuals able and willing to learn and develop 
their skill levels, regardless of their previous experiences or in some instances their 
educational background88. One of the two companies has decided to develop its own 
academy to provide workers with the required numbers and skill levels to keep up 
with the company‘s future demand which is expected to increase sharply as a result of 
their expansion plans in Egypt down to 2017.  The company‘s representative 
comments: 
 “We try to hire people with the right attitude then we start to train them on our 
system... in order to meet the (labour) needs of our expansion plan until 2017 we 
had to develop our own academy (emphasis added)... We developed a board of 
trustees; department heads and executives and they have suggested the things that 
they (workers) should learn because the educational system is outdated and is not 
in line with developments in the industry”. 
The representative reported attempts to cooperate with the state; represented in the 
Federation and the SFD, through the company‘s new academy.  This is not because 
the company cannot afford to deliver VET programmes on its own but rather for two 
main reasons: (1) the academy they are developing is expected to deliver larger 
numbers of workers than needed by the company, so the state could have benefited 
from excess individuals if cooperation between the two parties was possible; (2) 
poaching of workers is another threat that the company is concerned with.  So the 
intention was to cooperate with the state in raising the levels of VET in the sector as a 
whole to reduce the risk of poaching of workers.  On this latter issue, the company‘s 
representative comments: 
                                                             
88 These tendencies were reported in Soliman (2007) as part of a study on employers‘ and graduates‘ 
perceptions of work experience in Egypt 
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“The disaster that you need to keep in mind is poaching of workers!  After I train 
workers, the neighbouring hotel simply catch them and offers a better position with 
a better pay, although s/he might not be qualified for this higher position.  But they 
do so to attract them and this goes on and on.  Then, in less than ten years you will 
have this (phenomenon) all around the place (the field) and you will end up with a 
lot of people not qualified for what they are doing;  a real disaster”. 
 
This point raises a number of important issues.  First, unlike the other employer and 
EFI representatives who are passive about cooperating with the state in the provision 
of VET, this representative89 and his company are aware of the need to cooperate with 
the state in raising the levels of VET on a national level.  This is the only employer 
representative who had approached the state and asked for some kind of cooperation.  
Even amongst the three employers‘ representatives who reported some sort of 
cooperation with the state in VET, they were all invited by the state but none of them 
initiated the idea of cooperation. 
 
Second comes the serious problem of poaching externalities.  Both employers‘ 
representatives have reported that workers can leave them for as a little an increase in 
pay as 10 L.E., even if this other company is not going to invest as much in VET and 
upgrading their skills as workers are not expected to be concerned with the 
development of their skills.  One of the employers comments: 
“The worker does not care VET (he receives at this company), all what he cares 
about is that the other chain will give him an extra 10 L.E.... There is no a culture 
                                                             
89 A senior Human Resources Manager in an international hotel chain.  He received Western education 
and has international experience in the field. 
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of learning and development, he just needs a certificate to get married90 (that is 
why they join certified VET systems in the first place)” 
 
The company‘s attempt to cooperate with the state in developing VET in the sector 
can minimise the negative influences of workers‘ poaching.  Unfortunately, the state 
represented in the bodies approached by the company, has not been responsive to 
these calls for cooperation.  This might be due to internal politics and/or personal 
preferences as implicitly indicated by the company‘s representative as indicated 
above.  However, the company is still trying to keep good relationships with the 
Federation and more generally the state, and this attitude has been reported by the 
other representative as well, who comments:  
 “we try to we try to keep everyone happy and do our own thing and that is it” 
 
Apart from investing in VET, employers‘ representatives in both enterprises reported 
their reliance on imported labour mainly from East and South East Asia.  This subject 
was brought up by EFI representatives. They consider it to be a short-term solution to 
the problem of inadequate skills in Egypt and in a way, an obstruction to it.  In the 
tourism sector, employers seem to be very comfortable with this solution and are 
ready to expand reliance on foreign labour whenever possible.  For instance, in one of 
the interviews the HR manager informed the researcher that he has just signed a one-
year collective contract for Filipino workers before the interview (he did not indicate 
the exact number of individuals).  The manager prefers foreign workers over 
Egyptians, as the former tend to (i) have higher skill levels so less time and effort is 
invested in their training, if required at all; (ii) be more presentable; and (iii) not cause 
                                                             
90
 In Egypt, traditionally families prefer educated individuals for marriage and thus some people end up 
in educational routes just for the sake of obtaining a certificate that they can refer to when proposing  
marriage. 
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a lot of trouble, e.g. with customers, and problems, e.g. through unions, for the 
company.  He comments: 
“in many cases I resort to foreign workers.  I have just come back from the 
Philippines two weeks ago, I was looking for workers.  She (Filipino workers) 
speaks French, she wears makeup, she can work till late and she does not make 
trouble.  The Egyptian is here to make trouble... If I have 150 from the Philippines 
I will not feel their presence (will not feel any burden) except when they arrive (to 
Egypt) and when they leave, if I have an Egyptian worker s/he can cause me pain”. 
 
7.5.1.2. Perceptions of unions’ inputs to VET 
Like all other EFI representatives, employers on the enterprise level have 
unfavourable perceptions of unions.  They do not have direct relationships with ETUF 
and are not willing to cooperate with them in work-related issues, including VET.  
They also do not consider unions to have or could potentially have a role in VET and 
its development.   
 
One of the representatives justified this position in terms of the overall socio-
economic system that prevailed since Nasser‘s regime when the state offered many 
benefits to workers, such as full employment, open-ended work contracts and health 
and social insurance.  Benefits were received regardless of workers‘ performance 
and/or productivity levels and thus there was little reason for workers and/or unions to 
invest in upgrading VET levels.  However, this is not the situation anymore. with the 
increasing scope of the private sector since the first and second openings of the 
economy; in 1974 and 1990/1 simultaneously, that emphasises performance, 
productivity and competitiveness.  Unions and more generally the state are not 
perceived to have coped well with this transformation, especially given the current 
265 
 
legal framework; Labour Law No. 12/2003, which the employer representative 
criticises together with the overall situation: 
“They (unions) do not play any role in VET.. they are not concerned with VET at 
all.  You have the worst labour law ever... (employers‟) relationship with the 
worker is similar to a Catholic marriage; there is no divorce.  The government did 
not prepare people for the transformation from the (relatively) socialist system to 
the (relatively) capitalist economy.  So workers still believe they would get full 
support from their (private sector) employers (as they used to gain from the 
state/public sector in the past)”. 
 
Employers‘ representatives did not show any interest in increasing unions‘ inputs to 
VET.  They reported their preference for the status quo; minimum union engagement 
in VET and more generally weak employer-union relationships.  Employers recognise 
the ETUF but they avoid dealing with it.  They prefer direct relationships between the 
company‘s management and individual workers, not workers‘ organisations, to deal 
with any issues or problems on an enterprise level, which is not unusual.  Employers 
justify this tendency by arguing that the company provides workers with a wide array 
of benefits more than those offered by the union and thus there is no need for the 
involvement of unions, from employers‘ perspective; though this ignores procedural 
justice issues.  One of the representatives perceives the ETUF to be ―a government 
body‖ only concerned with proving its existence, as he comments: 
“there is not a relationship with unions; the benefits offered to workers by the 
hotel are way far more than that offered by the union... Unions do not have an 
effective role... their role is limited to who is going to be the (union‟s) president... 
As a government body (emphasis added) they try to say „we exist‟!”. 
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Union leaders are also perceived to be incompetent in representing workers in the 
sector.  A union representative gives an example by their inability to communicate in 
English; a necessity in this field, which does not qualify them, in addition to other 
things, to represent workers or to participate in VET, from his perspective.  He 
considers them to be only concerned with travelling to Geneva to attend ILO 
meetings with very limited effectiveness in any other way.  When asked about the 
role of unions, he comments: 
“which unions? these unions do not have anyone who speaks English and all the 
time they are attending meetings and conferences in Geneva (as part of the ILO), 
and they will never let anyone who is well educated to be part of it” 
 
7.5.1.3. Perceptions of the ILO and the ILO SDP 
Employers‘ perception of the ILO was either negative or neutral.  Two employers, in 
the same company, were not aware of ILO activities including the ILO SDP and one 
of them referred to another International agency that undertakes annual quality audits 
for the company when asked about the ILO.  The other companies‘ representative 
recognised the ILO though not the ILO SDP and reposted a negative experience with 
the ILO has been negative.  He used to attend ILO seminars and workshops as an 
employer representative but his suggestions and demands were not taken into 
account.  He argues that the ILO has its own ―preset agenda‖ and employers with 
different demands, like him, are not welcomed and for this reason he stopped 
attending.  He is very critical of the ILO workshops and he comments: 
“They (the ILO) want workers. People like me (an employers‟ representative from 
the private sector) are not required in these things (at all).  Therefore I stopped 
attending these things (meetings, seminars and workshops).  It is a waste of time; 
nobody is going to listen to you, they (the ILO) have a preset agenda... constituents 
attend to have a nice dinner and are compensated (financially) for the time spent 
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on these meetings, but my time is quite limited and I can spend it on more useful 
things.” 
 
Another issue that has been only briefly mentioned by the employer despite being an 
important one is the provision of information.  This issue of providing information 
has been indicated by a senior employers‘ representative (in Part 1) as one of the 
constraints to employers‘ cooperation in VET and it reduces the quality of labour 
market information which again has negative influences on VET.  Employers are 
reluctant to share information about their companies with either the state or other 
employers as they do not trust in how and by whom such information would be used.  
This concern is shared by this representative as well.  He brought up this issue 
randomly to the discussion which indicates it is amongst the important issues at the 
top of his mind.  On the ILO and other agencies, the representative comments: 
“We are never invited (as employers to participate in these programmes of raising 
awareness).  Sometimes we are invited by the USAID or the British Council (on 
programmes of) workers‟ and workforce development, but so what? If we meet and 
discuss these for 2 days, what is going to happen? The 2 days will be wasted, and 
they are (just) collecting information from you (emphasis added)” 
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7.5.2. Workers’ Perceptions  
NVivo Model 9: Analysis of workers’ perceptions on the enterprise level 
 
 
 
7.5.2.1. Perceptions of VET 
A total of 4 out of 7 workers did not receive VET in their practiced vocation; they 
graduated in different fields, such as agriculture and engineering.  The other 3 
workers graduated in hospitality and tourism colleges and higher institutes.  All of 
them started their careers in the 1980s and only one was slightly  older he started in 
the 1970s but at that time, VET systems were not popular and human resources 
development was not available within hotels (it is still not available in many 
enterprises91).  These workers have learnt the vocation through other people; relatives 
                                                             
91 For details see for e.g. Budhwar and Mellahi, 2006. 
  Workers‘ perceptions – on an enterprise level 
  U-: Unions‘ perceptions; SER: State-Employer Relationship; EUR: Employer-Union Relationship; 
SEUR: State-Employer –Union Relationship; SUR: State-Union Relationship; URILO: ILO services 
to unions; DIALOGUE: ILO SDP objectives in Egypt. 
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and/or friends, and built their experiences from scratch by practicing the vocation in 
different places of different sizes until they reached these big companies.  For 
instance, one of the workers learnt the vocation from a well known family in the field.  
This family of Chefs were illiterate but they were very professional.  It happened that 
he had a very similar surname92 so he acted as if he is a member of their extended 
family to gain their ―trust‖.  The issue of trust has always been an important aspect of 
work-relations.  He describes his experience:  
 “I used to work with a big family and I relied on (our similar) surname.. so they 
trusted me quite easily.  I learnt the vocation from them and they liked me a lot, as 
I used to read for them... they were illiterate but were extremely talented”.   
 
Respondents who graduated in hospitality and tourism reported a very limited 
relevance of their education to the workplace as their programmes focused more on 
theory than practice, as indicated by one of them below.  This respondent also said 
that training programmes in general had been unpopular in the late 1980s; a 
perception shared by all other respondents.  Thus, they think that nowadays there is a 
better recognition of VET.  One of the workers comments on this issue: 
“I graduated in Hospitality and Tourism, Helwan University.  What we studied is 
one thing and what we have practiced is a completely different thing.  We studied 
theories very well... (but) we wanted to practice what we were learning; how to use 
a knife, how to meet a guest and serve him/her especially foreigners... (when) I 
joined the field... training was not very popular (unlike these days).. that was in 
1989”. 
Then he comments on the ineffectiveness of the educational system in general: 
                                                             
92 A traditional practice as reported in a study on HRM in Egyptian enterprises in 1955-57 (Harbison 
and Ibrahim, 1958) 
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“the education system is not compatible with the needs of the workplace” 
 
Unlike union representatives who recognised the ITC and PVTD, none of the workers 
interviewed recognised state-owned VET centres.  They perceive the state‘s role in 
VET to be limited to the educational system and do not expect it to be directly or 
indirectly involved in VET on an enterprise level.  Instead, they perceive VET to be 
the responsibility of individual workers, who are expected to seek opportunities for 
their own skill development, and then the responsibility of the enterprise, which is 
expected to provide its workforce with development opportunities depending on its 
size and capacities. 
 
7.5.2.2. Perceptions of Employers’ inputs to VET 
All workers interviewed reported their employers‘ positive engagement in VET.  
These range from on-the-job training provided by supervisors and/or department 
heads to off-the-job training, which is sometimes delivered over a number of days to 
workers from various departments.  In other words, all of them were satisfied with the 
levels of VET provided by their companies.  They also referred to the provision of 
free-of-charge English language courses provided at the companies.  However, it has 
to be noted that these workers are working in above three-star hotels; above average 
companies in Egypt, hence there is a margin for bias regarding this point. 
 
However, all of them agreed that the effectiveness of these programmes rely on the 
willingness of workers to learn and to develop their skills.  For instance, one of those 
who graduated in hospitality and tourism comments on his experience in on-the-job 
training: 
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“I have received on-the-job training and I have been taking notes while working 
(during the training session), and I still have these notes... such training is 
effective.  As I told you the books (i.e. education) are completely different and 
irrelevant”. 
Unlike union representatives, workers in both enterprises reported favourable 
perceptions of employer-union relationship.  The extent to which this bilateral 
relationship is as strong, as has been reported is questionable, since respondents had 
known that the researcher was in contact with their managers.  One way to balance 
any overtly positive comments or reported perceptions is to make sure these are 
supported by evidence.  In this sense, it can be argued that employer-worker 
communication is available though nothing has been reported on the perceived quality 
of these relationships to justify a very favourable employer-worker relationship as 
reported by some workers.  For instance one of the workers described his and his 
colleagues‘ inputs into VET: 
“Every day during the duty break, we have to review guests‟ feedback... with the 
session head, the executive chef; who is Egyptian and there is a foreign Chef above 
him... we discuss the weak points, (decide on) the areas in which workers need 
training, at the end we come up with notes and the executive Chef communicates 
these to the management”.  
This is a positive example of a dialogue taking place between workers and 
supervisors in the department on work issues and training needs.  These are then 
communicated to more senior managers in the hierarchy for implementation.  This is 
also an indication of positive levels of employer-employee interdependence which 
have not been reported by EFI and ETUF representatives.  
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5.2.2.3. Perceptions of unions and their inputs to VET 
Workers in both enterprises reported some interesting perceptions of their relationship 
with the union.  It was noted that workers were keen to make it clear they have 
absolutely no connection to unions and not intending to have one; a feature shared 
internationally by workers in the catering and hospitality sector in which union 
organisation is in general largely weak.  One of the workers reported that all the 
employers he has worked with do not allow workers to become members of any kind 
of workers‘ organisation.  He mentioned an incident in one of the hotels where 
workers organised themselves and decided to leave due to problems with the hotel‘s 
management.  After this incident, employers became more alert to any form of 
workers‘ organisation and workers‘ right to organise themselves has been curtailed in 
many enterprises.  He comments: 
“you know why? Because they do not allow workers in these hotels (including his 
hotel) to have any kind of workers‟ organisation because... as what happened in 
Hurghada, do you what happened? The Chef took his staff and left to Cairo and 
did not show up the next day at  breakfast! So they prevented any kind of workers‟ 
organisation in hotels, I am not sure if it is still the same up till now, but I think 
until now there are no workers‟ organisations”. 
 
They argued they have no problem in dealing with their employer which is quite 
expected because they do not have a body to represent them.  They do not expect the 
union to offer them more benefits or advantages, apart from pensions but again these 
are insignificant as they indicated.  Some of them have stopped paying union 
membership; in other words, they are no longer members.  They only consider it to be 
useful in securing a pension though they perceived the value of unions‘ pensions to be 
insignificant.   
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Workers do not expect unions to play a role in VET; a shared perception with the 
majority of union representatives interviewed.  When commenting on VET 
development, all workers referred to an Egyptian association of Chefs established and 
run by a Swiss cook in the 1980s.  The association does not offer workers support or 
benefits on an enterprise level but it offers them opportunities to develop their skills.  
For instance, in one focus group one of the workers comments: 
“the Association of Egyptian Chefs is absolutely amazing.  It helps all the staff, it 
trains people and arranges national and international competitions”.   
And another adds: 
“each month they update you with news in the Chefs community; social and 
professional news, e.g. weddings, training programmes etc”. 
It has to be taken into account that workers interviewed in this sample have been 
nominated by their direct supervisors, hence: (i) workers are expected to be crème de 
la crème; and (ii) their responses might be influenced by the fact that the researcher 
knows their supervisor.  In an attempt to avoid this limitation, the researcher used a 
life history approach in the focus group.  This had to be monitored though as each 
focus group had at least three participants.  Some trends have occurred throughout the 
group interview.  Bipartite relationships are perceived to fairly balanced.  Again, it is 
difficult to tell to what extent their perceptions on employer-worker relationship had 
been biased due to the reasons indicated above.   However, all of the workers 
interviewed have been with the employer for at least five years and have worked in 
many places before so based on this it can be assumed that their perceptions on 
bipartite relations are relatively reliable.   
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5.2.2.4. Perceptions of ILO and ILO SDP 
All of the workers interviewed did not recognise either the ILO SDP or the ILO itself.  
When asked about the role of the ILO, they commented on the role of an 
‗international‘ agency that inspects health and safety within the enterprise, a similar 
reaction to one of the employers‘ representatives as indicated above.  The question 
was rephrased but again they did not recognise the ILO.  When asked about the social 
dialogue they repeated their perceptions on employer-worker relationship and on 
employer-state relationship that they referred to before. 
7.6.  FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION 
The findings of the analysed data are discussed below in two parts, addressing the 
second and third research questions respectively. 
RQ2 What are the mutual perceptions of key institutional actor of state, employer 
and union inputs and cooperation in VET? 
RQ3: In what ways do institutional actors perceive the ILO SDP to have 
influenced state-employer-union relationships and VET development? 
 
7.6.1. Part 1: Perceptions of state, employers’ and unions’ VET inputs 
There is a general consensus amongst employers‘, unions/workers‘ and ILO 
representatives as to the ineffectiveness of state, employer and unions input to VET.   
State’s inputs to VET through the educational system are perceived by all 
constituents to be focused on increasing the quantity rather than quality of output 
which has contributed to VET ineffectiveness.  State‘s input through training centres 
stand at a slightly better position regarding quality of output.  Amongst EFI 
representatives, three employers recognised VET activities at state-owned VET 
centres and two of them perceived their output positively, such as that through the 
ITC.  Amongst ETUF representatives, all union heads recognised the PVTD as the 
ETUF has been supporting it since the 1950s and hence their positive perceptions of 
275 
 
it are expected.  Nevertheless, only one of them was able to recognise other 
centres/programmes; the TVET Reform Programme, about which he was not 
positive.  Finally, ILO representatives refer to VET fragmentation to be a major 
constraint that reduces the effectiveness of any positive outputs from and/or 
initiatives by VET centres. 
 
As for employers’ input, seven employers did not report any form of cooperation in 
VET which they consider to be the state‘s responsibility.  The remaining three 
employers indicated their engagement with the state in some form of VET technical 
cooperation. This is high by regional standards and on a national level it shows an 
improvement in employers‘ role in VET as part of their increased engagement in 
economic growth more generally.  Nevertheless, ETUF and ILO representatives do 
not consider employers‘ input, especially their financial VET contributions, to be 
effective. 
 
Employers‘ unwillingness to invest in VET is supported by a number of reasons.  
First, although Article No.154 of Labour Law No.12/2003 obliges enterprises 
employing more than 10 individuals to pay a training levy (1% of their profits to 
MoMM training fund (AfDB/OECD, 2008)) all of the employers interviewed 
reported they are not paying this levy and have raised court cases against the 
legibility of this article.  Second, the reliance on personal networks and individual 
rather than collective interests in lobbying reduces employers‘ willingness to use 
VET investments as a lobbying tool.  In other instances, personal relations hinder 
potential VET cooperation as one of the employers reported failure to cooperate with 
the state in VET provision in the tourism sector due to unfavourable personal 
relations with state‘s officials in charge.   
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Third, reported low levels of trust reduce employers‘ willingness to share information 
about their enterprises and VET needs with both the state and other employers which 
hamper opportunities for state-employer and employee-employer cooperation.  The 
ineffective enforcement of laws and regulations in Egypt has contributed to this 
problem.  Fourth, the problem of poaching is a major constraint for employers‘ 
investments in VET.  Fifth, low levels of employer-employee interdependence 
support low investments in VET investments.  Finally, employers tend to import 
labour from other countries to counterbalance for VET inefficiencies, an effective 
short term solution but not likely to solve the problem in the long run.  These findings 
conform to the proposition made earlier: Egyptian institutional influences largely 
correspond to the Segmented Business Systems (SBS) institutional features (Wood 
and Frynas, 2006).  
 
ILO representatives call for a better engagement of employers in VET and suggest 
the state needs to put more pressures on employers to enhance their VET 
contributions.  Nevertheless, it is challenging to exert pressures on employers who 
have been increasingly empowered by the neo-liberal orientation to economic 
development since 1990/1.  Hence, the political will to exert such pressures is 
perceived to be largely lacking, at least at this point in time. 
 
 ETUF inputs to VET are perceived by all respondents to be negligible.  Although 
the ETUF has two VET centres, which is relatively high by international standards, 
employers‘ and ILO representatives are critical of their effectiveness.  Employers‘ 
representatives do not expect ETUF to contribute to VET and its development.  Even 
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the only employers‘ representative with favourable perceptions of the GUWC93 VET 
centre was completely unwilling to cooperate with the centre in any way.  
 
ETUF representatives do not perceive VET to be amongst their priorities as, from 
their perspective, there are a number of other ―more important” issues, such as 
demanding wage increases and improving working conditions.  Hence, they do not 
expect an increase in ETUF support and/or inputs to VET.  Two of them already 
reported favourable perceptions of ETUF representation on VET through the 
Supreme Council for Human Resource Development (SCHRD).  The latter however 
is argued by ILO and other international organisations (e.g. ETF and World Bank, 
2006) to be highly ineffective.  Despite the availability of a legal framework that 
empowers SCHRD to act as a tripartite body on VET and its development, the 
council has not been operating in practice.   
 
ILO representatives, unlike employers‘ and unions, recognise the importance of 
workers‘ VET contributions and they call for a better ETUF engagement in VET.  
Nevertheless, they identify the relatively low levels of labour rights in Egypt, 
including the right to freedom of association and collective bargaining94, as amongst 
the major constraints on the effective involvement of workers in VET and other 
labour issues.  All of them agree on the importance of achieving these core rights in 
order to realise effective levels of tripartism that would eventually lead to enhanced 
input and output of VET.   
  
                                                             
93
 General Union for Workers in Construction 
94 Conventions No. 87 and 98 
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7.6.1.1. State-employer-union Cooperation 
The unfavourable perceptions of state, employers‘ and unions‘ input to VET are 
directly and indirectly related to levels of state-employer-union cooperation.  The 
latter is challenged by numerous factors, such as low levels of trust across and 
amongst institutional actors, lack of enforcement of important laws and regulations, 
ineffective pressures on employers, ineffective incentives for workers and other 
challenges indicated in the data analysis.  All of these have led to the development of 
ineffective bipartite and tripartite relationships between these parties and hence their 
mutual participation in VET is largely ineffective.   
 
The problem originates from the incoherent employer-union relationship that lacks 
mutual benefits and trust.  Employers‘ reject any formal means of cooperation with 
unions and workers in VET and/or other issues.  They perceive such cooperation to 
be empowering for workers in ways that will eventually lead to increased labour 
demands and actions hence challenging their productivity and profitability.  
Nevertheless, employers have welcomed only informal engagement of workers, and 
not the ETUF, and three employers have already reported the participation of skilled 
supervisors and workers‘ representatives in developing various areas of production, 
including VET.  
  
Employers are not subject to any pressures from the state to cooperate with workers 
and the state on labour issues,Also, nor is there any effective pressure from the 
ETUF.  The latter has maintained low levels of collective bargaining since its 
establishment and has been further weakened by structural adjustment programmes in 
1990s.  The unwillingness of employers to cooperate with other parties distorts the 
whole equation of state-employer-union cooperation; a feature shared with the SBS 
archetype. 
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7.6.1.2. Positive Experiences 
A few positive experiences were identified from participants‘ responses.  It was noted 
that employers in different sectors showed varied levels of willingness to potentially 
engage in VET.  Employers in the tourism sector were more interested in and willing 
to cooperate with the state and invest in VET development as they are keen on having 
highly skilled labour to keep up with the high levels of international competition.  
This motive is not shared by employers in other sectors and thus they tend to be 
unwilling to invest their own time and/or money in VET.  They call for more 
incentives which further complicate the issue as state subsidies to VET programmes 
are already very high by international standards.   
 
Another positive experience was reported by the EFI representative in the 
construction sector of positive state95-employer-union cooperation in VET in Al 
Marg.  The three parties participated in the identification of VET needs and these 
were matched against employment opportunities offered by employers.  This 
resulted in the development of a new VET programme which proved to be 
successful.  Hence, social dialogue has actually led to effective VET but this 
positive example needs to be replicated on a wider basis.  The capacities and 
willingness of constituents together with the challenges indicated here will 
determine the extent to which such a positive case can be expanded on wider 
levels.   
  
                                                             
95 Represented in MoE as part of MKI. 
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7.6.1.3. Responses on an enterprise level   
Employers in both enterprises are not in favour of state-employer-union 
cooperation in VET.  It is blamed for increased and unwelcomed state and ETUF 
intervention in their business.  They do not rely on state-run VET programmes for 
the provision of skills.  Instead, they look for people willing to learn and provide 
them with their own VET, sometimes from scratch.  The larger the organisation, 
the better its capacity to be self-sufficient in meeting VET needs.  However, some 
external challenges, such as the poaching of workers, are hard to contain and can 
be tackled through better state-employer-union relations. 
 
Workers in the two companies did not indicate any engagement or relationship 
with the ETUF.  Some of them used to be members but they stopped paying the 
membership as their companies are perceived to be providing them with more 
benefits. Nevertheless, it has to be noted that the tourism sector is dominated by 
private employers which have been leading the growth of the sector as a whole.  
For instance, in 2007/08 the contributions of the private sector represented 98% of 
the real GDP growth of the tourism sector (ENCC, 2010).  Therefore, particularly 
in this sector, the ETUF does not play a significant role, bearing in mind that 
almost all of the members of ETUF members are public sector workers who are 
automatically registered in the ETUF upon their recruitment (see Chapter 4).  Also, 
private employers (i) offer more benefits to workers than the ETUF and; (ii) do not 
appreciate the interference of ETUF in their affairs so they prefer if their workforce 
are not members.  The benefits offered to workers are thus decided upon 
informally amongst employers in the sector, as indicated by a senior HR manager 
in one of the companies, as some kind of informal collective agreement on a 
sectoral level.  Yet, since such agreements are not formally binding, the practice of 
poaching of workers is highly common where one organisation offers a better 
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package with more benefits, such as pay, title and others, to attract qualified 
individuals working for another competing organisation. 
 
Workers reported their involvement with an independent workers‘ association: the 
Egyptian Association of Chefs.  It does not represent workers‘ rights and/or 
demands but it is perceived to be active in workers‘ professional development.  
Workers in the two enterprises are keen to invest in their own VET. Even if their 
companies do not financially support them, they still pay for VET courses in the 
Association.  This is mainly because, in the environment of international 
companies, their investments are rewarded in terms of recognition and enhanced 
career opportunities, as reported.  Nevertheless, this tendency cannot be 
generalised to other companies and/or sectors.  It would have been insightful to 
compare these responses with that of workers in the construction company; a large 
Egyptian enterprise, which was dropped as indicated earlier.  This can be an area to 
follow up on in future research.    
   
Finally, employer-worker cooperation in VET on an enterprise level is positively 
perceived by employers and workers.  Workers are involved in the development of 
some VET programmes delivered in their departments; however, the participation 
of workers is largely limited to senior ones.  Senior workers with sufficient 
experience in the field and in the organisation are involved by companies‘ 
management in the process of VET development as management tends to trust 
their inputs and loyalty to the organisation.  This shows that positive employer-
employee interdependence could be realised on an enterprise level if there were 
favourable levels of trust.  
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7.6.2. .Part 2: Perceptions of the ILO SDP and its influence on VET 
ETUF representatives were very supportive of the ILO SDP, which is an expected 
reaction.  Nevertheless, they do not consider the project to have influenced VET 
development in any way.  They also consider progress on the project to be 
hindered employers‘ unwillingness to engage in a dialogue. 
 
Across employers’ representatives, only three were aware of the ILO SDP.  Two 
of them were critical of the project and its attempts to promote a tripartite dialogue 
as they are, as the rest of the employers interviewed, are against any cooperation 
with the ETUF.  Employers have many concerns regarding such a relationship and 
this, more generally, constrains the development of social dialogue in Egypt.  
 
ILO representatives are aware of EFI‘s negative perceptions of and reluctance to 
cooperate in the ILO SDP.  Hence, the ILO started to consider a change in its 
approach96 through the engagement of the Federation of Egyptian Chambers of 
Commerce (FECC97).  Unlike the EFI, the FECC is: (i) only concerned with 
commercial activities and its support to employers is limited in that respect as 
compared to the EFI; for instance, the EFI is normally expected to be directly 
involved in VET but the FECC is not; (ii) not the official representative of 
Egyptian employers on the ILO.  Yet, the FECC seems to be at least more willing 
to engage in the ILO SDP and to meet collectively with the state and union 
representatives. 
 
                                                             
96 The idea of involving the FECC instead of the EFI was still embryonic when the research took place. 
97 The only employers’ representative with positive perceptions of the ILO SDP is also a senior 
member of the FECC; hence, his favourable responses. 
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As indicated by an FECC senior representative, the association agreed to cooperate 
with the ILO as it considers social dialogue to be an important and rewarding 
activity for its member employers adding that it would be ―some kind of activity 
without (the FECC) incurring any costs‖.  Nevertheless, there can be more than 
these reasons for FECC engagement in the project and for the ILO shift to the 
FECC in the first place.  The FECC has the same members as the EFI for the mere 
reason that any industrial activity needs a commercial licence which cannot be 
issued unless the company is a member in the relevant chamber in the FECC as 
stated by the Chamber of Commerce Act No.189/51 and the Commercial 
Registration Law.  However, the board of executives of both associations are 
different.  In other words, different players; heavy weighted private employers, are 
representing each association.  As it has been indicated before by an ILO 
representative, the rejection of the EFI is mainly an issue of leadership; rejection 
from EFI board of executives.  Thus, the decision to shift to the FECC indicates 
that its board of executives is more flexible and responsive to ILO demands.  
Whether the decision of the FECC board to cooperate with the ILO and MoMM in 
promoting social dialogue is based on the perceived benefits to employers in 
particular sectors or across all sectors and/or for personal benefits is unclear, 
though all of these options are probable reasons for FECC cooperation.  Two 
important questions at this point whether the FECC can be considered 
representative of employers in Egypt which is not likely to be the case given the 
size, weight and power of the EFI which cannot be easily replaced; and (ii) 
Whether the engagement of the FECC would lead to a better and more effective 
involvement of employers is still unclear.  On the VET front, unless an effective 
state-employer-union relationship develops, the ILO SDP will not have any direct 
or indirect positive influence on VET development.  
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7.6.2.1. Perceptions on an enterprise level 
On an enterprise level, the situation is worse.  All of the workers failed to 
recognise either the ILO SDP or the ILO itself.  Thus, the extent to which the ILO 
SDP could effectively influence levels of tripartism on an enterprise level and 
eventually VET cannot be reasonably expected to be high on an enterprise level.  
Across the three employers‘ representatives interviewed, only one recognised the 
ILO though he did not recognise the ILO SDP.  Nevertheless, he had negative 
perceptions of ILO activities and its effectiveness.  The Federation of Employers in 
Tourism is not, at least, as representative as it should be of employers and therefore 
ILO efforts do not seem to reach the enterprise level.  It is unrealistic to reach each 
and every enterprise in Egypt but at least employers on the sectoral and enterprise 
levels should be aware of the technical programmes and assistance offered by 
national and international organisations in the field. 
7.6.3. Reasons for the ILO SDP: A viewpoint 
The structural challenges facing state-employer-union cooperation and more 
generally the ILO SDP have been embedded in Egypt‘s institutional configuration 
since the 1950s.  The question raised at this point is why the ILO has launched the 
ILO SDP particularly at this point in time.  Also, it does not seem that the ILO 
SDP came in response to Convention No.87 violations as a mission was sent for 
that purpose in 2009.  Hence, at least the ILO SDP is not officially a response to 
such violations.  I obtained only one explanation from respondents.  I was told off 
the record that such a project was part of a social agenda to promote the position of 
Gamal Mubarak and his concerns for social in addition to economic development 
in support for the presidential election in September 2011.  Also, it is an attempt to 
show the positive steps taken by the state for a more democratic engagement of 
social partners which would enhance Egypt‘s image on the international scene.  
Although this is not a definite reason for the initiation of the project particularly at 
this time, it is a probable one.  
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7.7. REMARKS 
Data analysis and findings answered the second and third research questions.  
Incoherent state-employer-union relations have resulted in ineffective cooperation 
in VET which contributed to the ineffectiveness of the system, as perceived by all 
respondents.  The ILO SDP has effectively led to the improvement of state-
employer-union relations mainly due to employers‘ unwillingness to engage in a 
dialogue with unions.  Such unwillingness is supported by nested institutional 
factors, such as insufficient political will, low trust levels, low employer-employee 
interdependence, weak legislative enforcement other challenges as indicated 
earlier.  In turn, the ILO SDP is not perceived to have influenced VET 
development and it will continue to be ineffective under such an incoherent 
tripartite structure.  Nevertheless, there were positive experiences of (i) effective 
tripartite cooperation in VET in Al Marg; (ii) employers‘ willingness to potentially 
enhance their participation in VET in the tourism sector; and (iii) employer-
employee cooperation in VET provision on an enterprise level.  Hence, the ILO 
SDP can potentially succeed if a bottom-up approach is effectively utilised 
together with current national-level efforts.  The question is whether the ILO 
would have the time and willingness or resources to change its approach to achieve 
better results in the Egyptian context, at least from the viewpoints of its 
constituents. 
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8. CONCLUSION 
 
The policy problem of VET and its development is proved through this study to be 
more than simply one of skill supply and demand mismatches in the labour market.  
The frame of analysis thus needs to be broadened to accommodate key institutional 
influences on VET which are historically entrenched in a largely incoherent 
institutional configuration.  These have continuously marginalised institutional 
actors from effective participation in VET leaving the system and its development 
to the state; which has failed to create effective VET, and to VET development 
projects sponsored by international organisations.   
 
The state has been antagonistic to any form of workers‘ organisation; hence, ETUF 
has been co-opted by the state since its establishment in the 1950s.  Ineffective 
unions therefore did not lead to the development of representative and independent 
employers‘ associations as has generally been the historical sequence 
internationally.  The state has continued to be the main player in VET, as in other 
aspects of the economy, which weakened the VET system.  The latter has suffered 
from (i) the unavailability of reliable and comprehensive labour market 
information; (ii) ineffective pressures on and/or incentives for employers to 
participate in VET; and (iii) lack of incentives for workers to invest in VET.   
 
The state‘s unwillingness to share risks with the private sector was reduced under 
pressures of economic liberalisation from the IMF and the World Bank.  Structural 
adjustment programmes resulted in more complications for VET.  On the one 
hand, it opened the flood gates for Egypt‘s dependence on foreign financial 
assistance.  In the case of VET, the efforts of international organisations have been 
largely based on poorly-adapted European models, such as MKI and TVET 
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Reform Programme.  These will continue to be of limited effectiveness unless key 
institutional inefficiencies influencing VET are addressed.  On the other hand, 
economic liberalisation has (i) empowered a newly developed business elite who 
have gained relatively large state support and benefits; and (ii) further emasculated 
the representation and bargaining position of workers.  These have reinforced 
employers‘ unwillingness to participate both technically and financially in VET as 
almost no pressure is exerted on them from either the state or unions.  Instead, they 
have called for more incentives, which are already very high by international 
standards, for them to consider participating in VET. 
 
These features have been coupled with low levels of trust between institutional 
actors.  This is one of the most evident results of this thesis and is a major 
constraint to establishing effective social dialogue.  There are few clear formal 
rules of the game to govern relationships across and amongst institutional actors 
and whenever these are available they tend to be ineffectively enforced.  These are 
reflected in low levels of (i) employer-employer cooperation on a sectoral level; 
and (ii) employer-employee interdependence on an enterprise level reinforced by a 
paternal system of authority relations.  In turn, workers and employers have had 
little interest to invest in VET and as a result, a vicious cycle of low VET levels, 
low pay, low job tenure, high turnover and hence low investments in VET, has 
been created.  The challenges are magnified in an economy which has a relatively 
large informal sector by regional standards.   
   
Low trust levels are also reflected in employers‘ reluctance to share information 
with the state as they are unclear (i) if other employers with personal connections 
to state officials would share their information as well; and (ii) how and by whom 
such information would be used, for example if other parties including competitors 
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could access these.  These are serious concerns that negatively influence the 
quality of labour market information and consequently VET.  Such tendencies 
could be reduced if the state had put clear regulations on the collection, utilisation 
and dissemination of information across actors and more importantly it needs to 
guarantee the enforcement of these laws.   
 
 
8.1. THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTION  
 
On a theoretical level, the research here confirms that the Egyptian institutional 
environment largely corresponds to that of the SBS archetype suggested by Wood 
and Frynas (2006).  It shares the authoritarian character of the state, its 
interventionist role in economic activities including VET and its antagonism to 
institutional actors.  Unions have been co-opted by the state and as a result 
employers‘ associations have not been effectively developed.  Instead these have 
remained ceremonial bodies that do not represent the business community as a 
whole but rather are dominated by the business elite with close connections to the 
state.  These institutional features have been reinforced by low levels of trust in 
formal institutions which: (i) reduced employer-employer cooperation; and (ii) 
distorted lobbying systems as personal connections have proved to be more 
beneficial than formal routes in realising individual, rather than collective, 
interests.  This latter consideration also applies to union leaders who in turn have 
had little interest in enhancing the representativeness of workers‘ organisations and 
their participation in different issues including VET.  Low trust levels have been 
coupled with a paternalist authority system which has supported low levels of 
employer-employee interdependence.  Hence, employers as well as workers have 
not been motivated to invest in VET.         
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The segmentation of the economy is another feature Egypt shares with the SBS 
archetype.  First, the state exhibits close relationships with business elites and not 
all segments of the business community which has led to increased levels of 
clientelism and corruption.  Second, certain sectors are performing exceptionally 
well in such an inefficient economic environment, such as tourism  which is 
mainly run by the private sector and dominated by international standards.  Third, 
employers‘ willingness to invest in VET tends to be higher in sectors exposed to 
international markets and competition, such as tourism.  More evidence in this area 
needs to be obtained in future research to identify other relatively successful 
segments of the Egyptian economy by expanding the analysis to other sectors and 
to different types and sizes of enterprises in the economy.  
 
I also have suggestions for modifying Whitley‘s (1999) institutional framework.  
First, I suggest a better accommodation of the historical dimension, as it offers a 
deeper understanding of the origins of institutional relationships.  This is important 
for determining the degree to which amendments in some institutional features 
could eventually influence institutional arrangements that affect VET.  In other 
words, historical analysis offers deep insights into key institutional adjustments 
necessary to commence a cycle of effective institutional influences on VET.  For 
example, the minimal role of employers in VET is influenced by weak state-
employer-union relations and a financial system that does not support employers‘ 
engagement in long-term investments such as VET.  These two issues are 
interrelated; however, the historical analysis shows that the political willingness to 
empower institutional actors is more influential in raising employers‘ engagement 
in VET than financial changes.  This is reinforced by recent evidence of 
employers‘ unwillingness to participate in VET even when the state is subsidising 
90% of VET programmes.  Such a deep historical understanding is crucial for 
offering relevant and effective policy solutions. 
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Second, the analysis shows the importance of a better accommodation of the 
political dimension.  This is crucial in clarifying the political considerations 
supporting, or otherwise, certain forms of institutional arrangements.  This is 
shown, for example, in the changes of the ruling coalition between the state, 
employers and labour in the 1970s and later in the 1990s.  The political agenda of 
the Nasserist regime necessitated the maintenance of a social contract between the 
state and labour.  This social contract was abolished in the 1970s in the Sadatist 
era, for political reasons.  Then, in the 1990s stronger ties between the state and 
business elites were developed as the political agenda became focused on 
economic liberalisation.  Hence, the current state-employer-union relationship is 
not expected to change unless it is accompanied with a change in the political 
agenda, and here the events of early 2011 may prove relevant.      
 
Third, the role of international organisations had not been emphasised in the early 
works of Whitley (1992; 1999).  Wood and Frynas (2006) referred to the influence 
of international organisations on economic development in East Africa, but these 
were not included in the suggested institutional framework, an indication of their 
limited influence on institutional structures.  Our results to some extent confirm 
this orientation.  The ILO SDP is not perceived to have been effective since its 
establishment in 2008 to enhance cooperation and dialogue between social 
partners.  The project is challenged by a historically rooted set of incoherent 
institutional structures.  Thus, in theory the ILO SDP is working on a major 
institutional change but in practice its effectiveness has been limited.  This 
tendency confirms the idea of institutional stickiness (Boettke, Coyne and Leeson, 
2008).  The ILO SDP is considered to be a Foreign–Introduced Exogenous (FEX) 
Institution with limited stickiness or ability to take hold within the Egyptian 
institutional environment.   
 
291 
 
Nevertheless, other international organisations which offer financial rather than 
technical assistance, most notably the IMF and World Bank, have had a strong 
influence on the Egyptian economy since the structural adjustment programme in 
1990/1.  The new wave of economic liberalisation brought about by these 
organisations through privatisation and other policies has enabled a certain set of 
investors and state/business elites to maximise economic gains by focusing on 
certain profitable sectors which has created disparities in economic efficiencies 
across different segments of the economy.  Such segmentation was fuelled by 
ineffective bureaucracies, corruption and more generally institutional 
inefficiencies.  With regards to VET in particular, economic liberalisation has 
negatively influenced chances for the development of the already incoherent 
tripartite relationships in Egypt which in turn has been unfavourable to VET and 
its development.  Therefore, I propose the inclusion of state relations with 
international organisations as one of the main influences characterising state 
relations with key institutional actors in developing countries.  This is because 
although international organisations have not directly influenced institutional 
structures, as shown by the low levels of stickiness of the ILO SDP, these 
organisations especially those offering financial assistance have influenced key 
institutional relationships particularly state relations with workers and employers. 
 
8.2. POLICY CONCLUSIONS 
 
State-employer-union relationships necessary for an effective development of VET 
are constrained by the institutional inefficiencies indicated above.  These are 
reflected in the challenges facing the ILO SDP; most notably, the employers‘ 
unwillingness to participate in social dialogue.  This is not surprising given (i) the 
high levels of state support to employers (yet they ask to be incentivised to engage 
in ILO SDP); and (ii) ineffective pressures from both ETUF and the state.  Hence, 
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the effectiveness of the project is highly dependent on the state‘s political 
willingness to (i) put effective pressures on employers; and (ii) to empower ETUF 
so it would also put pressure on employers.  The latter option has been rejected 
since the 1950s which reduce the chances of it being supported   under the same 
state policies which ruled until early 2011.  The former measure is more 
problematic given the state‘s new direction towards economic liberalisation.  The 
state needs to balance two contradictory influences; (i) neoliberal policies under 
the ESRAP that empowers employers; and (ii) ILO agenda that supports social 
welfare and aims at empowering workers (at least in theory).  These decisions 
would determine (i) the extent to which the state would enforce key institutional 
actors; (ii) establish an effective dialogue with and amongst these actors; and (iii) 
eventually engage them in VET and its development.   
 
The empowerment of workers and unions has been rejected since the 1950s.  
Hence, it would have been impossible to achieve under the Mubarak regime and in 
this situation the ILO SDP would have been a waste of valuable resources as an 
effective dialogue between independent parties could have been impossible to 
realise.  Nevertheless, the 2011 Egyptian Revolution suggests possibilities for 
changes in favour of social dialogue.  These   were already particularly evident in 
workers‘ organisation before the 2011 events. In 2006 workers‘ organisation 
gained a new momentum with the establishment of the first independent union 
since the 1950s.  The new form of workers‘ organisation is largely democratic in 
its leadership and, unlike ETUF, is representative of workers on a grassroots level 
and has succeeded in voicing and winning their demands.  Now, with the abolition 
of the current structure of the ETUF along with the Mubarak regime, there are high 
chances of such democratic organisation of workers becoming more prevalent.  
This can lead to an empowered position of workers which could enhance state-
employer-union relations, develop social dialogue and hence the prospects of 
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having unions as useful partners in VET.  The ILO needs to provide effective 
support to the development of independent unions.  The new circumstances offer 
better chances for the enforcement of Conventions 87 and 98 which Egypt has not 
previously observed. 
 
The ILO can also make use of the positive influences identified with employers.  
There are instances of effective employer-employer cooperation on a regional 
level; 6th of October City, such as the provision of housing to workers and their 
families.  This means there are chances for them to extend cooperation to VET.  
The instance of tripartite cooperation in the small region of Al Marg also proved to 
be beneficial for VET development in the region.  The ILO could study the 
conditions of such a positive experience and expand it accordingly.  Hence, the 
ILO can utilise such a bottom-up approach to support its ILO SDP from a 
grassroots level upwards.  This needs to complement rather than replace ILO 
efforts on the national level.   
  
It was also noticed that employers tend to be more willing to invest in VET if there 
are high levels of competition, as in the tourism sector which faces severe 
international competition.  Hence, the effective enforcement of quality standards 
on a national level  could enhance national competitiveness.  The ILO is already 
supporting Egypt in that respect through SECTOR which intersects with the ILO 
SDP.  The enforcement of other laws; most notably minimum wage levels, training 
levy and working licence would (i) enhance employers‘ contributions to VET; (ii) 
motivate workers to invest in VET to obtain the working licence; and (iii) help 
reduce problems of poaching.  All of these would eventually lead to an effective 
development of VET.    
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Finally, the study offers some policy recommendations to the Egyptian state.  As 
illustrated through this research, VET development could play a major role in 
Egypt‘s socio-economic development.  First, an effective VET system would 
directly contribute to enhancing the effectiveness of the business environment and 
the economy‘s international competitiveness.  Second, it would contribute to 
reducing unemployment especially amongst the youth (which was one of the main 
reasons for 2011 events).  Thus, the state needs to commence a programme for an 
effective VET development that is not limited to the supply/demand mismatch 
analysis but that expands to recognise other institutional factors and relationships 
as suggested by our broader analytic framework.  This new programme could 
largely benefit from the potential effective representation of civil society and social 
actors in socio-economic matters post 2011 events.  Hence, VET would have more 
opportunities to benefit from an effective representation of workers‘ and 
employers‘ organisations.  The new regime needs to support these new 
opportunities through an effective enforcement of the regulatory framework as 
indicated earlier.  There are some institutional factors that would be more 
challenging to alter, such as reliance on personal relations and networks.  
Nevertheless, these can be utilised in a constructive manner under an effective 
legal framework to enhance trust levels amongst and across institutional actors on 
grassroots levels.  These are suggested by Matinsons‘ theory of institutional 
deficiencies and proven from our examples on an enterprise level and on a regional 
level; Al Marg.  
 
 
8.3. FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
On an institutional level, the proposition that Egypt falls within the SBS category 
needs to be verified in future research by a large scale study of business system 
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characteristics on an enterprise level through a representative sample of the 
different types and sized of enterprises in Egypt.  It is also important to study of 
the influence of the 2011 Egyptian revolution on levels of democratisation, 
independence and engagement of social partners.  According to institutional 
theory, institutional change is a difficult and long-term process.  It can be realised 
with different degrees of efficiency, as in the experiences of transition economies.  
Hence, a longitudinal study of any changes in institutional arrangements and/or 
role of institutional actors including ILO efforts to enhance tripartism would be 
interesting.   
 
Future research could also focus on the positive examples of regional employer-
employer cooperation to assess whether these could lead to effective participation 
in VET and gain deeper insights into the reasons leading to such exceptional 
cooperation levels.  The extent to which similar cooperative levels would be 
available after the revolution is another area of investigation.  These could be 
verified across various sectors with different levels of exposure to international 
competition to test the propositions I made earlier.  
 
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), which have been constrained by state 
antagonism to intermediaries under past regimes, could also become more 
empowered as a result of the Egyptian revolution.  There are chances for 
expanding their contributions to VET as a result and these could be grouped under 
a representative body to coordinate their activities and enhance efficiency.  These 
could represent grassroots institutional influences on VET that could possibly be 
added to Whitley‘s framework in developing countries.  Also, some benefits could 
extend to the informal economy as the enhanced levels of freedom of association 
could allow for unions to emerge in this sector.  These could possibly act as social 
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partners in that significant sector of the economy which would have positive 
influences on VET.  All of these issues require further investigation.  
 
A final proposition is made with regards to the possibility of financing VET 
projects from the money of Zakah which can be invested in a training fund to 
support VET and its development.  Zakah is, simply, a contribution of the affluent 
to less privileged individuals within the society according to a number of criteria 
that define the degree of affluence, amount of contributions and other issues.  This 
can act as a short- to medium-term solution to the problem of ineffective 
employers‘ financial contributions to VET and workers‘ reluctance and inability to 
make VET investments.  These propositions need to be considered in relation to 
other institutional arrangements to assess the possibility of its inclusion as one of 
the institutional features of Egypt, and possibly other similar countries in MENA, 
in a way that would contribute to institutional theory in developing countries.   
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APPENDIX A: List of respondents 
No. Phase Category Department/Sector Number 
of 
interviews 
1.  Phase (I) State 
representatives 
Industrial Training Centre – 
senior representative** 
2 
2.  Ministry of Education - 
senior representative** 
1 
3.  Industrial Training Centre – 
senior representative (wood 
and woodworks council) 
1 
4.  Ministry of Manpower and 
Migration - senior 
consultant** 
1 
5.  Training Organisation of the 
Ministry of Housing and 
Reconstruction – senior 
trainer 
1 
6.  Ministry of Housing and 
Reconstruction – senior 
representative (VET 
department) ** 
1 
7.  Employers‘ 
representatives 
Water and wastewater 
holding company  
1 
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8.  Senior HR consultant (works 
with companies in different 
sectors) 
1 
9.  Phase (II) State 
representatives 
Industrial Training Centre – 
senior representative** 
1 
10.  Ministry of Education - 
senior representative** 
1 
11.  Ministry of Manpower and 
Migration - senior 
consultant** 
1 
12.  Ministry of Housing and 
Reconstruction – senior 
representative (VET 
department)** 
1 
13.  Phase (II) 
– Pilot 
studies 
Workers‘ 
representative 
A worker in textile sector 1 
14.  A worker in real estate (the 
independent trade union) 
1 
15.  A worker in construction 1 
16.  Phase (III) Employers‘ 
representative 
(from the 
Egyptian 
Federation of 
Food and beverages 1 
17.  Building and Construction 1 
18.  Tourism 1 
19.  Mining  1 
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20.  Industries Building and Construction 1 
21.  Tourism 1 
22.  Textiles 1 
23.  Building and Construction 1 
24.  Tourism 1 
25.  Employers‘ 
representative 
(from the 
Federation of 
Egyptian 
Chambers of 
Commerce 
Commercial activities 1 
26.   Employers‘ 
representatives 
(enterprise level) 
Senior HR manager – 
International hotel chain 
1 
27.  Senior HR manager – 
International hotel chain 
1 
28.  Department manager – 
International Hotel Chain 
1 
29.   Workers‘ 
representatives 
(from the ETUF) 
Senior representative of the 
ETUF 
1 
30.  General Trade Union of 
workers of land transport 
1 
31.  General Union for Tourism 1 
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32.  General Trade Union for 
Engineering Industries and 
Minerals 
1 
33.  General Trade Union for the 
construction and timber 
industries 
1 
34.   Workers at an 
enterprise level 
4 workers in the kitchen 
department 
1 
35.  4 workers in the kitchen 
department (one did not 
show up) 
1 
36.   ILO 
representatives -
Cairo 
Senior representative – 
Social Dialogue 
3 
37.  Senior Specialist, Workers' 
Activities 
1 
38.  Senior Specialist, Skills and 
Employability 
1 
39.  Specialist, International 
labour Standards and Labour 
Law 
1 
40.   ILO 
representatives - 
Geneva 
Senior representative from 
DIALOGUE 
1 
41.  SECTOR - Hotels, Catering 
and Tourism Specialist 
2 
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42.  Specialist , Bureau for 
Employers‘ Activities 
1 
43.  SECTOR - Textiles, 
Clothing and Footwear 
Specialist 
1 
44.  DIALOGUE – Senior 
International labour 
Standards and Labour Law 
specialist 
2 
45.  Dialogue - Senior Industrial 
and Employment Relations 
Specialist 
1 
46.  Senior Declaration Officer 1 
47.   State 
representatives 
Ministry of Education 1 
48.  Ministry of Manpower and 
Migration (VET specialist) 
1 
49.   Specialists and 
experts in the 
field  
Labour market economist, 
Cairo University 
1 
50.  Gtz representative in Cairo 
(Mubarak-Kohl Programme) 
1 
51.  Better Work representative 
(ILO/IFC partnership) 
1 
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52.  Consultant – MoMM 1 
53.  Economist, American 
University in Cairo 
1 
54.  Financial markets, specialist 1 
TOTAL  57 + 2 
Focus 
Groups 
 
**Follow-up interviews with respondents in Phase II. 
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   APPENDIX B: Sample Frame 
  Table 1: ILO representatives in SRO-Cairo and HQ-Geneva 
 Title Location 
1 CTA, Social Dialogue Project in Egypt SRO - Cairo 
2 Director of the Industrial and Employment 
Relations Department  
HQ – Geneva 
(DIALOGUE) 
3 Hotels, Catering and Tourism Specialist HQ – Geneva 
(SECTOR) 
4 Textiles, Clothing and Footwear Specialist HQ – Geneva 
(SECTOR) 
5 Director of Labour Administration and 
Labour Inspection Programme 
HQ – Geneva  
(LAB/ADMIN) 
6 Labour Administration/Inspection Officer HQ – Geneva  
(LAB/ADMIN) 
7 Specialist, International labour Standards 
and Labour Law 
SRO - Cairo 
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8 Senior Specialist, Workers' Activities SRO - Cairo 
9 Senior Specialist, Skills and Employability SRO – Cairo 
(EMP/SKILLS) 
10 Representative of the Bureau for 
Employers‘ Activities  
 
HQ - Geneva 
ACT/EMP 
Source: The International Labour Organization, 2010 
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Table 2: EFT sixteen chambers, Chambers’ Chairmen and General Directors 
No. Chamber No. Chamber 
1 Cereals and its products 9 Building Materials industries 
2 Cinema Industry 10 Chemical Industries 
3 Food Industries 11 Engineering Industries 
4 Leather Industry 12 Information Technology and 
Communication  
5 Metallurgical Industries 13 Leather Tanning 
6 Pharmaceutical Cosmetics and 
Appliances 
14 Petroleum and Mining 
Industries 
7 Private Sector Healthcare 
providers 
15 Printing Industries 
8 Wood Working and Furniture 
Industries 
16 Textile Industries 
Source: The Egyptian Federation of Industries  
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 Table 3: Members unions of the ETUF and unions’ chairmen 
No. General Union No. General Union 
1. General Union of Agriculture and 
Irrigation, fishing and land 
reclamation 
13. General Trade Union of workers 
of land transport 
2. General Union of Textile Workers 14. General Trade Union of 
Maritime Transport 
3. General Union of Workers Trade 15. General Trade Union of Air 
Transport 
4. General Union of banks, insurance 
and financial businesses 
16. General Trade Union of 
Chemicals 
5. General Trade Union of Railway 
Workers 
17. General Trade Union of workers 
in mines and quarries 
6. General Trade Union of Public 
Communication  
18. General Union for Press, Printing 
and Information 
7. General Trade Union of Public 
Utilities 
19. General Union for Tourism 
8. General Trade Union of workers in 20. General Trade Union of 
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Education and Scientific Research administrative services and social 
9. General Trade Union of Health 
Services workers 
21. General Trade Union of Military 
Industry  
10. General Union of workers in food 
industries 
22. General Union for Postal services 
11. General Trade Union for Engineering 
Industries and Minerals 
23. General Trade Union of 
Petroleum 
12. General Trade Union for the 
construction and timber industries 
  
Source: The Egyptian Trade Union Federation, 2010 (Translated)  
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